



MY UCLA CHANCELLORSHIP: AN UTTERLY CANDID VIEW

Franklin D. Murphy

Interviewed by James V. Mink

Completed under the auspices
of the
Oral History Program
University of California

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INTRODUCTION

Oral history is the perfect medium for Franklin Murphy, for he is a notably vocal person. Even in this transcript you can sense the optimistic timbre of his voice and the convincing rush of his words. I often had the impression that he thought in the press of argument and lively discussion rather than in quiet reflection. He seemed frequently in the warmth of conversation or in the midst of an impromptu speech to hear himself suddenly expressing an opinion or an idea quite as unexpected and convincing to himself as to his audience. I don't recall him ever reading a prepared speech; he would have considered that constricting. The barest of last minute notes sufficed for pointed and compelling public oratory. He would dictate a letter on an administrative matter if need be, but he preferred to get you on the phone or corner you at a cocktail party for an intense business discussion. Intensity and whirlwind activity were hallmarks of his style during the almost twenty years that I worked with him as his university librarian at both the University of Kansas and UCLA. His remarkable administrative assistant Hansena Fredrickson put it most aptly when she said somewhere, as I recall it, that he was the only boss she knew who could enter a room through two different doors simultaneously;

and I would add, talking forcefully if not fiercely.

Franklin Murphy's remarkable contribution to American higher education is implicit in this colorful and frank interview, but it deserves to be stated explicitly. Other men, but probably not very many, have presided over more than one university. But very likely no one else has consecutively taken on two rather subdued or dispirited universities and in short order pressed them to a national level of distinction (in UCLA's case even international distinction) by the sheer force of his personal conviction, the power of his vocal argument, his utter impatience with dullness or the second rate, his innate sense of timing, his political acumen, and his administrative drive. He gave not just leadership, but more importantly, a strong sense of pride and heart to both KU and UCLA. I think it actually the case that both universities were transformed by Franklin Murphy's personal dynamism; this was not abstract administrative principles and ability so much as personal style.

As with most of us, Franklin Murphy used certain symbols to rally his cause. The "free marketplace of ideas" was one. Another, as I can especially testify, was that library quality is the best measuring stick for university distinction. Both in Lawrence and in Los Angeles he used this symbol with brilliant success--convincing alumni, the general

public, legislators, and even some narrow faculty members that a great library, including scarce and valuable books, is essential to academic quality. And for him this was no abstract belief. He reads widely, rapidly, and purposefully, and he himself was turned to book collecting, while he was a student, by a colorful Kansas City antiquarian bookseller, the late Frank Glenn.

But as is evident in this interview, he has other passionate interests, particularly in the arts, and he is always attracted by people or programs that combine brilliance and enthusiasm with sheer knowledge. When he found such a combination in a program, such as modern sculpture or ethnic arts, or in the person of such scholars as a Donald O'Malley, Lynn White, or Milton Anastos, Murphy as chancellor could be counted on for an equal measure of enthusiasm and for generous support, both moral and practical.

The UCLA sculpture garden is most fittingly marked with his name, as is the music building at the University of Kansas, for they are true indicators of his enthusiasms. It is equally fitting that UCLA's administration building should bear his name. Often such a designation might be pro forma, but in this case it correctly recalls that Franklin Murphy gave meaning and power to the office of chancellor at UCLA, and thus to campus administration, in

a unique and enduring way.

Franklin David Murphy was born January 29, 1916 in Kansas City, Missouri, the son of a physician father and a musician mother. After taking his A.B. at the University of Kansas in 1936, he went on for his M.D. at the University of Pennsylvania, 1941, where he interned and taught as an instructor for two years. In 1946 he returned to his alma mater, as instructor in the University of Kansas School of Medicine. Within two years his meteoric administrative career began, with appointment as dean of the school in 1948. His drive to carry the skills and graduates of the school to the small towns and rural communities of Kansas was so successful in all ways, including political ways, that in 1951 he was called to Lawrence as chancellor of the university. The story of that career from 1951 to 1960, as well as the subsequent career at UCLA as chancellor from 1960 to 1968, is sharply delineated in this oral history interview. Then his innate sense of timing shifted him into a different milieu, where I hope he is equally successful, innovative, demanding, and personally involved, as chairman of the board and chief executive officer of the Times-Mirror Corporation.

UCLA, 1976

ROBERT VOSPER
Director of the
William Andrews Clark
Memorial Library

INTERVIEW HISTORY

INTERVIEWER: James V. Mink, University Archivist and Head, Department of Special Collections, UCLA Library. BA, MA, History, UCLA; BLS, University of California, Berkeley; Certificate in Archival Administration and Preservation, American University, Washington, D.C.

TIME AND SETTING OF INTERVIEW:

Place: The library of Franklin D. Murphy's home at 419 Robert Lane, Trousdale Estates, Beverly Hills.

Dates: October 18, 19, November 15, December 6, 26, 1973.

Time of day, length of sessions, and total number of recording hours: The interviews took place in the midafternoon, with sessions varying from a half-hour to two and one-half hours in length. Total recording time for the interview was eight hours and fifteen minutes.

Persons present during interviews: Mink and Murphy. Mrs. (Judy) Murphy was present at the session of October 19. Joel Gardner was present December 6 to operate the video equipment.

CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEW:

In preparation, the interviewer perused scrapbooks and records from the Office of the Chancellor and sought questions from university associates of Franklin Murphy, such as Andrew Hamilton, former director of the Office of Public Information. The interviewer set out to pursue a biographical framework; however, Dr. Murphy preferred to begin his memoir at the moment of his first notification that UCLA would be interested in bringing him west to be chancellor.

With biographical details filled in and interspersed, the narrative continued chronologically with the Murphys' arrival at UCLA and the many problems faced by the new chancellor in developing autonomy for the campus. He described in detail his interplay with Clark Kerr, president of the University of

California. The interviewer then employed a subject-by-subject approach to the Murphy years at UCLA, including the chancellor's particular interest in the professional schools, athletics, alumni affairs, and the fine arts, especially the Franklin D. Murphy Sculpture Garden and the Museum of Cultural History. The interview concluded with a look at the state of education in the sixties and seventies and the administrative successor to Dr. Murphy, Charles Young.

EDITING:

Editing was done by Joel Gardner, editor, UCLA Oral History Program. The verbatim transcript of the interview was checked against the original tape recordings and edited for punctuation, paragraphing, correct spelling, and verification of proper and place names. The final manuscript remains in the same order as the original taped material. Words and phrases inserted by the editor have been bracketed.

Dr. Murphy reviewed and approved the edited transcript of his interview. He made minor corrections and deletions and also supplied spellings of names that had not been verified previously.

Joel Gardner compiled the index and prepared other front matter. Robert Vosper, former university librarian at both the University of Kansas and UCLA, wrote the introduction. The manuscript was reviewed by the interviewer and by Bernard Galm, director of the Program, before it was typed in final form.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS:

The original tape recordings, video tape segment (December 6, 1973), and edited transcript of the interview are in the University Archives and are available under the regulations governing the use of noncurrent records of the University.

TAPE NUMBER: I, Side 1

OCTOBER 18, 1973

MINK: I'd understood that you were high on the list of possible nominees for the presidency of the university. Did you get any feedback on that?

MURPHY: You mean at the time of Bob Sproul?

MINK: At the time that Bob Sproul retired.

MURPHY: No, as a matter of fact, I knew nothing about that until I had come to California. It was subsequently that both Ed Pauley and Ed Carter told me that at the time Bob retired, they had in the pot my name. They had a lot of names, but as I recall, when it came down to the wire, as it were, they had John Gardner; they had myself; I think they had McGeorge Bundy, who was then dean at Harvard; and Clark Kerr, who was chancellor at Berkeley at the time. I was told by Ed Pauley that my name got into the pot--that Bob Sproul put it in. I also remember that Ed told me that at that time he had talked to Harry Truman, who was an old friend of his and an old, old friend of mine, and that Truman had strongly recommended that the regents ask me to go to Berkeley as president. But, I never knew anything about this until after I'd been at UCLA for several years.

MINK: While you were the chancellor at the University of

Kansas, it was asserted by the press that you were at odds with Governor [George] Docking.

MURPHY: I was.

MINK: And I wonder if you could give some of the background of this activity, possibly as a comparison with some of the things that you faced at UCLA later.

MURPHY: Well, George Docking was a very peculiar man. He lived in Lawrence, Kansas; he was the head of a bank there. But he was a man who, over the years, had become known as a person with an ungovernable temper, an unpredictable quirk about him. You couldn't know which direction he was going. The result was, in that little university town of Lawrence--long before I ever got there--he was never asked by the establishment, as it were, related to the university, to get on commissions involving the university. In short, the establishment rejected him, because he did have this reputation of losing his temper ungovernably, even physically striking out sometimes. This was his greatest, greatest problem--his temper. And people just didn't want him around. He had developed over the years, therefore, a covert hatred of the university, because, as I say, he was never drawn in--to be an alumni member of the Athletic Board or an alumni member of the Union Operating Committee or these kinds of things--whereas the other members of the civilian establishment

in Lawrence who were alumni of the university were involved. In fact, they were the ones that sort of black-balled him out because of this quirk of temper.

Well, when I became chancellor, I met George. I went to Lawrence. I got along with him well, George Docking, and his wife especially. My wife and I were very fond of his wife, Virginia. As a result of a variety of political circumstances that are unnecessary to relate, Docking ran as a Democrat for governor in Kansas and was elected because the Republicans had torn themselves asunder. (A Democratic governor in Kansas, until recently, has been as rare as snow in June in Kansas. This was a freak thing, politically.) Then almost right after he became governor (he was elected in the fall), the university budget was up for processing, as it were, by the governor's office before it went to the legislature in January. And to my amazement and enormous surprise, he took some bitter, bitter cuts at the budget--unreasonable, unnecessary. I went up and talked to him about it, asked him what was up, and was astonished to see this venom pour out: "This goddamned university, now they'll know who George Docking is." Really, in effect he was saying, "I'll get back at you guys after the way you have ignored me"--not me personally, but the university.

Well, it was clear to me that I had to get major

restorations by the legislature in the budget. And I had to get them. The legislature was Republican, but the Republican majority was not quite large enough to override a governor's veto. So I had to get not only the Republican majority to agree to these restorations, but I had to get enough Democrats to vote with the Republicans to override what I assumed was a predictable gubernatorial veto. And I set out to do just that. I mobilized our alumni; I organized the state; I personally went to friends of mine. I had been a graduate of the University of Kansas; by that time, many of my classmates at the university were now publishers, even in the legislature--even some Democrats in the legislature. I reminded them of our long-standing friendship, and to make a long story short, the legislature restored these unreasonable cuts. Docking vetoed them, and they overrode the veto. And this absolutely infuriated him.

From that point on, he set out really to get me. It became now not a university vendetta, but a personal vendetta. The Kansas legislature, even in those days, met annually. They had biennial sessions for general legislation and budget, but they also had an annual budget session. So for four consecutive years, I had to go through this exercise of getting restorations in our budget and getting overrides of his veto, involving

getting Democrats to incur his wrath and rage, enough to override the veto.

Well, this man, as I say, had an ungovernable temper. There are a number of little interesting episodes. For example, one of his close friends was a man called Louis Oswald, who was a lawyer in Hutchinson--very close to Docking and had been, and supported him in his campaigns and so on. Oswald was a friend of mine, but most of all he loved the university. One night he related this story to me: One night he was at the governor's mansion and he was at dinner with Docking and his wife, Virginia, and his son, Bob--who is now governor of Kansas, interestingly. There were the four of them at dinner, and Louis Oswald brought up the question, why didn't George stop this vendetta? that he was only hurting himself, that the university was important to the state. His wife then chimed in and said, "George, Louis is absolutely right;" and his son said, "Dad, look, enough's enough. Now let's get on with the business of the state." Whereupon George got up, face red, absolutely enraged, irrational, accused them all of letting him down, physically knocked his wife aside--she fell to the floor--and said that he never wanted to see any of them again, they were all.... And very profane. Well, this went on, and he gradually began to attack me publicly and imply that I was dishonest.

When the press pressed him on that he got off it, because he couldn't prove it.

But this episode happened: A very, very close friend of mine, Joe McDowell, a Democrat who was a state senator and very powerful in the state senate--I think he was the minority leader in the state senate--called me up one day and said he wanted to see me privately. He was from Kansas City, Kansas. The next time I was down, I went to see him. He said, "Franklin, listen. You must be very careful." I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "Now, look, I don't know anything about your private life. But," he said, "anywhere around here, the Middle West, don't you dare have anybody in your hotel room, any female who's not your wife." And he said, "Secondly, if you're in a hotel somewhere--Wichita, Topeka, Garden City or something--and you hear a knock on the door, don't let anybody in until you inquire who they are." I said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "I wouldn't be at all surprised if some night you hear a knock on the door and a lady will say, 'Can I come in? I must use your phone,' or something, close the door, promptly tear her clothes off, and scream bloody murder." I said, "Joe, you can't be serious!" He said, "I'm deadly serious."

Another legislator came to me and said, "Look, do you keep close tabs on your expense accounts when you

travel?" And I said, "Yes. Well, I'm supposed to." He said, "You'd better keep very close tabs on these expense accounts. And secondly," he said, "where do you keep them?" I said, "I keep them in my office file." "Well," he said, "you'd better make duplicates of these files, because someday those office files may be rifled, and there won't be any documentary material; and then you'll be accused of misuse, and you won't have any documentary material to furnish us."

So it was at this level. Now, in all fairness, none of those things ever happened. But these were very responsible people who were telling me this.

Now, the governor really put pressure. The only way I could get these vetos overridden--because the university would have been destroyed, really, the budget cuts he was playing around with--and the only way I could get any real support in this regard was to be out in the state all the time, talking to Rotary clubs and this and that and the other thing, talking to publishers, because Docking, with his press conferences, would imply that money was being wasted at the university. He would take things out of context. I remember once he talked about our buying some rare book and implied that we were spending all this money on only rare books--stuff like that.

Well, in the end, he finally created a situation

which made it clear to me that it was not possible for me to effectively run the university, because given the technique of appointing regents, he had proceeded after four years to get a majority on the board. Now, I was handicapped not only by his vetoes there, but by his instructions to the board to do certain things with our budget. And although I had more success with the board, I had some real problems with it. So I finally decided that the best way that the university could be served would be for me to go on.

Now, I'd made up my mind to this some time before I got the approaches from UCLA. I will say also--and I'll come to that in a minute, let me just finish this-- I also had been told by this time that Docking, stupidly, had put himself in a position of making me a kind of martyr. The unfairness of his attacks were now beginning to accumulate--and publishers were telling me this, my newspaper friends around--but the irrational character of this man, his hatred, and all the rest of it were such that he was oblivious to this. It was clear to me that the only way the university--and, for that matter, all of higher education in Kansas--could really get going again, in a sense, would be for Docking to be driven out of office. He was very popular because he ran on a program over and over again of cutting taxes and keeping

down expenses and all this sort of thing. Kansas is basically a conservative state.

So a lot of my friends told me that they hoped I wouldn't resign, but they always said, "If you resign"--Docking had announced he was going to run again--"you don't realize how you have gotten the affection of the people of the state, the alumni and so on. It's going to do terrible political violence to him." So I made up my mind that some time in 1960, prior to the election, I was going to quit, resign. Now, I had, at that time, offers from at least two universities. I'd also been giving some thought about going back to Washington, because I'd been importuned from time to time. I wasn't so high on that, and you know, this had been very erosive to my quietude; I'd just been under this pressure all this time. I was part of a group that for many years went to South America, a group called CHEAR. Clark Kerr was in that group. And in spring of 1960, there was a meeting in Chile. Clark took me aside, and he said, "Look, we're looking for a chancellor at UCLA. The regents have had a committee and everything, scoured the situation, and you're their number one choice. Would you be interested in coming to UCLA as chancellor?" I'd always been attracted to California for a number of reasons--as a symbol, you know. It seemed to me this was a state which was on the

move, this sort of thing. Although I'd spent most of my life in the East and Midwest, my sister lived out here. I had happy memories of college when I had a summer session at UCLA. I remembered the campus then. I'd been on it subsequently when Kansas played UCLA at football in 1958. Ray Allen was still chancellor. So I said I'd look at it. And I came out twice, brought Judy, and finally decided--and I'll get into that later--that I'd really like to try. And the reasons I was convinced of this, as I say, I'll get in later.

Well, then I went back and announced the fact that I was leaving. And there was a huge press uproar. I think all the press clippings--somebody kept them for me--the editorials, are over in the library, and you've got some flavor of the reaction in the state. They really came down on Docking. I never accused Docking in any of my statements. I simply said, "I've been here eight years; I think it's time to go on. It's time to get some fresh blood." Never mentioned him, because I really wanted to destroy him in the process of my leaving, and I knew to get in a fight with him would not help destroy him. And I say that flatly. I'm sure there was some personal rancor by that time, but at least my rationalization was that this university is going to be in trouble as long as he's governor. And I was, needless to say,

enormously pleased when he came up for reelection a third time and was badly beaten. And although I'll take no credit for it, a lot of the editorial writers at the time the next morning said that he'd gotten his comeuppance in a large measure because of this.

It was a strange thing. His wife, during all that period, would get messages to me and my wife indirectly: "Look, I don't understand this; I hope you and Judy understand I'm not a part of it; there's nothing I can do." His son used to get messages to me indirectly. We'd been fraternity brothers, members of the same fraternity, at Kansas. Since Bob Docking has been governor in Kansas, he has been very good to the university. He has, on more than one occasion, consulted with me about university requests and some major programs in expanding the medical school. And I think, in retrospect, I've been, in a way, helpful to the University of Kansas, just because of Bob's desire to erase that blot from a Docking family member.

It was a moment in my life that was exciting, because you were in a real struggle and a battle, and that keeps your blood boiling. It was very enervating, however.

MINK: You said it was disturbing to your quietude. I wonder if, just for the record, you would go on now to describe this transition from Kansas to UCLA: the activities that you were involved in, the trips, the people

you saw, the bases you touched.

MURPHY: Good. Let me say first of all, however, that I had gotten into education administration very early in my life. I became dean of the University of Kansas School of Medicine when I was thirty-two years old. And the job there was to really rehabilitate a medical school that had fallen on bad times because of the fact that there had been no change in administration for twenty-five years--no new ideas, no nothing. Immediately I was plunged up to my ears in legislative manipulation and money-raising and curricular reconstruction and leading a faculty toward reforming itself. I left that job after three years because Dean [D.W.] Malott, the man who got me into it, left and went to Cornell; and the regents said, "You've now got to come and run the whole university." In the process of running the University of Kansas, and looking back on the medical school experience, I suddenly began to realize that running a large educational institution is not a lifetime job anymore, that due to the complexity of the problem and the pressures that current society makes possible, that a person, in doing innovative things and in pushing an institution forward, not only must give out an enormous amount of energy--emotional and physical--but he also creates scars. And they accumulate. So I gradually had gotten to the notion that with or without

George Docking, ten or twelve years, I used to say to myself, is as long as a person ought to stay in one higher educational job.

And let me say here in advance why I left UCLA: that my years at UCLA, nine, had convinced me that my original suspicions when I was at Kansas were absolutely valid; that nobody--and I can say this flatly now--in my view, ought to be in a position of top leadership in a university for more than ten and at most twelve years, regardless of age. I must say that this attitude is growing. Barney Keeney left Brown on these grounds. The man at Yale at the moment, Kingman Brewster, has told me plainly this is clearly his view. Bob Goheen left Princeton well before his retirement age because of the same attitude. And that was partly in my mind. I suspect, I repeat, if George Docking had not been there, within two more years I would have probably gone elsewhere.

Okay, now UCLA. How did I get here? Well, right at this time, as I told you, I had been one of the founding members of something called CHEAR, Commission on Higher Education in American Republics, a group of university presidents funded by the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation. We'd go every year to South America, meet with our colleagues down there, and commonly discuss problems in both hemispheres in higher

education. I'd become chairman of the group and also head of the executive committee, and I had recommended that we turn over some of the members, keep a core group. And one year we turned over some members, and I recommended that Clark Kerr be added--because Clark had just been made president of the University of California; maybe he'd been in there a couple of years. So I got to know Clark, and Clark got to know me. Furthermore, as Ed Pauley subsequently told me, he had remembered his conversation with Harry Truman, and a number of the regents had remembered Bob Sproul's recommendation that I succeed him as president.

Ray Allen, as you know, was fired, and this was terribly upsetting to the UCLA alumni. You know all about that bitterness--that Allen should have stood up and didn't, and Allen was caught between Sproul and the alumni down here and so forth as a result of that football scandal and other matters; and I gather he wasn't a strong man in any event in his leadership qualities, in the sense that he didn't fight Sproul, as subsequently I had to fight Kerr, and didn't have a rapport with the regents and so on. Anyway, the UCLA alumni had made their views crystal clear to a number of the southern regents. By God, they didn't want just some guy who'd been around the University of California system and who had not had the

experience and the guts to push the UCLA position. They had been conditioned by Sproul's destruction of Dykstra; they had remembered Sproul's promises to them about the authority Dykstra would have which Dykstra never got; and, in short, they didn't trust Berkeley.

Well, a number of the southern regents, including Ed Pauley--who, although a Berkeley graduate, was very much attached to UCLA--accepted this concept in principle and told Kerr that they wanted a man who could just as well run the whole university as UCLA, a man of that quality, that experience, that background and visibility. And they told Clark that they didn't see anybody within the system that had that independence and experience and strength. And the reason they said that was--I learned all of these things subsequently--Dean McHenry, who was a UCLA graduate, very much wanted the job, and Dean McHenry was one of Clark Kerr's closest friends. Their wives had been roommates at Stanford and so on. McHenry was shot down immediately by these selfsame regents who said, "No, he's not run a university."

Clark finally turned to me. I suspect he was directed to turn to me, really. Now, I don't want to put Clark down on this, because I don't think he came to me reluctantly, but I think he was directed to me. I think Ed Pauley and some others said, "Now, you go talk to this

fellow Murphy."

Well, as I say, Clark raised the subject with me down in Santiago, at Viña del Mar, at these meetings. I was going through the views that I indicated I'd had, the Docking thing, and really getting a little tired of this thing and seeing no end in sight. And then I came back from that trip in February with Mrs. Murphy, and we arrived in Kansas City, and there was one of the greatest snowstorms in their history--ten, twelve feet of snow on the ground. We had to fight our way up to Lawrence. The snow didn't get off the ground; it was one of the worst winters. And I talked to Judy, and Judy said, "Look, you call Clark Kerr and say that you'd like at least to look at it." These were all little things, really. You know, if you really wanted to stay, to hell with the snow.

MINK: Sure.

MURPHY: So I said, first of all, that I wanted to come out myself. And Clark said, "Yes, we want you to, because I've only asked you on behalf of the regents whether you're interested in the job, but the regents want to talk to you." So I came out at the time of the regents' meeting, which was being held at Berkeley. (In those days, as you know, they held the meetings on the campus.) And I met with a committee of regents--Don McLaughlin; Ed

Pauley; Ed Carter; John Canaday; I think Bill Forbes, who was alumni president and as a result on the regents; Ellie Heller, no, not Ellie. Anyway, I met with these regents. And we had a conversation back and forth, and it was pretty pro forma. They asked me my views on a lot of things, and I gave it. I, in turn, asked them their views and how they conceived the chancellorship. Kerr was present. In retrospect, I realize I was probably a little too polite in terms of sharpness of my questions to them. But we parted. Dean McHenry or Harry Wellman was asked to show me around the Bay Area--the usual kind of thing. And I left.

Clark called me a few days later and said that the regents' committee were very impressed with me, and that he was in a position to proffer the offer. And I said, "Well, now, Clark, I want to get down to some serious talking, because I can't accept the offer until I get some issues clarified. Furthermore, I now want Mrs. Murphy to come out and take a look at things." So it was arranged for Judy and I to come out very quietly; this was supposed not to be known. (Gee, it's interesting how all these things come back.)

Before I came out, I called some friends of mine around the country in whom I had great confidence. John Gardner was one. John, who was then head of the Carnegie

Corporation, I knew knew a great deal about higher education and especially California. He was a Stanford and Berkeley graduate. I called [O.] Meredith Wilson, who was then president of the University of Minnesota, a very close friend. I spoke to Jim Perkins, who was then vice-president of the Carnegie Corporation; as you know, he subsequently went on to become president of Cornell. I spoke to Henry Wriston, who had just retired as president of Brown University. And I spoke to Harold Dodds, who had just retired, an old friend of mine who was president of Princeton.

They all told me the same thing. In effect, they said, "Franklin, it's an impossible job. And the reason it's impossible is (a) the chancellor is powerless, relatively. There's a strong tradition in the University of California of faculty control over the substantive issues in education on the one hand; and, administratively, the Berkeley operation runs the place. You're far away, and the north doesn't like the south anyway. There's a long history of Berkeley trying to keep UCLA down, both in administrative as well as the faculty levels, and you will not have even the administrative independence. So don't take it." Well, I won't say that that determined me to take it. That would be dishonest. But it intrigued me. I couldn't believe that this was the situation.

So I came out. I spent several days. There were two parts to my coming out that time--me on the one hand; my wife on the other--and I'll deal with both. As far as I was concerned, I, first of all, insisted on talking to two or three regents privately. And I spoke to Ed Carter, and Ed Pauley, and John Canaday. And I honestly told them what these people had told me. They said, "Look. We are in the process of decentralizing administration. We think it has been overcentralized. Your friends are right in terms of the past and maybe even the present; but we know this has got to change, and we will support you in your effort to get the kind of authority that matches the responsibility."

Then I insisted on having a talk with Kerr in this regard, the same kind of a conversation. In both of those cases, I made a mistake, in retrospect. I spoke in the abstract, and I didn't pinpoint who does what; who does what, who does what. And I got the usual, "Oh, no problem, Franklin, you'll find a cooperative administration at Berkeley and all of the authority you need"--quote-unquote--"you will have." So the question is, who determines what authority you need? If I came under any illusions or false premises, in all fairness it was my fault, in that I didn't sharpen the questions. Unfortunately, I assumed these were honorable people. I'm not implying they were dishon-

orable, but I didn't realize how far apart their conception of authority and mine really was. I assumed that they could understand this, believed it.

The other side of the coin was, my wife came and went up to the house--Vern Knudsen was ill when she was here; Mrs. Knudsen was there--and Judy was absolutely shocked. This great university, and she looked in the kitchen--there was a stove that ought to belong to the Smithsonian Institution; an icebox that hardly ran; the furniture was run down; this and that. And she asked Mrs. Knudsen about this, and Mrs. Knudsen made very little effort to convince Judy that this was the place to come to. Whether it was because she was enjoying being the chancellor's wife for a while, I don't know.

MINK: That was one year. And they knew in the beginning that it was one year.

MURPHY: Yeah. Well, whatever reason, she kept saying, "We don't get anything we ask for." And Judy came to me; she said, "Well, Franklin, if I'm supposed to operate even in a larger milieu, the way we tried to do in Lawrence with students and faculty and the community, this is impossible." I checked with Hansena Frederickson, and I discovered that in this large, well-financed university, the budget for entertainment was less than the one I had at Kansas. There was none, practically. So much for that.

That side of it looked not that good.

Then I decided I needed to know what the community wanted, because I had discovered in Kansas that in order to do the things there that had to be done, I had to have the community. I had to have the community believing in the importance of the university and supporting it and working for it, and in turn you had to therefore communicate with the community. So I insisted on going and having a talk with Mrs. [Dorothy] Chandler, who was then a relatively new member of the board, and Norman Chandler, neither of whom I'd ever met. I had a wonderful conversation with them and got an image and a view of Mrs. Chandler's and Norman's view about how Los Angeles was coming along, how it was really changing in terms of intellectual vitality as a result of the postwar developments. They very much encouraged me to come and guaranteed their support as appropriate, but made a very strong point with the fact that one of the great deficiencies of UCLA was that the university on the one hand and its leadership on the other had really not gotten involved in the community nearly enough, that this had almost gone by default to USC and some of the private institutions, and that one really had to make a commitment not only to scholarship and the scholarly world but to the community that nourishes you. Well, I found

that interesting and exciting, because that's precisely what I had done all those years in Kansas.

MINK: I don't want to interrupt your train, but it intrigues me. Did Norman and Buffy say why UCLA had never reached out and become involved with the community?

MURPHY: Well, yes, the reason they gave was the character of the leadership. I reminded them, for example, of the extension program. Even from a distance, I knew that UCLA Extension was one of the best in the whole United States. And yet the point was that in spite of that, people of that quality and caliber were saying the university at UCLA is outside the community. I had my own views on that subsequently. I think it was partly the leadership.

MINK: I think it was the image, too, don't you?

MURPHY: The image? Partly.

MINK: Because it had had a bad image ever since Moore. Moore got us into the trouble, and we never lived that down.

MURPHY: That's right. That was clear.

MINK: And the Times didn't help it.

MURPHY: That was clearly there. The "little red schoolhouse" business. Sure. Well, I didn't get that little red schoolhouse business till later, till after I got here. [iced coffee break] Yes, I discovered that very

strongly. But I'll have to come to that. Their view was that it needed strong leadership--that's about all I can remember--and they would be supportive.

Then I sat down with an alumni group, and it was from them I began to get the problems vis-à-vis Berkeley in very real terms.

MINK: Who did you get those from? Forbes?

MURPHY: Phil Davis, in a strong way. You know who Phil was.

MINK: I talked to Phil.

MURPHY: Do you have his oral history, I hope?

MINK: Only in my mind. We didn't do it.

MURPHY: Oh, I'll get into some. It'll be hearsay, but I had long talks with Phil, because he played a crucial role in the development of this institution. Mr. [Edward A.] Dickson encouraged him to run for the legislature, and as you know, he was a really partisan person.

But Phil Davis had a group of alumni at his house, and they sat and talked to me, and I with them. And I asked them what they felt they wanted, and they wanted somebody who could--a strong chancellor is what they said--someone who could have the guts to stand up to Berkeley. That was the essence of a two-hour conversation.

MINK: Well, that would have been Phil's main pitch, because he was really strong about this.

MURPHY: But all the other alumni, many of whom had been presidents--in fact, it was a group of past presidents of the Alumni Association. And of course, as past presidents, many of them had served on the board. And they had first-hand experience as to how UCLA repeatedly got the little end of the stick, and how Sproul had gone back on his commitment to give Dykstra authority, and how, in effect, Sproul had really cut the heart out of Ray Allen on the PCC, or whatever it was--football problem. So, the sum and substance of their message was: "We think you know about higher education; you've got a good track record where you've been (we don't know enough about that; we're going to talk about it). Your big problem is to give UCLA visibility." They did talk about this relationship to the community. That's when I first began getting this little red schoolhouse problem fed in.

MINK: Did you have the impression that they were sensitive to the fact that UCLA's image was low profile, that there perhaps was a hesitancy on the part of the university to extend itself into the community simply because it felt that it might be rejected by the community?

MURPHY: Yes, that was part of it, and I also began to understand this reservoir they felt was in the community, that all the Communists were out here and all the good guys were at USC--that kind of thing.

Then I had a meeting in the chancellor's study with a committee of the faculty. On that committee, I can't remember all, but I remember Foster Sherwood was there. That's when I first got an impression of Foster. There were key leaders--Swedenberg was there, Tom Swedenberg, and I can't remember who else. I think Vern Knudsen climbed out of bed; he'd had the flu or something. He was there. There were about ten. I leveled with them, and I told them what I'd been told by distinguished leaders in the field of higher education. Well, they then explained the Academic Senate tradition to me, and I said, "Well, look, you know, one thing'll never work, and that's the division of authority and responsibility. And I do not come here to make the campus safe for the faculty. I'm also realist enough to know that if you haven't got the faculty behind you, you charge into battle without any troops. But I wouldn't take this job," I said, "unless I felt that I could be what the regents say they want, the alumni say they want--namely, a strong chancellor. And if I'm a strong leader, inevitably, given what I understand to be the administrative track record here at UCLA with chancellors going in and out like a revolving door, usually fired, with a committee of three or people like that running the place, that you really haven't had this. So I think you don't want to recommend

me if you just want a figurehead. On the other hand," I said, "the only person who can get you what you want, a fair share of the resources that the state of California put into higher education, is someone who's strong. And he can't be strong in one place and weak in another." So this was a very plainspoken conversation.

The net result of this was that they all reported back to Kerr, and then Kerr called and said, "Look. You've got to come; we want you; everything is fine," and so forth. So I pulled the family together and we had a conversation, all four children. The two oldest ones I had to talk with most because they would be disrupted in high school. They all said, you know, "Dad, if you want to do it, that's the thing to do." And so we came to California.

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MINK: I caught one thing that intrigued me. Maybe you've answered this. You said you were perhaps too polite when you were talking at the board meeting about coming, too polite in lack of sharpness.

MURPHY: Not precise enough. In other words, in the whole area of what authority does the chancellor have vis-à-vis the president? "Well, all that he needs." Well, at that point, clearly, in retrospect, I should have said, "Well, all right, to be specific, how is a faculty member promoted? How is a faculty member appointed? Who makes decisions about salaries?" Things like that. You see, at Kansas there'd never been any question. I had the responsibility of running the place. Given, the system of the recommendations came up, but the final authority before it went to the regents was mine. And I assumed that the president of the university was a coordinating sort of person, a representative at the legislature, a man who, in essence, pulled all the university budgets together, presented them to the legislature after regental approval. But it just didn't cross my mind that the internal operations of the institution, the final authority there, belong anywhere but the chancellor. Now, if I'd asked some of these

specific questions, I probably would have ascertained that their notion of what authority was was so far removed from what I'd been accustomed in authority that we had a huge gap. But I don't blame that on them. I blame that on me. I just didn't ask sharp enough, precise enough questions.

MINK: Well, now, when you came to talk to the faculty here in the chancellor's office....

MURPHY: It was in the study of the chancellor's residence.

MINK: ...in his residence, you found that traditional methods of appointment in the Academic Senate were different from those that you'd been used to at Kansas?

MURPHY: Not substantially, because again, I think those fellows, in the end, probably wanted me to come, in retrospect. So what I got from the Academic Senate fellows was the letter of the law. You know, the budget committee and all these other committees are presumably advisory. But common law had developed, where advice became final decision.

MINK: It's pretty much that the chancellor didn't go more than once or twice against one of these committees before people began asking questions.

MURPHY: That's right, and saying that "you're interfering with our prerogatives." Furthermore, they did not get into the question; and, again, it's probably I didn't ask the right questions. They didn't even get into the question.

I assumed that if I were to overrule, that was it. And finally, my recommendation went to the regents. What I didn't comprehend was that I would overrule and Kerr could overrule me. Now, this became very important and led to probably my most severe confrontation with Kerr, when I ripped away this authority, finally, and got the regents to agree to it.

MINK: He hadn't, in his initial talks with you, or talks prior to your appointment or immediate subsequent to it, promised any more autonomy in this and in other respects as far as UCLA was concerned.

MURPHY: You see, that's just my point. He said, "You'll have all the authority you need." I don't blame Kerr. Kerr didn't lie to me. I didn't ask the questions either of him or the regents or of the faculty senate as to what they meant by authority, because, as I say, it didn't come into my mind that a man could be asked to run at that time a 15,000-student, complicated university campus and not have roughly the same authorities administratively within the campus that I'd had at Lawrence. See, it just didn't occur to me. I'll come in a moment to my first awakening.

MINK: When did that come?

MURPHY: Well, let me just get to that. So we get here in the summer, July 1, after a horrible trip. I must say,

I should have sensed that the omen of the trip itself presaged some problems. We bought a new Chevrolet station wagon. Three of our children were at camp, so Mrs. Murphy and I set out with our second daughter, Martha, to drive from Lawrence to Los Angeles. I'd spoken to Hansena Frederickson on the phone, told her roughly what night we would get in. She told me where the key to the house would be, which was--I forget precisely, but it would be in a certain place. What happened was that we drive across the country, and within six hours of leaving Lawrence, there was a huge knocking in the motor. We discovered one of the drive rods was broken. We had it repaired; middle of the next day, the same thing happened; and to make a long story short, it was a defective motor. All of our side trips that we'd planned--to see the Petrified Forest and all that sort of thing--were out. We literally went from garage to garage to get here. It was the most horrible motor trip I've ever taken.

Secondly, we limped into Los Angeles along about midnight, having crossed the desert (a horrible trip, you know, in July; the air conditioning in the car broke down), and finally arrived at midnight in the chancellor's residence (I finally found it; I'd never driven there before), and the key wasn't there. It turned out it was there but it was in the wrong place. The person Hansena had told had

put it in the wrong place. I had to get the university police--and I didn't know where the hell they were--to come around and open up the house. Of course, there was no furniture there. There were some old mattresses, so we laid them down. We didn't even take our clothes off to sleep that night.

Then we had the problems of moving in, but the next thing that happened--I think the third day--a fire started. It was in the morning, and all of a sudden we heard fire engines roaring, and they roared right up to the front of the chancellor's house. Somebody had thrown a cigarette on that hill on the west, you know, and a fire was going on. They had to put the fire out.

The next morning we got up, and we couldn't get any hot water. The reason for that, we discovered finally, was that there'd been a slight earthquake the night before which we had not noticed, and they had earthquake safety things on the gas pipes which knock the gas off at the time of an earthquake; so there was no gas to heat the hot-water heater--all of this, you know, in one period of time. Judy finally, jokingly, said one night, "Franklin, do you think we made the right choice? Somebody's trying to say something to us." Anyway, that wasn't serious.

So I got into the usual planning and sitting down, getting to know and meet my staff, talking to people and

all that sort of thing. The first thing I needed to do was to select a vice-chancellor. I talked to a lot of people about this. I knew because of the particular character of the University of California, my total lack of knowledge of it.... (And I didn't know anybody, you know. Mrs. Murphy and I came to Southern California literally with only one person that we knew--namely, my sister. All of our friends were in the Middle West or in the East.) I didn't know much about the institution, didn't know anybody on the faculty; and I began making inquiry, concluded that I really was going to get my number-two academic fellow, at least, from within the institution. And I made further inquiry, and I finally concluded that far and away the best man for the job was Paul Dodd. And I developed then, and have never ceased having, enormous respect for Paul Dodd. In fact, many of the things that I got credit for, Paul had already gotten underway. And it is clear to me that if there was anybody around there for the previous six to eight years who was really a strong man, although quiet in his way, it was Paul.

I spoke to Kerr about this. (This is in the very beginning, and I had total confidence in Kerr and his candor and his way of doing business. As you see, before this is over, I wound up having no confidence whatsoever,

because I don't want to be too harsh, but I'd been disillusioned so many times.) I called Clark, and I said, "You know, I think the first appointment I want to make is Paul Dodd as my vice-chancellor. I'd like to talk with you about it, because you know about these people better than I do." He said, "Franklin, no way." I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "The regents would never approve him." I said, "Why?" He said, "There are two or three regents that have an intense dislike for Paul Dodd going back to the loyalty oath days." He said, "You have no idea of the depth of feeling in these people related to that time." He listed, you know, six or eight people. "There's no way you can get that done." "Well," I said, "all right. I'm deeply disappointed. Do you mind if I talk to some of them?" "Oh," he said, "you can talk. I'm just telling you what you'll hear." So I talked to two of them and, boy, it was clear to me that that was the best possible way to get off on a bad start.

So I had to give that thought up; and then I began again canvassing the faculty; and I finally began hearing more and more about Foster Sherwood. A man of integrity, he was a man who knew the university well; he knew the operations of the senate; he could keep me from out of the sand traps and the quicksand of the senate; Kerr thought highly of him. He had not been that visible

vis-à-vis the regents, so he didn't have any scars there. I talked to Foster. I'd been rather impressed with him when I'd met with that first senate group. So that was my first move.

My second move was to look around for an administrative assistant, a troubleshooter type. There was a man there, whose name I've completely forgotten now, whom Allen had brought in, and I decided to work with him. I wasn't terribly impressed with him. (The records will show who he is; as I say, I just can't remember the name.) But after six months, I knew that he was impossible, in terms of my style of operating. Furthermore, he was constantly advising me every time we had a problem with Berkeley not to fight it through--there's no way; they'll win anyway; and so on. And I began to see this defeatism. These people had been beaten over the head so often that I wasn't going to get any support.

That's when I began searching around, and I met, one time in Berkeley, in Dean McHenry's office, Chuck Young. I'm getting a little ahead of my story, but I'll come back. I was very taken with Chuck--his manner, the way he spoke. He was assisting Dean at that time; he'd worked on the master plan and so on. So I had already determined to get rid of this fellow, whatever his name was, and I asked Dean about Chuck. And Dean chuckled, I

think; he didn't know why I was asking him. Dean was ecstatic. He said, "Oh, my God, I don't know what I'd do without him. He's first-rate. When you tell him to do something, he not only does that, but two other things that I'd forgotten to tell him," etc., etc. I talked around, and I talked to people at Riverside who remembered him and some people at UCLA who remembered him when he got his PhD. So I offered him a job. And I think Chuck will tell you he took it, you know, bingo! [snaps fingers] like that, without a second thought. Let me stick to Chuck just for a minute.

MINK: Assistant to the chancellor.

MURPHY: Assistant to the chancellor. But Chuck is one of those persons.... I operate in a very delegated fashion, basically. No-news-is-good-news kind of thing. I like to preoccupy myself with what I conceive to be the big problem and not have to worry about a lot of other things. The more I began delegating to Chuck, the more I realized that he would just eat it right up. You could just visibly see him grow with authority and responsibility. So pretty soon I said, "Look, he's no more an assistant to the chancellor. He's assistant chancellor." It just went right that way until, I guess, two or three or maybe four years before I left, he became vice-chancellor and so on.

It was an amazing experience. I've never worked with a man where after a little while I could communicate what I was interested in in less than a sentence--almost with a look or a gesture. He knew precisely what we were talking about. Or vice versa. It's the most effective working relationship I've ever had with another human being in any situation.

Anyway, let me go back. Bill Young was there. Bill is a very deceiving person, as you know. He's not very articulate, and he's not a great orator, and he seems to be sort of floating around. You just wonder whether anything'll get done, and I discovered that remarkable things were getting done. In my whole experience with Bill through time, never, before or again in the history of UCLA, will there be such a spate of building in a period of time as occurred in that nine years.

MINK: There was great pressure on Young's office at that time.

MURPHY: Enormous pressure. Because Young's office, we had to program and to supervise and everything else, at an expenditure, I don't know, of \$150 million, maybe, or something. We doubled the size of the physical plant on the campus in a nine-year period, including the medical school, and set up a new master plan and master plan transportation and roads and everything else. That was

a very exciting period, and a marvelous team of Welton Becket as the supervising architect, Bill Young as the guy that kept his finger on where it was going, and myself, who got involved in it in terms of concept and so forth.

So I had the team, Foster, Bill, and ultimately Chuck--Foster on the academic side; Bill on the physical plant side, which was very important at that time; and Chuck on the administrative side, the mechanics of administration. Well, you know, my theory has always been--and every experience I've had proves it further--that good people make you look good. The administrator who is afraid to appoint and even promote and push a person who potentially is better than he is is a damn fool--because first of all, you get loyalty on the part of those people; and secondly, I repeat, they're the ones that make you look good. And that team made me look good, if indeed I looked good.

I conceived of myself as a coordinator of that team. I also conceived of myself as someone who really had to project the image of UCLA--in the community, within the regents--and to carry the UCLA message right directly head on to the Berkeley administration. I also conceived of myself as a person--my office, as it were, and I was in the office, so I was a person--who somehow had to convince the UCLA community that they were as good as I

knew they were. They had so long been Berkeley's little brother. And, you know, sure, Berkeley has nine Nobel Prize winners, and we'll never have any sort of thing; and when you talk about the University of California in London or New York or something, they say, "Oh, yes, you mean Berkeley." So I conceived early on that this image had to be changed. Now, a few things convinced me of it. I had been told about Kerr's inauguration, which was apparently a very festive event. He went to every campus, and there was a big thing.

MINK: He was inaugurated at UCLA first, as sort of a gesture, we were told.

MURPHY: Well, the first thing that happened was I went to work down there, and I assumed there was an inauguration involved. I'd been inaugurated at Kansas; I'd been to a lot of other guys' inaugurations around the country. You know, I thought one day, I thought this was the responsibility of the regents and Clark Kerr. And finally I was at a regents' meeting, and time had gone by, and I said to Clark, "By the way, who's in charge of this inauguration?" He said, "What inauguration?" I said, "Oh, you don't inaugurate the chancellor?" "Oh," he said, "yeah. I'd forgotten about that." So he called Harry Wellman. "Harry," he said, "what do we do about inaugurating a chancellor?" Harry said, "Well, I don't know."

Nobody had given it a thought. Well, I determined, right then and there, there was going to be an inauguration.

MINK: This must have been around July of '60, somewhere in there? July or August of '60?

MURPHY: Oh, it was in August or September. When was I inaugurated?

MINK: September 23, 1960.

MURPHY: Yes. Then this had to be in late July or early August. So Kerr delegated this to Wellman, who called me up and said, "What do you want to do?" And I said, "Well, look. The way I understand this is done, you appoint a committee down here of the faculty, they sit down with me, and we work something out." So they appointed a committee of the faculty, who'd had no experience because they just didn't know about these things; and I sort of tried to indicate what I thought should be done. And in the end, nothing much was happening, so I finally just decided to be the committee and to tell the committee what to do. So I called Lee DuBridge, president of Caltech, who was an old friend of mine, and I said, "Would you please speak?" He'd be delighted to. "Where are you going to have it?" "We're going to have it where we have the graduation"--as they did in those days--"in Dickson Court. I want to have it at the time of a regents' meeting down here, the sooner the better, the first regents' meeting on the UCLA

campus." They were having them back and forth in those days. "And it could be simple. I don't want a big thing, and I don't want to invite everybody from all over the country, but I would like to invite the presidents or heads of every California institution of higher learning." You know, it was too late by then to invite the president of Harvard or Princeton--indeed, if you wanted to. In retrospect, I didn't.

Well, the thing was finally scheduled, and then Kerr decided to get involved--his office. So they started shifting things around and said that there should be a lunch after the thing--they would take care of that, and things would be taken care of in Berkeley. Except they weren't. So what happened was, we had this inauguration with a sort of handful of people, as I recall, a very hot day. And the day before, Kerr had gotten a cold--which was communicated as influenza. So he announced that he could not be present at the inauguration.

MINK: He went into UCLA hospital.

MURPHY: Yes, that's right. He went into the UCLA hospital. He said he wanted Harry Wellman to preside. And I got this message from somebody, and I called back and said, "If the president can't preside, then the chairman of the board's going to preside." And in fact, I thought the chairman of the board was going to preside anyway. I

said, "I assume--and correct me if I'm wrong--was I appointed in the end by the Board of Regents or the president?" "Well, it was the Board of Regents." "Well, then," I said, "I think the appointing authority should preside." Well, Dean McHenry and some others said, "Look, don't stand too much on ceremony." I said, "I don't give a damn personally--but for the image of this institution. You know, this is not a little two-bit cow college. It has to have the same dignity applied to it as any other." I said, "I love Harry Wellman, I like him, and this is not a personal matter. This is a symbolic matter." So they agreed. It was my first real run-in. Ed Pauley presided, and he announced that the president was ill and in the hospital. Afterwards we went to a lunch. We were told it was at the Bel-Air Hotel. And it was disastrous.

MINK: Oh, is that right?

MURPHY: Oh, it was absolutely disastrous.

MINK: I didn't know that.

MURPHY: There were no place cards; nobody knew where they were to sit. Some people that should have been there hadn't been invited. In other words, it was the most disorganized, badly handled thing, totally different than anything in my administration at Kansas. When we laid something on for the legislators, we knew precisely what was going to happen and how it would happen. We had a system. As a

matter of fact, Bobbie Pauley was absolutely furious. I didn't know Bobbie well then. But she came to me. She said, "Franklin, is this a university luncheon?" She was thinking I'd laid it on. "Can't you do better than this? No place cards, nobody knows where to sit," this and that. And I said, "Bobbie, I had nothing to do with it." I went back and talked to Hansena Frederickson afterwards. I said, "Who does this around here?" "Well," she said, "in past times, I usually have been involved in this, and Mrs. Allen sometimes, but," she said, "we were told that the university would handle this, the university administration."

MINK: At Berkeley.

MURPHY: At Berkeley. "Well," I said, "that's the last time. I want to instruct you right now: I don't want you to communicate with anybody in Berkeley without letting me know--on any subject." It was my second awakening. "Oh," she said, "Dr. Murphy, I can't agree to that." I said, "Why?" She said, "I'm not only your secretary, I'm Clark Kerr's secretary." I said, "Oh?" "Oh," she said, "yes. President Kerr, when he came in, said that he needed to have a secretary for down here, and he deeded to have somebody who could give him information and whom he could use, and who could organize his life when he came down--and I was it." Well, I said, "Hansena, I don't want you to

create a problem for the president, but," I said, "do you like that role?" She said, "Dr. Murphy, I hate it." She said, "Quite honestly, I've been asked questions that I just don't think were appropriate, because my loyalty ought to be to the man I'm working with day in and day out." I said, "There isn't any doubt about that."

So I called Harry Wellman, and I said, "Harry, we've got a problem here, and I want you to resolve it with Clark. I don't want to get into another hassle right after the inaugural thing." I said, "Hansena Frederickson cannot have a relationship with anybody in Berkeley, least of all the president. Now," I said, "out of our budget--I'll find it somewhere--we'll provide secretarial assistance. Kerr is down here, you know, once every three months. He really doesn't need it. But I can guarantee that the president, or any other statewide officer, will get whatever secretarial assistance they need when they come down." Well, Harry said, "Well, why not?" I said, "Harry, there's a very basic principle here. My secretary is my secretary. And I'm just not going to give all that. You make it perfectly clear to Clark." "Well," he said, "it's not a big thing." I said, "That's right, it isn't a big thing, so let's get it resolved."

MINK: Oh, yes, but it was a big thing. You see, it was something that it was good to have nipped in the bud,

because it was something that began right after the retirement of Provost [Ernest Carroll] Moore and continued from that time forward, with [Robert Gordon] Sproul here six months and there six months, a secretary here--all through [Earle R.] Hedrick, all through [Clarence A.] Dykstra, the same way. And she had always served in this capacity--which in a sense makes a spy.

MURPHY: That was the potential. That was the potential.

MINK: A spy.

MURPHY: So I said, "Harry, look. I don't want to create a problem with Hansena. I'm delighted to have her. She's forgotten more than I'll ever know about the way this place is run. I think she's discreet. I'm never going to ask her and I don't think she's going to tell me things about anybody who went before. But," I said, "it's very simple. Either Hansena will be assigned to Clark--we'll give her a little office up the hall, and I'll get another secretary--or Hansena stays with me and we'll get a little office up the hall and keep it vacant for a secretary for Clark. But it can't be both." I said, "I hope it will be the latter, because Hansena could be very helpful to me." Well, he called back subsequently and said okay. But that bothered me, you know.

Well, then the next thing that happened was, I was so aware of the fact in those days, I'd go to these educa-

tional meetings in South America and Europe and the East, and quite literally (it wasn't so much in this country, but even surprisingly in those days in this country):

"You're at UCLA. Now, what relationship does UCLA have to the University of California?" And I'd try to explain this. "Oh, we thought that was Berkeley." I'd hear that over and over again. University of California at Berkeley. So I got mad one day. I picked up the telephone and called in from somewhere, and the phone operator said, "University of California." And I said, "Is this Berkeley?" She said, "No." I said, "Well, who have I gotten to?" "UCLA." I said, "Why didn't you say UCLA?" "Oh," she said, "we're instructed to say University of California." So the next morning I went to the office and wrote a memo, I don't know, to Paul Hannum or somebody; I said, "Will you please instruct the operators as of noon today, when they answer the phone, to say, 'UCLA.'" Well--who was it?--I guess it was maybe Foster or Bill who was in the office when I was saying this, and I guess Hansena, too. And they said, "You know, they won't like it at Berkeley." And I said, "Well, let's just see. There are a few things, maybe, we can do around here without getting their permission."

Sure enough, about two months later--and again, this was the way Kerr operated; he would talk through Harry Wellman very often--Harry came around to me and he said,

"Franklin, we called down there the other day, and the operator said, 'UCLA.' Is that new?" I said, "Yes." "Well," he said, "it's always the University of California, isn't it?" And I said, "Harry, the problem is that most people who call here want to talk to somebody at UCLA. Maybe up at Berkeley people will understand, but," I said, "most people who call in down here know whom precisely they're calling. They're calling at UCLA. It's a practical matter. It's like a road sign." "Well," he said, "you know, I don't...." He said something about the fact--somewhere the word "authorization" came in--who authorized it? I said, "Harry, I authorized it. And make it quite clear to everybody up here that if I can't authorize the telephone operators to identify the institution, I sure as hell shouldn't stay at UCLA or in the University of California, because it would be my belief that my authority is zero." That put an end to that.

Well, you know, there were hundreds of these things. God, I can't think of them all. But very quickly on, I began to realize this whole symbolism of control, and the subconscious--or even deliberate--desire up there to keep this little brother from getting too big and keep it from gaining its own strength and visibility and self-confidence, is the way I guess I'd put it.

MINK: You certainly couldn't expect to alter in one or

two days what it took twenty or thirty years to build up.

MURPHY: That's right. But it was clear to me that this was now one of my major, major problems.

MINK: I had a question (I like to listen to you talk rather than ask you questions): What you thought, when you went in there after you arrived, that the single greatest challenge that you met was. Maybe it was this. But maybe you didn't know it until after you were here.

MURPHY: Oh, I really didn't. No, I didn't know it. As a matter of fact, as I say, I'd made some assumptions that turned out to be completely faulty. And it didn't take me six months--because living here now I was playing golf with Phil Davis on a Saturday; I was talking to Bill Young; I sat down with Mrs. Dickson one evening and spent a whole evening with her and out poured the story of Ed Dickson's problems, which was from a different point of view. And it didn't take me long to begin to get the whole history of this relationship. Plus the fact that I had gone through the beginning of a budget cycle and saw how little authority I really had. Within six months, I began to realize that my single greatest problem--not just me personally, but in order to advance the best interests of this institution--was to get out from under the shackle of the Berkeley administration. Clearly.

MINK: I know you've got a direction, and I don't want to

divert it; but you mentioned the first budget cycle, and maybe if you could say something about what your reaction was to that, because that was a really important point.

MURPHY: Well, in the first place, I discovered that the administrative apparatus on the UCLA campus to get this budget together was absolutely rudimentary. We had a lovely little guy called Jerry Fleischmann who worked his tail off and was loyal and dedicated but was way over his head. The reason that they had any budget at all was that they'd get a formula down from Berkeley. Everything was done by formula--so many FTEs, so many students; and then if you had the student FTE, then you related that to faculty, new faculty, you related that to book budgets--and these were formulae that had preexisted. There were formulae up there as to how many dollars per square foot of building space you needed for maintenance and all that sort of thing. So there was nothing creative in this budget. It was just reacting to a formula.

Secondly, I discovered that as the budget came down, there was practically no flexibility in moving between-line items. If you could save some money here, you couldn't transfer it to there. It'd have to go back in the university pool. There was no incentive, therefore, for creative administration.

And thirdly, if you wanted to do new and innovative

things, you not only had to go through the whole damn senate process of approvals and this and that--which I didn't mind in the end very much, because that was an interesting and constructive dialogue, it was a substantive dialogue; even if there was disagreement, it was on intellectual grounds. And let me say here quickly, in the end I came to not only work within the senate system, I really came to enjoy it. And I'm convinced in its way, even though it's ponderous and even though it seems inefficient at times, it probably is the best system I know. But it works only if the administrator working with the senate on campus has the final authority and cannot be second-guessed.

Anyway, I discovered that in terms of money, budgeting for it, uses of it and so on, there was no flexibility whatsoever--no transfers, no nothing. And therefore, they didn't need anybody but Jerry and a couple of secretaries. It was just a mathematical calculation.

The second thing I ran into on the budget side was when I sought comparative figures. The thing that led me into the seeking of comparative figures was the library problem. I had determined--a personal penchant, but I think it valid in any event--that distinction of a university, both symbolically as well as in terms of tools, is related to the library. I had been talking to Larry [Powell]

about this, and Larry finally began to level with me about some of the problems that he'd been having. And I said, "Well, what does Berkeley get in these matters?" Well, he said he'd been trying to find out for years, but he could never get the facts, but he said it was a hell of a lot more than we were. So I made an innocent inquiry. I said, "By the way," to Harry Wellman one day--and this was all in the first year--I said, "I'd just like to know whether in terms of library support, book budgets, all the rest of it, the formula treats Berkeley and UCLA the same." He gave me a very evasive answer. And then I started talking to the budget people at Berkeley, and I was told plainly that this was none of my business. And I began to get suspicious then, needless to say.

Finally, I concluded that the Berkeley people were already beginning to get a little leery of me, that they were beginning to sense that they had gotten a fox into the chicken pen. I also began to realize that I would never get anywhere in getting equity, in getting authority, without working directly with the regents, because I was convinced that the regents would never be told. There would never be a transference of my concerns, and I was convinced that the regents--just in terms of reality--would never know the right questions to ask. Now, I knew this was a dangerous game to play; and in retrospect, it was a

disloyal game, because I do believe in a system--I believe in channels. And I can tell you I believe it's true. I can swear to you today that I would never have gone the regents route had Kerr and Wellman been full and open with me. I would have been reasonable. I would have pressed, of course. But I would have believed that there was full disclosure and that I could enter into the lists without my legs tied together. I didn't want any disadvantage. I never, in the height of the heat of all this thing, I never said I wanted something at the expense of Berkeley. I always said that Berkeley was a jewel in the crown of the University of California and that the university and the regents should support it with great vigor; and Roger Heyns can testify to that, in terms of the things I did for him in the end.

Let me tell you a story. This was again in the first year. Paul Dodd had come to me; he'd gotten the word he wasn't going to be vice-chancellor. Paul knew, really, why. But Paul was this kind of a guy--he said, "Franklin, you know, I've had a lot of responsibility in building these institutes and building some distinction here, there, and elsewhere, and one of the things we're under way on is to build up the Slavic languages thing. We have the opportunity of hiring"--I forget his name--a Slavic name, Professor So-and-so, who is retiring early from Harvard.

And he'll come for five years. We'll have to pay him a little over scale to get him." But he was one of the giants in the field. He said, "The importance is that even in those five years, he will attract good young people; we'll be able to recruit at the assistant professor level and so on and get the building of a department." I said, "Paul, it sounds good enough to me." It had all been approved by the budget committee unanimously and all the rest of it, so I forwarded this to Kerr. And I got back-- in those days it was just a verbal communication--a proposal denied. So I called Kerr on the phone, "What are you denying for? We've got the money in the budget." "Well," he said, "look. We're going to concentrate on Africa and the Middle Eastern things at UCLA, and I don't think you can go in all these directions at the same time." Well, I said this had been completely evaluated, and I went through the whole thing--I won't go into detail. He said, "Well, I'm sorry. This is not one I'm willing to take on to the regents."

To my astonishment, I learned--and this is no hearsay, I learned it from the horse's mouth three years later--that at the time that proposal had gone to Berkeley, Kerr had called the chairman of the Slavic language department at Berkeley and said, "By the way, do you know Professor So-and-so at Harvard is available?" And of course, Kerr knew

precisely; he'd seen in the papers that went up the real distinction of this fellow.

Well, these things gradually accumulated. Now, in the meantime, I had gotten the whole history of this institution and its struggles against Berkeley.

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MURPHY: In the meantime, I had been meeting and talking on social grounds with regents and alumni leaders, because I must say that some of the regents and many of the alumni leaders went all out to bring me into this community. Ed Carter and Ed Pauley, John Canaday and Bill Forbes, you know, just leaned over backwards to get me involved in this, that, and the other thing. Tom Davis, Phil Davis, John Vaughn--all of them. Well, in the process of playing golf or going to dinner or whatever, they were anxious to tell me about the background. It always came out, especially from the alumni, nonregents, the problems they'd had over time. This is where I began to learn about the intense struggles, starting with Ed Dickson, in this university becoming anything. Now, that's all been written up.

MINK: In a way, it's been written up. Well, a lot of it's been recorded. Not too much of it has been actually written.

MURPHY: Well, I suppose.

MINK: UCLA on the Move, as we know--referring to that semicentennial history of the university--is pretty much of a gloss-over of what's actually happened. I was going to ask you, one of the stories that Phil Davis told me--

and this would be second-hand if you heard it--was concerning the struggle over the appointment of Provost Dykstra. Did he talk to you about that at all?

MURPHY: Yes, and I'll tell you who can give you even more on that--John Canaday. Have you done his?

MINK: Not yet, no.

MURPHY: Well, most of the stuff I got from Phil was about actions in the legislature, especially the establishment of the medical school, the law school, and the engineering school. I'll come to that. The story I hear from Canaday --because he was then executive director of the Alumni Association--and as I remember it (it's been a long time), the dimensions were roughly this. They had determined--the alumni--that they had to have some kind of a visible and strong chancellor. And Sproul had come up with some names that everybody knew would be his puppets. Dykstra had this track record. He'd been at UCLA. A lot of the details of this story I've forgotten, but John tells me that they went to Sproul. They'd gone to Dykstra, and Dykstra said, yes, he'd be interested in coming. No, I think it was the other way. They went to Sproul and said they wanted him to look at Dykstra. And he said, oh, yes, he would do that. He came back and said, "I've talked to Dykstra, and he has no interest whatsoever." Then, Canaday said, either accidentally or deliberately, some of this same

UCLA group ran into Dykstra, talked with him, and he said, "Yeah, I'd be interested in coming." "Well, have you talked to Sproul about this?" "No, Sproul has never discussed this with me."

So they went back and confronted Sproul with his lie. I don't know any other word for it. His misinformation. And Sproul said, "There must be some kind of a misunderstanding," and so forth, but obviously he was in a corner on this thing. "Well, if Mr. Dykstra is interested in coming, well, certainly, we ought to nail this down right now," you know. You know how Sproul was: he could turn it around very quickly. And Dykstra came. However, Dykstra didn't agree to come until he'd gotten--according to John Canaday and also according to Hansena--Dykstra had gotten, he thought, firm commitments from Sproul. And practically every one of them turned out to be nonexistent. And my impression is that to a large extent Dykstra died of a broken heart, literally and figuratively. But again, the one living man that was in the center of that that I know well is John Canaday, and he can give it out, chapter and verse.

Now, on the Phil Davis side, there was also a Reverend [Jesse R.] Kellems here, who had been in the legislature, who'd also worked for the university. Also Ernie Debs, the current supervisor, was in the legislature

at that time. But Phil, I think, is the one I got it best from. And Phil made it clear to me that the professional schools at UCLA in every case had to be rammed down the throat of the statewide administration.

Kellems is the one that carried the engineering school. He explained to me how they were trying to kill it in the legislature. And of course, the man that Sproul used to do this was Jim Corley, who was his legislative operator. Corley's influence, of course, was in the senate. They were there longer, and he was shrewd enough to get the senate with him. He didn't have nearly as much control over the house, because they were more in and out and there's more of them. I remember Kellems telling me how he just told Corley that he would see to it that over time the university would really get a beating unless this engineering school were established. He had to threaten. The same was true of the law school. There were two or three alumni and, ultimately, regents who in effect just forced this down the throat.

But the one I remember best was the medical school, because the decision had been made down here that they wanted a medical school, that people in Southern California felt they should have a medical school, etc. But now you had not only the statewide administration and the Berkeley crowd basically fighting, but you had the San Francisco

people fighting, because they had a monopoly on this. And they were powerful, because they were doctors of regents and doctors of legislators. So Phil Davis said he went to the legislature because Ed Dickson urged him to. UCLA needed somebody. And this was Phil's basic job every year--to help UCLA. So the medical school was his baby, and it was finally gotten through the assembly Ways and Means Committee, was approved by the assembly--the appropriation for the medical school. The regents, curiously, had not approved it at all. So Sproul's first gambit was to tell the regents that they had to fight this because the legislature was taking educational policy out of their hands. Well, the facts are that a number of requests had been made to the regents and to Sproul to support a medical school in the proper way, and they had blocked it. This was the only way around it. So Corley went to work, and the bill was stalled in the senate.

In the meantime, the senate had passed the appropriation measure for the whole university. It was now over in the assembly for passage. So Phil Davis told me that he called Corley up one day, and he said, "I want you to tell Sproul something. I want you to tell Sproul that as long as the university blocks that bill for the medical school in the senate, the university's appropriation bill isn't going to get out of the assembly. And it's

that simple. And also"--you remember Phil; he was tough--
"I want you to tell him that I'm just as patient as he is.
Most of all, tell him that he needs the money more than I
do." Corley said, "Oh, you can't do that; you'd be cru-
cified," this, that, and the other thing, threatened him.
And Phil said, "I'm just telling you. You tell him that."

So it went down to the wire; it really did. And that
bill was just stalled right in the assembly committee.
And finally Sproul related this to the regents. He said,
"You know, we have no alternative." And they agreed.
So the medical school bill came out, over, nearly, Sproul's
dead body. And you can imagine how I felt when I picked
up this history of UCLA and saw the groundbreaking with
Bob Sproul there digging the thing, with Governor [Earl]
Warren, and saying, you know, "one of the great days in the
history of the University of California."

Well, these bits of hypocrisy began building and
building and building. Then my suspicion began building
when they wouldn't give me comparative data on FTE, book
budgets, or anything else. So as I said earlier, I finally
concluded that either I ought to get out of this job or
win this battle. And since I had no troops except the
regents, I had to get it done through the regents. It
was very tough to me to come to this decision, I repeat,
because clearly it was an act of disloyalty. I was getting

out of channels. I repeat, my rationalization was that there was no other way to do it.

MINK: One thing you pointed out earlier was that you had talked to Kerr at least on one point. You said, "Well, is it okay to talk to the regents?" He said, "Sure."

MURPHY: Yes. On that one point. Well, what happened was, I began briefing the regents. Now, I must say, this came very normally, because, as I told you earlier, Pauley and Carter and Canaday and Buff Chandler had become my social friends as well. We became good friends; we were socializing together. So I would use those occasions and other occasions to tell these fellows how bad I thought the situation was and in fact they didn't know how bad it was. And I began generating questions that I thought they should ask. And I began explaining that this was really, in my view, the last good chance for UCLA to really make the move to distinction, because--and this was an egocentric thing to say--that if I with my experience and my kind of Irish temperament got licked in this, I didn't think they'd ever find anybody that could win that battle.

I must say, the regents, even the UCLA regents, in my experience, have never wanted to see anything except the whole university improved. They have not been parochial. But they have been damn firm, in my experience, that UCLA

deserved its fair share. So this was not a destructive thing; this was a positive thing--at least, the way I'm interpreting it.

Well, we started out. I remember one episode which was a humorous one, because it went too far. It was early in the days of dormitory building. We had Dykstra Hall and we had Sproul Hall--and my God, again, given all the loyalties of people who worked their tail off down here, to have that thing named after Bob Sproul, who did everything he could to keep this place back, is a miscarriage of justice, too. But that's another question. There was a discussion at the buildings and ground meeting of the regents one day, and the regents were going to put in an application for two dormitories at Berkeley, two additional dormitories. Now, the facts are that we already had one more than they (this was early in the dormitory building). The statewide administration recommended an application to Washington for two dorms at Berkeley and one at UCLA. And frankly, that's all we wanted at that time. To my amazement, Carter spoke up and said, "I won't support this unless there are two at UCLA and two at Berkeley"--when we hadn't even wanted two. By God, it sailed right through. And that's how we got the two up there, in addition, rather than the one. This is merely symbolic of the fact that these people were beginning to speak up

and say, "Look, equal treatment."

Well, I decided that symbolically and in every other way, the way to really bring this issue to a head was the library, because in a disproportionate way the library means a lot to faculty--in its symbolism and everything. So I began on this library. I began saying I thought we were being terribly shortchanged. I pulled out of the regents' minutes a statement that had been made and approved by the regents, a policy, that UCLA and Berkeley would be the two major campuses in the state, north and south. And I said the implication here is crystal clear. They deserve equal treatment if they're going to be the two great campuses. (This is before they'd gotten into this new-campus stuff.) I went to them, and I said, "You know, the statewide administration is not following this policy of the regents. They're ignoring it." "Well, what do you mean?" I said, "In two areas, they're ignoring it. Area one, the library. I can't tell you how badly, but there is an enormous disproportion in acquisition funds." I then explained the nuances of the fact that of the exchange of the University Press, all the books went to Berkeley. In those days, they did. And that was a free thing. Exchange of journals--all went to Berkeley. Therefore they had those funds--I mean, they didn't have to buy those things that we had to out of our funds. But in addition

to that, in absolute numbers, compared to any FTE relationship at all. I said, "Also, there is the faculty disproportion. There are many more over-scale professors; there are many more higher-category people; and furthermore, these are my guesses, but if you ask the questions--I can't get the information--you'll find out that the faculty-student ratio at Berkeley is substantially smaller than it is at UCLA." Well, these fellows, by one means or another, started boring in and asking questions; and they were able to get information that, of course, I couldn't. And sure enough, all of these suspicions were manifest.

MINK: About when was this?

MURPHY: This was about two or three years after I'd been here. I had to get my feet on the ground.

MINK: I mean, a lot of this that you could feed to them, RV [Robert Vosper] was feeding to you, though, right?

MURPHY: Oh, yes. Bob was getting what information he could. But here again, in those days, you couldn't get the figures. Now, we did know, we finally got the figures, on how many books they were bringing in each year. And God, you know, that was way above us. So finally, I decided to make the first fight on the library. I knew I had to make the second fight on the faculty-student ratio and the third fight on building funds. To me, I had to make the symbol. So this matter finally came up--and I won't go

into a whole lot of detail. But the regents finally, on a motion of Canaday or Forbes or somebody, passed a motion that there would be created two major research libraries for the University of California--one north and one south, one at Berkeley and one at UCLA--and that these libraries would grow to x millions of volumes this year and y millions of volumes the following year.

About that time, at a meeting of the chancellors prior to the regents' meeting, Kerr said, "I have a matter I want to bring up. We've got bad administration going here. We've got chancellors going directly to regents; we've got regents bringing up materials that have not been processed by the statewide administration; so I am now establishing a rule that no chancellor may speak to a regent without my permission." He said, "Furthermore, now that we're into this, I understand that some of our chancellors have been communicating with other university presidents in California. This is a very sensitive matter; we've got a master plan"--and this, that, and the other thing--"so I want to establish another policy: that no chancellor may speak to the president of another university without my approval." [tape recorder turned off]

I spoke up, and I said, "Well, let me get this defined. As you know, Clark, Ed Pauley's become a close personal friend of mine, Ed Carter, John Canaday, Bill Forbes, Buff

Chandler"--several others who were on the board at that time. "Are you saying that I can no longer associate with them socially?" "Oh, no," he said. "I just mean about university business." "Well," I said, "are you saying that if they ask me about this or that or the other thing at UCLA, I'm to say, 'I'm sorry, you'll have to talk to Clark Kerr'?" He said, "Yes." "Well," I said, "I'd better just tell you right now that I'll not abide by this policy." I said, "Furthermore, are you saying that when Norman Topping calls me up and says, 'Franklin, we have a problem with the board of county supervisors about the funding of our medical schools and the two county hospitals,' that I'm to say, 'I'm sorry, Norman, I can't talk with you; you must call Berkeley,' or 'I must call Berkeley and get permission'? Are you saying that when Lee DuBridge calls me and says, 'Franklin, there's a possibility that we can make a joint application for a nuclear reactor or something with the National Science Foundation for joint operation in Southern California,' I must say no--not even explore the possibility?" "Well," he said, "I think these are matters that need to be taken up with the president's office." I said, "Clark," and very low-key, I said, "if that's to be the policy, I'll have to tell you in advance I can't abide by it." I said, "Frankly, the reason I can't is that I'm 500 miles away from the statewide office. You may not think so,

statewide administration may not think so, but everybody in Southern California thinks I'm administering UCLA. Now, am I or am I not? And do you want me to destroy that image? Do you merely want me to say that I'm a housekeeper?" "Well," he said, "I think we've got other matters to discuss at this meeting. Perhaps we can discuss this privately. Maybe the thing to do is for you fellows to think about these proposals, and I'll come back next month and we'll discuss it subsequently." It was never further discussed.

So afterwards, two or three of the chancellors, Emil Mrak especially, came around and said, "God, that would have been disastrous." He said, "You know, the regents on the board that are interested in agriculture, they're constantly talking to me about it. I could no more have lived with that...." "Well," I said, "why didn't you speak up?" He said, "You know, we're not accustomed to it." I said, "Let's all get accustomed to it."

About three weeks after that, Dean McHenry called me. That was while he was still working for Kerr and before Santa Cruz had been established. He said, "Franklin, I want to talk to you at the next meeting of the regents." So we went out in his car and he drove me around, and he said, "You know, I don't think you understand the way this thing works. You should know that people up here at Berkeley

are getting very disturbed about your method of operation." Well, I said, "Why?" "Well, you're not a team player." And I said, "Dean, you know, that's the truest thing you've said to me since I've come to California. How can you play on a team when you have no notion of the goals the team is supposed to achieve and you're not really a member of the team? Now," I said, "maybe the thing for me to do is to leave UCLA." [tape recorder turned off] He was speaking for Clark. I said, "I've decided I'm not going to leave until the regents ask me to. I've never been fired in my life, and maybe that's an experience I ought to have to round out my total experience. But," I said, "I'll tell you: until I'm fired, I'm going to have but one objective-- and now you carry this word back to whomever you're speaking for--and that is to strengthen UCLA within the framework of the regents' resolution," which I referred him to, "'to strengthen the authority and responsibility of the chancellor in the system, wherever he might be,' and finally, in so doing, believe that I'm strengthening the entire University of California. Because the University of California can be no stronger than its weakest part, and we chancellors can't run complicated campuses in these complicated days. Now, if I fail in this, or if I become too disruptive, I suspect the regents will ask me to leave. But until that time, I'm going to proceed just the

way I've been proceeding. Now frankly, as you know, Dean," I said, "my problem is that rarely can I talk to the president. He's either in Hong Kong, or presiding over a conference in London, or [is] a consultant in Washington, or he's consulting with his regents. He increasingly has no time to talk about direction, policy, or philosophy; and what time he has got, he is now totally devoting to the new campuses. So," I said, "I'm going to continue to operate the way I'm operating until the regents tell me not to."

I promptly went back--and I didn't think it was a dishonest matter--and I said to Carter and Pauley and Canaday and so on, I said, "Listen, you know, I'm getting into difficulty, and I want you to know that I never want to be president of this university. I don't want Kerr's job under any circumstances, because if I'm going to stay in education, I want to be on a campus. If I go into administering an empire, I'll go into business or government or something. The greatest satisfaction I've had is being on a campus. So if I have confrontations with Kerr, you'll have to understand this, because I'm really trying to do this job for UCLA that you people told me you wanted done." And I said, "I had a confrontation the other day in which he advised me that I was not to speak to any of you on matters relating to the university. And I simply

told him I wouldn't abide by it."

Well, that infuriated the regents, because I'd never-- indeed, at the very end I tried to save Kerr's job; I'll get to that--I never once in my years at UCLA tried to get at Kerr. If it seemed like I might have from time to time, it was only because of trying to get Kerr to stop from cutting our library budget or prevent it from becoming equal, but there was never a personal thing in this.

In the meantime, my wife was beginning to have problems. Kay Kerr decided that she needed to be to the wives of the chancellors what Clark was to their husbands. So she would start calling meetings of wives of chancellors. And she would say, "Now, I think you should do this. This is what we do at Berkeley. This is what we do with foreign students. This is what we do with faculty receptions. I think we should have a manual of the way the chancellor's wife deals with this, that, and the other thing." You know, here she's talking to my wife, who'd done this for twelve years.

MINK: It's really very hard to believe, you know.

MURPHY: Well, it's an absolutely true thing.

MINK: I'm certain it's true. I'm sure it is, but it's certainly hard to believe.

MURPHY: Judy would come home and say, "God almighty, what am I to do?" I'd say, "Just ignore it. Just do what you do

and do superbly well. Pay no attention whatsoever."
She said, "Do I have to go to these meetings?" I said,
"Well, yes. You know. Go and sit and listen. Don't
argue. And just bite your tongue and come back and do what
we would do in any event. Pay no attention."

However, about that time--again, I can't give you
dates, but they can be tied to experience--Sam Gould was
chancellor at Santa Barbara. He was married to a Danish
woman, I think, who spoke with an accent--a charming woman,
a lovely woman. Sam was having some problems up there
because there were cliques on that campus in terms of the
previous chancellor and Sam. You remember that previous
chancellor had gotten into that trouble in New York and so
on. So this clique problem ran down into the faculty
wives. Sam's wife was trying to heal this and doing things
with wives--parties and so on. Well, one of the people
that didn't like Sam's wife or something got to Kay Kerr,
who instead of doing the thing you would normally do--"I'm
sorry, I don't want to hear about it, that's Mrs. Gould's
responsibility"--listened very carefully; and then the
next time they were down here, she got in touch with Gould's
wife and just gave her hell. "You shouldn't be doing that
sort of thing; you're running with the wrong crowd"--this,
that, and the other thing, all in terms of internal campus
politics and cliques. Sam called me up, and he was beside

himself. (Sam and I were very close.) He said that his wife had told him that, by God, he was going to leave. They weren't going to stay there one more minute. She would not put up with this; it was humiliating and insulting.

Well, this little thing went over. But a year or two later--Kay Kerr continued to run these so-called "seminars" for the behavior of chancellors' wives and the management of chancellors' wives' lives--the State University of New York was looking for somebody to run it. (They asked me, incidentally. They were asking a lot of people to come back and look at the job.) Sam went back and looked at it. It wasn't that good a job. In fact, it was a bitter experience for Sam; as you know, he subsequently left it. He said, "You know, I'm going to take it, Franklin, for one reason and one reason only: My wife wants to get out of California. She cannot take this kind of thing." It's the first time I've ever told that story.

So we had this going all the time. It was much more severe in the early days. Finally, at least as far as we were concerned, it kind of disappeared, except for a few instances that we'll get to subsequently, because Kay Kerr finally understood that Judy and I were paying no attention whatsoever. Judy finally just stopped going to the meetings. She simply always had an engagement or some-

thing. She'd go to every third one or something. They died a natural death. But it just, again, poisoned the water. This was a group that was supposed to work together and be self-supportive, and you were having people who really were not that competent and experienced and didn't know, really, the situation on the different campuses. UCLA's totally different than Davis, and Davis totally different than Berkeley, and so on. Quite literally, there was at one time a proposal to create a handbook for chancellors' wives.

Well, these were the kind of issues that began building, and little by little, with regent backing, things began happening: the regents' resolution about the libraries--which, you know, even to this day they're still fighting up there--they never really fully implemented it. But at least we moved ahead in a quantum way. They always sniped at it, even at the end, until Kerr finally got out. [Charles J.] Hitch has been, I think, much fairer. Then came the building thing. Here we had some very real problems. I wanted to finish the medical school.

My view about Kerr, incidentally, in all of this, is that one of the problems with Kerr was, he's basically a Berkeley guy. This is why Hitch was a great appointment, and why really, in essence, the president of the University

of California should never come from the system. He always should come from outside. Berkeley was his home, and he lived up there, and all those faculty were his friends, and he was proud of that; and so he was always going to see that Berkeley was number one. At the other end of the spectrum, he realized that he'd never get credit for Berkeley. That's my interpretation. So he seized upon the new campuses. This would be Kerr's monument. Now, what fell in the middle was a place like UCLA.

MINK: And like Davis.

MURPHY: Yes. Well, what's UCLA going to do for Kerr? Nothing. So this was increasingly part of the problem--preoccupation of regents' meetings with new campuses and this and that and the other thing, and camouflaging and hiding my efforts to get equal treatment. On the building side, however, we were very lucky. We had Mrs. Chandler and we had Bill Forbes as members of the building and grounds committee, and they really worked with us. And I must say that whether it was Kerr's way of trying to keep them happy or whether he finally got the message--namely, that the southern regents were determined to have this or whatever--the one thing we never had problems with was building. We got that building money. And we got it with a minimum of struggle. We had some struggles about the medical school; they wanted to only do half of it, and

I finally got Mrs. Chandler to really ram that through. We had a few other little troubles. But we really got equity on building.

Now, our next step was on the FTE, and according to Chuck, we're pretty close to it now. But here they really twisted and turned. The regents began asking questions--you know, "What is the faculty-student ratio at Berkeley?" Well, it was lower, but there were reasons. They had a higher graduate enrollment. Then, right in the middle of the ball game, they decided to change the internal weighting in terms of the way they allocated FTE faculty; and so now a PhD program would have a factor of 4, and a master's program a factor of 2.5, and an undergraduate program, 1. So that was the thing which applied to Berkeley and UCLA. In the new campuses, however, the undergraduate got a factor of 3 and so forth and so on. And they just jiggled these statistics around--probably, in my view, to, in effect, get the bulk of the faculty FTE they were getting from the legislature to the new campuses and keep the Berkeley ratios the way they'd always been. Well, we began fighting this battle, and again we had the regents, again we sought statistics, again we didn't have them, again the regents sought them for us; and gradually these statistics began coming out. And that, as I say, is when Kerr suddenly realized he had to find a new

formula, and they came up with this new formula which temporarily justified the then status quo; although instead of reducing the Berkeley thing, we began getting relatively more FTE instead of their putting them in the stockpile for the new campuses.

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MINK: I think that when you left off yesterday afternoon, you were about to talk about the infamous Charter Day.

MURPHY: Before I do that, there're a couple of other little incidents that I think are important to suggest the flavor of the times and the character of the problem. I indicated earlier in the tape some of my shock at the lack of budgetary responsibility, budgetary flexibility on the campus, and my determination to do something about that. That entire first year, not only did I get the input of the history of all these problems that UCLA had had vis-à-vis Berkeley and the statewide office, but I was uncovering, week after week, instances in which normal, reasonable campus flexibility didn't exist.

The thing all culminated when we were making plans for the first commencement after I'd gotten here. Somewhere along the way, as the program was being developed, somebody said, "And of course, then, at this point in the program, the president will give the degrees, issue the degrees." I said, "What?" "Oh, yes." Well, as it turned out, for years, since the degree was the University of California degree, the theory had always been that the president came and, in ceremonial fashion, gave the degree.

Well, I just went through the roof. I said, "This is absolutely outrageous." I called up Harry Wellman. He said, "Oh, yes, this is the way it is, always been. This is the way the regents want it."

Parenthetically, one of the games, one of the things that forced me to go directly to the regents on matters, was that early on, whenever I would object to something, I would get from Berkeley the kind of phraseology, "Well, we understand your view, but the regents want it the other way." This is the old technique of talking about the third party. And I must say, after I got that for a while, I decided to find out what the regents really wanted.

In any event, on this issue, I was determined not to give, and we had a sort of showdown meeting. They gave me the history, and I said, "I'm not interested in history. You've given me the responsibility of dealing with this faculty, dealing with the student body. Over time I'm going to deal with a whole cycle of students. And at the very least, I ought to be there to give them their degree there." Well, we debated back and forth, and I absolutely stood firm on this matter. Then they changed it to the honorary degree. Well, the honorary degree is not given by the campus. It's given by the regents. It's given for the whole university. I said, "Okay. Let the president give the honorary degree. That's got the glamour anyway."

That's the distinguished individual. But the chancellor, in my case, I want to give the local degree."

In the beginning, they were unwilling to give all this, so they played a very clever game. This thing was still in debate; I was still hot. And about a month before the commencement, they called up from Berkeley and said that the president had discovered that he had a conflict of dates and that he couldn't come, and would I give the degrees for him? I said, yes, I'd give the degrees. Well, then Harry Wellman would come and give the honorary degrees. I said, "That's all right with me, as long as I give the degrees in course."

The way that problem finally got resolved was that it was at least three years before the statewide administration agreed the chancellor would give degree in course and the chancellor agreed that the president would give the honorary degree. In all those three years, I gave the degrees down here, because in those three years President Kerr conveniently had a conflict. But by the end of that three years, the chancellors had decided now to follow me and help me get autonomy. So at the end of three years, it was given to all the chancellors, and we finally won that.

MINK: This was attrition, in other words.

MURPHY: Yes. It took three years to kind of beat 'em down, that's all. But incredible. The chancellor would

not give the degree in course. Well, we won that.

Another issue I remember, a climate. Here I was in Southern California; remember, that was before Irvine, before Riverside was anything but a little undergraduate campus. Santa Barbara was small. UCLA was the University of California in Southern California. I had been asked by the regents, by the southern regents especially, and by the alumni leadership, to really bring the university into the community. Well, obviously I had to do that, and this was very--I won't say expensive, but this took entertaining; it took using the chancellor's residence for receptions and this and that; and there was very little money for expenses. As a matter of fact, in that first year, before we got the money up, I took it out of my own pocket--not all, but a lot of it.

I was talking to Ed Carter one time about this and grumbling, and he was outraged. He said, "I can't believe that." I said, "It's a fact." He said, "I'm going to look into it." I said, "As a matter of fact, go beyond that. Would you please find out how much Kerr has to spend and how much the chancellor at Berkeley has to spend. Add those up, and then compare that with what I have to spend for an even larger population area."

Well, as it turned out, it was an enormous differential. So the following year, at Regent Carter's insistence, the

statewide administration increased the chancellor at UCLA's budget for this purpose. But you see, here again, it would have never happened had there not been some exterior force that forced them to do it. So when you hear now--now that we broke through and UCLA's where it is--when you hear those fellows say what they did to help us, I hope the record will show that it wasn't that voluntary.

The next thing is an interesting little footnote. After I'd been operating for a year and we'd changed the telephone from University of California to UCLA, I changed the signs on the streets coming in from University of California to UCLA. And I'd gone through these exercises about degrees in course and so on. It was perfectly clear to the Berkeley crowd, as I said, earlier, that they'd gotten a wolf into the chicken coop. And now all kinds of efforts were mounted to make me understand that I should be a team player. I mentioned McHenry driving me around and so on.

Well, there was a meeting of the regents down here--I forget which month; it was in my second year, though, probably, as chancellor. The regents in those days usually had a dinner where they got together the Thursday night, the night of the first day of their two-day meeting. And I say parenthetically, it was all those regents plus the president; and, of course, the president is a regent. So

it was just regents only. But they would talk about all kinds of thing, off the record, that related to the campus. And I really objected to this, and I made my feelings known to Kerr and Wellman. They said, "Well, the regents want to talk with themselves." I said, "My God, we're their chief administrative officers. Are they against us, or are we all together? Even if we didn't open our mouths, it would be a good public relations gesture. This is just good employment practice." Well, it was clear that Kerr didn't want the chancellors to be visiting with the regents. They agreed with me. They said, "We don't know why you shouldn't be there." I said, "Well, you better talk to the president about it." They obviously did, and I'm sure that was an additional reason that Kerr and Wellman and the others were thinking of it as an unsettling force.

Well, finally we got a call one day that on this particular regents' meeting, which was to be down here, chancellors were invited. And I went to it. It was in the Bel-Air Hotel. And I thought it was just going to be friendly--you know, have some drinks and sit around the table and talk. The drinks went very quickly. The dinner went very quickly. And Kerr announced that they would now retire to the next room to discuss the structure of the university--nothing said in advance about this to me. So we go in there, and the chairs are all laid out; it was

obviously planned well ahead. And Clark got up and spoke about the University of California, its greatness, and its greatness because it was one university; and the fact that it spoke with one voice; and it was the statewide university; and over the years efforts had been made to fragment it, but they had been beaten down. You know, the message was coming through loud and clear to me. And these were a whole lot of other general phrases that nobody could basically disagree with, not even I. But you know, double entendres. And it was clear to me, and I think clear to the other chancellors and to a lot of the regents--maybe not to the regents, but certainly to the other chancellors who were close to this matter--that he was really zeroing in on me. Lots of efforts, I repeat, had been made to fragment it, but those had been overcome, and the regents had taken strong positions to maintain the unity of the university.

Then he finished, and then, out of the clear blue sky, he turned to me and said, "Now, Chancellor Murphy, would you care to comment? Would you express your views in this matter?" Well, you know, this was really put up. Now, whether the rest of it was put up, I don't know. This much clearly was put up. Let me tell you what happened. I got up and I said, "Well, you know, I cannot disagree basically with President Kerr." Quite honestly, when I

tell you what I said, this was my philosophy then; it's my philosophy today. I said, "I do believe that the strength of the University of California is related to the fact that it is one system with one board of regents, with one voice to the legislature, with one voice to the master plan, and that it is a situation where the sum of the parts is greater than the whole." But I said, "On the other hand, I want to make it quite clear that I think this university is no stronger than its weakest link. It is a university that has evolved enormously in the last ten or fifteen years in size, in visibility, and in function; and the UCLA campus," I said, "is as large as many state universities in total. It is in one of the great population centers in the country. I believe the regents, the president, and the chancellors must work to develop a situation in which the president, the office of the president, is respected as the chief administrative officer of the system, but that the office of the chancellor is a great deal more than merely that of a representative on the campus. He has to be strong, and he has to have the authority to match his responsibility." [tape recorder turned off] So in effect, I stated that I believed in the system but that I thought the system was askew in balance of authority. And I thought I'd be perfectly honest, and I more than once said that I thought the office of the president should be

maintained with dignity and integrity and influence, etc. I merely said that in balance, you ought to increase the authority and responsibility of the chancellor.

MINK: May I ask you something? Do you think, in a sense, that Kerr visualized this as sort of a showdown with you?

MURPHY: Well, in a sense. Let me tell you what happened, and then we'll see how we interpret it, because this is only a part of it. Yes, I think it was partly that, but let me come back to that.

One other thing I pointed out in this connection: I said, "You know, UCLA's a very large and complicated thing, as is Berkeley--the campus, that is." And I said, "You know, unless you do have a strong chancellor--and you can't have a strong chancellor unless he's got authority --not only are you going to not have happen what you want to have happen" (and I must say I didn't realize what I was saying when I said it), "unless he is strong and has the image of authority, you could conceivably have chaotic conditions on these campuses." I think that came up to haunt somebody in the subsequent difficulties.

I'd scarcely sat down when Harry Wellman stood up and said, "Mr. President, I want to respond to that." And then he really laced in, became almost personal. I obviously had no understanding of what made the university great;

there was no way to substantially increase the authority of the chancellor without eroding the authority of the president's office; there were and there had been evidences of fragmentation; and there ought to be some understanding on the part of the officers of the university of this great tradition, etc., etc., etc.

Well, he had scarcely sat down when Jesse Steinhart.... And I'll never forget this. Jesse Steinhart, as you know, was a part of that ancient old Steinhart family in San Francisco. All of them had gone to Berkeley. Jesse Steinhart was an old man, clearly of that generation that looked upon the rise of UCLA as a terrible thing, of that group of San Franciscans that thought Los Angeles wasn't worth anything anyway--it was filled with Hollywood and this kind of thing. All the symbolisms of San Francisco at its greatest and its worst. And Old Blue--one of the most devoted Berkeley graduates I ever knew--and a very intimate and close friend of Clark Kerr's. And he got up, and he blasted me--again, not by name, but there wasn't any doubt as to who was getting their hide flayed.

And this went on until finally Catherine Hearst got up and said, "Well, I've heard all of this, but I'll have to tell you, Jesse, and I'll have to tell you, Harry, I don't think you precisely heard what Dr. Murphy was saying, because this is not my reaction to what he said.

I rather think that what he had to say didn't go in the direction of wanting to fragment the university. I didn't hear anything about five boards of regents," and so forth and so on. I'll always be grateful to Catherine for that.

Then someone else--I believe it was Canaday--got up and seconded what Catherine was saying, and said, "I don't really know why we're having this meeting, President Kerr. If we're to discuss the structure of the university, we should discuss it not in these kind of generalities. And I think Dr. Murphy has a right to express his view. Maybe there should be modifications. Maybe this institution has grown in such a way that we'll have to modify our administrative structure." And at that point, somebody else said, "Well, now let's get on to the next subject"--whatever that was.

I was so angry, and I must say really hurt, that at that point I just got up and walked out. And somebody said--it may have been Wellman or Kerr--"Well, now we're on to another subject," ROTC or something. And I said, "I'm sure that you'll be able to deal with that quite effectively in my absence as in my presence. Goodnight, and I'll see you at the regents' meeting tomorrow." I was really bitter. I was bitter, but I was angry. I wasn't defeatist at that moment. I went home, told my wife what had happened, and she had just had an experience--

one of the experiences I described yesterday with Mrs. Kerr--and so we both sort of went to bed very depressed.

Well, the next morning, I went to the regents' meeting, and Bill Forbes and two or three other people got me aside and said, "Now, look, don't do anything hastily. It was a terrible thing to do. Mrs. Chandler said the same. We know precisely what your views are; we think they're sound. You and Dr. Kerr ought to get together and negotiate this thing out." And I said, "Look, I'm ready to negotiate anytime. The problem is, they don't move. They don't move except under pressure."

Now, this episode clearly was staged. First of all, I was given no advance notice, nor were any of the other chancellors. Secondly, we'd never been invited to a dinner before. Why, all of a sudden, that particular dinner? Clearly, Harry Wellman had been told to perform.

MINK: Sort of a Nixon-Agnew kind of a thing. Wellman was speaking for Kerr, saying the things that Kerr personally couldn't say.

MURPHY: That's it precisely, precisely. He was Kerr's spokesman. He was a ventriloquist's Charlie McCarthy. But the one thing that really shook me was Jesse Steinhart. Jesse is a nice man; he and I got along well. He didn't care anything about UCLA, but he didn't vote against us. All he wanted to know was what's happening at Berkeley.

It was as though UCLA wasn't there. But now, all of a sudden, overnight--he never privately got me aside and said, "Now, look, Franklin, you're getting a little too energetic." So I have to believe--but in all fairness, I don't know for certain--I have to believe that he was a part of the orchestrated act. I think that Kerr got the first message at that time that it was going to be very tough to get the wolf out of the chicken coop when he saw Catherine Hearst and John Canaday, and I'm sure after the meeting some of the others went to him and said, you know, "Why?" And then he suddenly realized that the regents--a lot of the regents, anyway--supported my views, thought well of me as a person, and were not bound to follow his lead, or at least would be open-minded about modifications--the regents, that is--in terms of these traditional techniques of administering. Now, have you got a question?

MINK: The question I think you've pretty well answered, and that was whether you thought that this was an intentional showdown.

MURPHY: Kerr was never a man [for a showdown] and never will be. You know, he's a labor negotiator.

MINK: He was an arbitrator, I know.

MURPHY: And I think the last thing Kerr ever wanted was a one-to-one showdown. There were plenty of opportunities. But Clark--I'll give him credit for this, because I think

this is sound in human relations--Clark was never one to create a situation where the two parties couldn't somehow, sidewise, back out to come back another day. But in my mind, there isn't the slightest doubt that this was contrived to get a message to me.

MINK: Did you make you administrators aware of this?

MURPHY: I kept very little back ever from Chuck Young, Foster Sherwood, and Bill Young. I didn't go beyond that. I didn't tell the deans or people like that. Whether I've related this particular incident, I can't tell you. I probably did to one or more of them. I may not have. I must say, I was as hurt and as humiliated and as angry and depressed when I went home that evening as I've been for a long, long time. But you bounce back the next day. There are several other little points I want to put in here before I get to the confrontation. My memory is not as good as a computer. All I can assure you is that there were literally hundreds of these kinds of little episodes.

MINK: Needling things.

MURPHY: Needling--sometimes Kerr directly; more often somebody speaking for him or thinking they were speaking for him and protecting the power that that little group had gotten. You see, Kerr was away a lot. He delegated a lot of stuff. He had budget officers up there--vice-presidents and a whole coterie of people--who were playing

God with Kerr's delegated authority. And they would play the same game that Kerr would play with me. Kerr and Wellman would say, "The regents want this." But these second-level bureaucrats would say to me, "The president wants this," you see.

So this happened over and over and over again. It not only happened to me--it happened to Sherwood, it happened to Chuck Young, it happened to Bill Young--and it was just a constant harassment. Sure, we could have stopped the harassment by just sitting back and saying, "Okay, we're just a group of kind of third-rate administrators down here. Tell us what to do." I think in the beginning Bill Young and Foster really didn't think I'd lay on this battle, because people had before and lost it; but after a year, when they saw I wasn't going to give, and was not going to be denied [what was] reasonable, they swung all the way around, and they were in there loyally. They were fighting their counterparts in Berkeley with this harassment as much as I was.

MINK: I was going to observe that I think in my experiences with Bill Young, interviewing him, he's a pretty hard-nosed guy himself.

MURPHY: That's right.

MINK: He doesn't take any bull.

MURPHY: That's right. Not from me or anybody else. But

in the beginning, they were all taking it. They had been accustomed to taking it. Anyway, once they realized that I wasn't going to cave in and leave them out on a limb, then we really got geared up. Okay.

Now let me tell you some of the problems that I began identifying. And I explained this to the regents all the way along. The first one in the system, inherent in the system, was the built-in conflict of interest, with the president of the university having been the Berkeley chancellor and appointing the chancellor. Now, the conflict of interest was that the president of the university was physically located in Berkeley. Sproul was the prototype. Sproul was, in effect, the president of the university and the Berkeley chancellor, because Sproul didn't have a chancellor. You remember, the first Berkeley chancellor was Clark Kerr.

MINK: He had a provost. [Monroe] Deutsch.

MURPHY: That's right. Yes, Deutsch. But he [Sproul] was running Berkeley.

MINK: He was sort of a figurehead, more or less.

MURPHY: Yes. He was running Berkeley, Sproul was. As a matter of fact, he was running UCLA, living down here and this sort of thing. Finally, as you know, the chancellorship was forced upon Sproul--the concept of the chancellorship. To get one down here, in order to save face, they

got one at Berkeley and they got one at Santa Barbara. But you must remember that Sproul appointed that person. He lived in that house, the president's house. He leaves; Kerr becomes president. He doesn't want to move into it. He appoints somebody that he can manipulate and control totally. And symbolically, that house on the campus was left empty. That's a huge symbolism. We'll come to that later when I tell you about the Roger Heyns. He was the first chancellor to live in that house. Anyway, they appointed the first chancellor, Glenn Seaborg. Glenn was a Nobel Prize winner with a lot of glamour and no administrative experience whatsoever.

MINK: He was a UCLA man in his undergraduate years.

MURPHY: He was an undergraduate, yes. But basically he was a Berkeley fellow. Glenn didn't like administration. He wasn't good at it, either. He didn't like it. So in those early meetings, when I was fighting to get the chancellors more authority, Glenn Seaborg always sided with Kerr. And what he would say, I'll never forget. He said, "I don't want to become a full-time administrator." Imagine! He said, "My schedule--and I want you to know this--I'm a scholar first and an administrator second. And my schedule is that I spend two days a week in the chancellor's office and three days in my laboratory." Well, the way he ran the place and what happened at

Berkeley was evidence of the fact that there was somebody lacking.

But basically that's what Kerr wanted to hear, because Kerr had this desire. As I told you earlier, I wouldn't take the presidency of the university, because the most interesting part of a university job is the campus--the faculty, the students, the dynamics of it, seeing departments grow, libraries grow, and so on. Kerr really wanted to be, subconsciously, the Berkeley chancellor and have that fun, and be the president of the university with that authority. And that was an absolutely intolerable conflict of interest. And it was a guarantee that he couldn't be objective, either about authority to the chancellor or equity between Berkeley and UCLA. When Glenn Seaborg left to go to Washington and the Atomic Energy Commission, he then appointed his old friend Ed Strong, who followed and quoted his line completely.

MINK: Chapter, line, and verse.

MURPHY: And Ed was a philosopher. He'd never administered a department, hardly. And again, that's precisely what Kerr wanted.

MINK: When you say "appointed," this was simply that there was no list drawn up. The regents were just given a name?

MURPHY: That's correct. That is absolutely correct.

MINK: It was sort of pro forma.

MURPHY: Pro forma. In that case.

MINK: And yet with the other chancellors, they would have search committees. It doesn't seem exactly equitable.

MURPHY: Well, but, you know, if you're running a show, you can manipulate and you can say that nobody wants the job and this and that. Okay.

All that time, that house on the campus remained empty. Incidentally, Ed Strong, at these meetings, would jump on me, say he didn't need the authority and that was a larger campus--why did I? Stuff like that. Until, of course, he and Kerr had their split. You talk to Ed Strong today and get quite a different picture. John Saunders, I remember, he was even more of a sycophant. "Oh, yes, I don't need any more authority," and "If we give the authority we'll...." He said all the things Kerr wanted to hear. When Kerr fired him, or was told to fire him by the regents--I don't know which it was--Saunders suddenly saw the reality. And somebody ought to take his oral history, if indeed you've got asbestos tape; for then, he would tell me what he had been told to say. He'd been programmed. He had been told what I might probably say at a chancellor's meeting and what he then was to say in rebuttal. He's told me this more than once.

So that the chancellors at that time were inarticulate, frightened, I think, to some extent by the president. They'd all been appointed by him or they assumed that he could get the regents to fire 'em. They assumed that if they were good they'd get their budgets improved, and all this kind of thing. And Kerr used them. It wasn't until about the third year that the chancellors really began to speak up, and the first one to come along and support me was Emil Mrak at Davis. And in the end, he was a tower of strength in our struggle to get for the chancellors--not just for UCLA, not just for me--but to get a workable system within the system. In the end, we were all together. I was the spokesman. But in the beginning, I was a very lonely spokesman. I don't resent it. I just resent the fact that it was all so unnecessary. Okay, these were the notes that I made, and we'll come back to some of these later.

MINK: Was there any particular reason that caused Emil to see the light?

MURPHY: Well, I think there were two reasons. First of all, you know, Emil was an Old Blue through and through. He went to Berkeley, got his graduate degrees at Berkeley; his wife was a Berkeley graduate. But I think when he saw Kerr beginning to move to put the resources in the new campuses and not permit Davis to develop into a general

campus university, he then began to realize that his hopes for Davis would not be achieved unless he spoke up. Furthermore, by that time Kerr was away so much, making speeches and consulting in the government and so on, that Mrak was now dealing with the second level, and he was furious with these people--the budget officers and the others that were telling him what he could and couldn't do, and always saying "The president says this and that." Emil would talk to me and say, "Franklin, you know, Clark doesn't want this. Just some bureaucrat does." I said, "Why don't you ask him?" "Well, I can't get hold of him. He's a very busy man." Finally, I said one day, "Emil, listen, wake up to the fact: you know damn well Clark wants this, or these fellows wouldn't be saying it. You've written him letters; you've made phone calls; you've talked to him. You get doubletalk, but it's still happening, isn't it?" He said, "Yes." Then I said, "What conclusion does an intelligent man draw?" "Well," he said, "I just can't believe that Clark would say one thing and really not mean it." I said, "Well, you're going to have to draw your own conclusions." I said, "All I ask you is to be totally objective. That's all."

Well, finally, he came around, and he said, "Franklin, you know, you're right. We've got to fight if we're going to get the kind of authority and responsibility that permits

us to make some campus decisions." He was more apologetic for Clark than I ever was, which was okay. Maybe I'm over-reacting; that's an absolute possibility. He would say, "I think Clark really doesn't want to confront his own people. I think he really believes that I should have this and this and this authority, but his own people have...." "Well," I said, "then there's only one thing for you to do, and that's just to force it." And he agreed. So he was the first recruit.

Sam Gould came in about that time. He was helpful. Unfortunately, he left, for some of the reasons I mentioned earlier. John Saunders, never, because before he realized the truth and the reality, he was out. Ed Strong, never, because when he realized the truth, he was locked in a life-and-death struggle with Clark about the Berkeley campus and the riots, and he really couldn't think about anything else. Subsequently, Strong has told me that he really knew I was absolutely right and felt he was not in a position to do anything about it.

Okay, that's part of this climate. And if you say, "Well, gee, that sounds like a chronic struggle; was it really that all the time?" I'll have to tell you, it was. Now, this is not stuff that was in the Daily Bruin or in the Los Angeles Times, because a lot of this was locked behind doors, and you don't give press releases

about this sort of thing.

MINK: How visible was it to the governor and to the speaker of the assembly?

MURPHY: Very invisible.

MINK: And the other politicians?

MURPHY: I think as far as the politicians were concerned, it was quite invisible. I don't think they ever realized that Kerr and I were having this battle, because publicly I was always supporting Kerr, always supporting him. I made speeches about this gifted man, this good president. Kerr in the end--and I'm getting ahead of my story--frequently turned to me; for example, he had a real problem of getting the regents to agree to eliminate compulsory ROTC. And he finally came to me. Wellman, I think, told him to. He said, "Look, I need your support on this. There are three or four regents whose votes I've got to have, and I'm not going to get them unless you help me." I said, "I'll help you." I talked to them privately, and stood up at the meeting, and fought with Ed Pauley, my old friend; and we got that through. There were other things like that. Publicly, I never, to the very end, turned my back on Clark. I thought it was totally unfair to do so, and I did my fighting privately. And in public, if I fought at all, it was in his behalf--including, as you'll discover later, saving his job a year before he lost

it and so on.

Okay, now, the famous Charter Day episode. From the time I'd come, I inherited the concept of Charter Day. I began to get restless about it. I said, you know, "Charter Day. Well, that's the foundation of the University of California, that's true, but it's really the foundation of the Berkeley campus." I said, "Sure, we'll celebrate that, but we've got to have our own day, when UCLA was founded"--forty-fifth [anniversary] or whatever it was when I came. So I began working with the Alumni Association on this one. Doug Kinsey was here at the time--or maybe it was even when Harry Longway was here I started on it. I talked to the Alumni Association, which parenthetically I found weak and underfinanced, by and large.

One of the things I worked very hard on, and I think fairly successfully, was to make these people understand that if they were going to have an Alumni Association to match the quality and the size of this institution, or the Berkeley one, they had to put money in it, they had to get adequate quarters. Let's talk about that later; that's an interesting story unto itself, starting fund raising and getting the Alumni Association reorganized.

Anyway, I began talking with these people about doing our own thing, not in lieu of, but in addition to. Well, finally word got up to Berkeley that we were thinking of

having, in the spring, a celebration of the foundation of the UCLA campus. So I got the word: "What's this all about?" "Well," I said, "we want to take note of the fact that forty-five years ago UCLA was founded." "Well, don't we have a Charter Day?" I said, "Sure, that's the University of California. We'll do both." Well, they were restless about it, especially since by that time the student body had decided to choose as their song--and I encouraged them behind the scenes--Hail to the Hills of Westwood. I wanted them to have a song that was theirs. That upset the people at Berkeley a lot. They said, "Well, what about the University of California song?" I said, "Well, the kids can sing that. Let the kids sing what they want. This is their campus. I'm not going to tell them what to sing or what not to sing." I said, "I can assure you that at Charter Day that will be sung, because that is a University of California thing."

Well, of course, the chancellor's role in Charter Day was zero when I arrived. The theory here was, the president came down, took the whole thing over, made the speech. What the chancellor did--and I did it the first time--the most he was asked to do was to present one of the candidates for the honorary degree. The president made the speech, and the president presided. So after going through the first one of these exercises, I sat down with the people--in this case Earl Bolton, who'd been hired by that time as vice-

president for ceremonies and everything--and I said, "Earl, look. I think the chancellor ought to preside." "No, no, no; this is a university day." I said, "What the hell, am I a part of the university or not? This is my campus." I said, "I ought to preside, and I'll introduce the president. He can make the speech; he can give the honorary degrees. All I do is just welcome the people on my campus." Well, that seemed to be a very complicated problem. I kept pressing this, pressing it, and finally, I guess to get me off their neck, they agreed. It was modified to that extent. So, I guess starting with the second or third Charter Day, at least I presided.

Secondly, when I presided, what I did was to welcome these people, and I spoke for about five minutes. "I welcome you here today to UCLA"--a little bit about UCLA, this and that and the other. Well, I was accused of having made a speech rather than presiding. I said, "Well, listen. This is like angels on the head of a pin. If my welcoming comments are five minutes or three minutes, just say I'm too articulate. But I didn't make a speech. I made some opening comments. This is what I say." I then said, "Look. You've given me a good idea, Earl. I think the chancellor should make some comments." So I said, "I think what I'm going to do, I'm going to extend this to about eight minutes." "Well, I'll have to check with the president." I said,

"You just tell the president that my opening comments are going to be a little longer than usual. I'll not duplicate anything he says. I'm not going to talk about the statewide university."

So gradually that's the way Charter Day evolved, and I never went beyond that. I never demanded more than that, because I did believe that the center of attraction was the president. I, as chancellor, on behalf of the campus, welcomed him to one of his campuses. I introduced him. I usually was very fulsome in my introduction and then turned the whole thing over to him. Well, they couldn't really object to that, finally. (And incidentally, I had a little regents' help on that, too.)

The next kind of an operation was that after Charter Day, there was a luncheon, always a luncheon. And traditionally, the Alumni Association laid on the lunch. The Alumni Association would seat at the head table the honorary degree fellows, the president, the chancellor, and so on. They made all the arrangements. So that went on for several years, till we came to whatever year it was of the [Adolfo] López Mateos-Lyndon Johnson.

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MURPHY: Well, came this famous Charter Day. There are so many elements, but let me try to remember what I can about it. John Kennedy had been assassinated, and Lyndon Johnson was the new president of the United States. Ed Pauley, Regent Pauley, had for many years been a close friend of Lyndon Johnson. So Pauley got the idea--I think this whole thing really originated with Ed Pauley--that it would be a great thing early in Johnson's administration for the university to give him an honorary degree. Pauley, at that time, also had a deep interest in Mexico. And in his fertile mind, he conceived the idea that we should also give López Mateos, who was then the president [of Mexico], an honorary degree; and that since Johnson had publicly stated that a good-neighbor policy in the U.S. was going to be one of the high points of his administration, why not have López Mateos and Johnson meet for the first time in California and give them both an honorary degree.

Well, he talked to Clark Kerr. Pauley was then, I think, chairman of the board; or even if he weren't, he was always, as you know, a powerful regent. He also talked with Governor [Edmund G.] Brown, and Governor Brown thought that it was a fantastic idea, Brown being a Democrat and Pauley

a Democrat and Johnson a Democrat. Well, needless to say, Clark Kerr was not about to say no, when the governor and Pauley said this was a good idea.

Now, Ed Pauley, more than any other regent, had the habit of dealing directly with me. This infuriated Clark Kerr, but there was nothing he could do about it; and, for that matter, there was nothing I could do about it. Pauley would simply call me up and say, "Look, I want to come to the campus and talk to you about this or that or the other thing."

So he called me, and he said, "What do you think about it?" I said, "Fantastic." "Well, now," he said, "I want to keep you fully informed." I said all right. I called Clark; thank God I called Clark. I said, "Clark, Ed Pauley called me, and he told me about this idea. I think it's a great idea. What's happening?" And Clark was very short with me. He said, "Well, now, look. Ed Pauley was... out of line," he called it. "This thing hasn't even been fully cleared with the regents." And he said, "Don't you worry about it. We'll take care of it in our office." I said, "I'm not worried about it. I'm just calling to tell you that Pauley called me." I couldn't understand why there was this irrational overreaction.

Okay. The next thing I hear, I'm in my office, and Ed Pauley calls from Mexico City. And he said, "I've just

talked to López Mateos's secretary, and he's interested in the idea. And I'm going to fly to Washington to talk to Lyndon Johnson. Now, tell me what are the best dates?" So I quickly look at the calendar, and I figure out some dates, and I say, "Well, I think this or this or this would be fine." Again, I immediately call Clark Kerr, and I say, "I've just heard from Ed Pauley from Mexico City," and I relate the conversation. Kerr is extremely short. "Well, why didn't he call me?" I said, "Clark, I don't know. Believe me, I don't know. You'll have to ask him." "But," I said, "you're learning it within five minutes after I learned it." I said, "As a matter of fact, if Ed's going to independently operate this way, he may be calling me again, and I promise you you'll hear as you have in the past --immediately, if he calls." "Well," he said, "I should be doing this." I said, "Clark, I really think so. But that's your problem with Ed Pauley. There's nothing I can do about Ed Pauley. Why don't you call him up?" He said, "Well, where is he?" I said, "Well, he's on his way to Washington, I gather--that's what he told me--to talk to Johnson."

Well, whether Clark ever called him or not, I don't know, because about three or four days later, Pauley calls me--now from Los Angeles--saying that Johnson has agreed in principle. And now the problem is to work out the dates.

And he said, "Now, will you get after this?" I said, "Ed, I can't do this. The president's office ought to do it." "Well," he said, "then will you get him to do it?"

So I call Clark Kerr, and I relate this conversation. Well, needless to say, he's furious. I don't blame him. But I'm an innocent party in this whole damned thing. So I say, "Clark, really, would you call Ed and take this thing over? Because, look, it ought to be in one place." He said okay, he would. And I said, "Seeing all the formal letters and invitations have to go out, I would like to suggest some dates because of scheduled problems down here and so on." And I gave him the same dates. And I said, "Now, they've obviously got to relate to your calendar. Would you check?" And he checked, and yes, two or three of them would be okay. I said, "Well, I hope this is the last time I hear about the invitations and getting this done."

Well, they went ahead, and they wrote the letters from Berkeley, and the agreement was made--they picked a date. Well, when Kerr informed me of this, of the date, I called together our people--Andy Hamilton; I got Bob Neumann into the act, because Bob was very knowledgeable about protocol and he was the head of our foreign education program at that time; and I got all of the other people that would normally be concerned with planning;

and I got the Alumni Association into the act. I think Tom Davis was involved in that. Tom Davis was a regent, I guess, at that time, and he was centrally involved as an alumnus. Wasn't he president of the Alumni Association? And I said, "You fellows had better get busy, because this is going to be quite a lunch."

MINK: It was quite a day.

MURPHY: And quite a day.

MINK: Sure.

MURPHY: And Tom said, "Well, look, we're going to have to rely a lot on you and your office and Judy"; and I said, "Look, we'll do anything we can, but please take this responsibility."

Well, the first thing that happened was that some Secret Service people came out from Washington, very far in advance, to look the place over. And I assigned our police department, buildings and grounds people to it and so on. The next thing I get is a phone call from Berkeley in which they say, "We understand that some Secret Service people are there. Why weren't we informed?" And I said, "Well, you know, this is a mechanical thing." "Well, we haven't agreed on where this should be held." I said, "Well, I told you. We're going to hold it in the athletic field. We're going to have to build some bleachers." "Well, you don't have the budget for that." I said, "I

know. I'm going to ask the regents for \$25,000." "Well, why aren't we brought into this more?" I said, "Well, all right, how do you want to be brought into it?" "Well, we want to know whenever there are any inquiries."

MINK: Who were these people that were calling?

MURPHY: I can't remember. Some functionary. It wasn't Kerr. Earl Bolton, I think, probably. So the next thing that happened was that I'd asked Bob Neumann to find out from the State Department, and from the local Mexican consul and whomever was involved, some protocol things. I said, "Develop a memo here about who has priority, seniority, and so forth." Well, Bob made a couple of calls to Washington and the State Department, just about mechanical, protocol-type things, and to the Mexican consul.

Then again I got a phone call, "What's Neumann doing? We understand that Bob Neumann is taking over the arrangements." I said, "No, he isn't taking over the arrangements." Finally, this got so harassing that I went to Berkeley, and I got hold of Kerr, and I said, "Look. This thing is becoming extremely difficult." I said, "Would you please assign somebody on your staff as the person, and we will deal directly with him and he deals directly with us. And then he can report to you--someone that you have total confidence in--because here we are with an enormously complicated thing, for which we're responsible, lying ahead of us. We have to

make plans; we have to call people. We've got people coming out to see us. We have to give instant decisions. And we can't have this caught up in this statewide bureaucracy. I'm not going to consult with your building man on putting the bleachers up and another fellow on this and another fellow on this. Put somebody in charge." He said, "All right, I'll put Earl Bolton in charge." I said fine. I told Andy Hamilton that he was to deal with Earl Bolton; I told Bob Neumann he was to deal with Earl Bolton.

In the meantime--and I've got this correspondence--Kerr wrote Bob Neumann one of the nastiest letters I've ever read in my life, accusing him of going far beyond his authority. It was an irrational letter. Neumann was hurt. He came in, and he said, "What does this mean?" I read it. I said, "Bob, I haven't the vaguest idea, but" I said, "these people in Berkeley are up so tight about this that you can't imagine it." He said, "What shall I do?" I said, "You sit down and write Clark Kerr the same kind of a letter. You say in paragraph one this: 'It is not true. This is what the facts are.'" I said, "Kerr has obviously been misinformed and badly informed." And he wrote such a letter and sent me a copy of it, which I have along with the copy of the original letter that he wrote to Neumann.

Well, about this time, our people were working desperately to get things up and work with the Secret Service and

so on. And Andy was loyally trying to work with Earl Bolton. Earl Bolton was really throwing his weight around. Well, we were able to take that until Kay Kerr got into the act about the luncheon. And Bolton was starting to say, "Now, Mrs. Kerr wants this; and Mrs. Kerr is going to do that; and Mrs. Kerr, as you know, is the official hostess for this thing; and she wants this at the lunch; and she doesn't want this at the lunch," and so forth and so on. So we got hold of Tom Davis, and I said, "Tom, you know, you're planning this and that, but that isn't what Mrs. Kerr wants." "What the hell has Mrs. Kerr got to do with it?" I said, "Well, you should know this." Tom got furious. And I said, "You're a regent. You go directly to the president." Andy had informed him of this as well as I. Tom had said, "You know, all they're doing is creating terrible problems for us; and after all, this is our lunch, not theirs."

Well, Bolton apparently was confused about this. He thought, in the beginning, that Mr. and Mrs. Kerr were putting on the lunch, and therefore Mr. and Mrs. Kerr wanted this and this and this and that's what they were going to have. Incidentally, the whole lunch was, in a sense, built around Clark and Kay Kerr; and then the two presidents and their cabinets were coming along and so on. And the rest of us were, you know, out in the audience.

Apparently, Davis and Kerr had a real set-to about this. And, in a sense, Kerr took it out on me, because the implication is--he had his underlings talk to me, especially Bolton--that I had put the Alumni Association up to this and that they were acting as a front. And they even brought my wife into it, who was an innocent bystander--that the Alumni Association are running interference for you and Mrs. Murphy, but Dr. and Mrs. Kerr are the host and hostess. And I said, "Earl, let me make one thing clear to you. I never assumed I was the host--least of all, Mrs. Murphy the hostess. I must explain to you that from the very beginning--and this is like it's been every other year--the Alumni Association is the host. "Well," he said, "that isn't the way Dr. Kerr views it." I said, "You'd better talk to him, and, again, tell him to decide right now whether he wants to change the tradition. And if he does, you have him tell Mr. Davis, tell the UCLA alumni people. Leave me out of it. I'll be there. I'll be sitting somewhere, I guess." "Well," he said, "you should talk to Davis." I said, "I won't do it. You guys got into this; you've created all of this dust." I said, "Now, listen. If you had left this to us and the president--he issued the invitations; we would have made all the arrangements. Hell, we've done this before. We're not children down here. And we would have sat down with you, worked

out the program the way you wanted it. It would have been very simple." And I said, "Really, the real problem here is that President and Mrs. Kerr have thrown themselves into this as though this were happening at Berkeley. But it isn't." So he went back. I don't know how he phrased it with Kerr.

Oh, then there was the question of the press release. The announcement. That had come a bit earlier, and that had really been an issue, too, because the press release said, "President Clark Kerr announced today that at Charter Day at UCLA, honorary degrees will be given..." etc., etc., etc. "President Kerr says that..." and then there's a quotation of a lot of things that he said--"a landmark day in the history of the University of California," etc.--and no comment by the UCLA chancellor. Andy brought it in to me. He said, "This is what Al Pickerell sent down." I read the damned thing, and I said, "Look, I'm not going to approve it. They've got to put in there--and you write it; I don't give a damn what's said--they've got to say, 'and Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy comments that for UCLA this is a great day,' and so forth. Put it at the end. But it has to be there."

Parenthetically, when I'm through with this story, remind me to come back and tell you about the hassles we had about the announcements, both on Charter Day appointees

and the appointment of presidents and deans. We'll come to that in a moment.

Well, they sent it back to Pickerell, and Pickerell took it in to Kerr; and I assume that Kerr blew up and said, "That damned Murphy. Can't he leave things alone?"--or something. Anyway, this was a real hassle. Finally they decided yes, they'd give me one line.

MINK: Generous.

MURPHY: It was a real struggle just to get in there at all. Okay. Then came this Bolton thing and the hassle about the luncheon--the question of whether Dr. and Mrs. Kerr were the hosts or Dr. and Mrs. Murphy; my saying that we never intended to be, it was the Alumni Association. The next thing that happens is, I'm in Kansas City at a Hallmark board meeting, and Andy or Chuck or somebody called me and said, "The president has announced that he's not going to attend Charter Day at UCLA and is so going to advise the regents. We just had a call." I said, "Oh, what's the problem?" "Well, he simply says that since UCLA has taken the whole thing over, he doesn't wish to be a part of it." I get on the phone; I call Kerr; and I finally get him. And I said, "What's this I hear?" He said, "Absolutely." He said, "You've taken this out of our hands completely, and," he said, "I don't want to have any responsibility or any part of it. And Mrs. Kerr

feels the same way." Well, I said, "Clark, I don't know what you're talking about," and I repeated that Earl Bolton had been fully informed and we were reacting. And the program was precisely the way--he was going to introduce the two, and he was going to give the honorary degrees, and he was going to make the speech. And I said, "What's the problem?" "Well, this luncheon. Apparently you and Mrs. Murphy insist on being host and hostess." I said, "Look, Bolton has either lied to you, or he hasn't told you the facts. We never intended to be." I said, "Clark, you know that this has been the Alumni Association's responsibility." "Well, that's just a front." "Well," I said, "it wasn't a front before. Why wasn't it last year or the year before?" "Well, this is different. These are two heads of state. This is a unique moment in the history of the University of California." "Well," I said, "make your peace with Davis, not with me." "Well," he said, "you should make the peace." But he said, "Furthermore, I'm just through with it." "Well," I said, "do the regents know this?" He said, "I've written them a letter today, all the regents." And I said, "Would you mind sending me a copy?" And he said, "Yes, I'll send you a copy." He said, "Furthermore, you and I have got to come to an understanding about our relationship to this university." He said, "You have demanded all kinds of things since you've been here. We've given you more than anybody

has ever been given. And each time we give you something, you want two more." And he said, "At some point we have to sit down and decide what you think you need, and I've got to tell you what you can get and what you can't get; and at that point, then some fundamental decisions have to be made." I said, "I'd be delighted. You just write me the letter, tell me...." He said, "You write me your letter first." And I said, "I'll do it."

I went back to Los Angeles, and I found a copy of his letter. I found phone calls from Pauley and Carter and I don't know who. So I put in the phone calls, and they asked me what the problem was, and I tried to tell them. I called Tom Davis, and I told him, and he was furious. That's when Kerr lost Davis forever. And I said, "Would you call Clark and try to convince him that I haven't been using you, which he accuses me of doing?" You know, Tom didn't like to be accused of being used by anyone. I called Pauley and explained it to Pauley, and Pauley said, "This is ridiculous. I'm going to call Kerr and order him to be there." And I said, "Do whatever you want, Ed."

MINK: He could, too.

MURPHY: He did. What he did, as I understand it, was to call two or three other regents, tell them what he was going to do, and urge them to do the same. So three days later, Kerr changed his opinion. In the meantime, Tom Davis had

called him, first of all gave him hell, and finally said, "What are we planning that you don't want, you and Mrs. Kerr?" Well, as it turned out, it really wasn't very much; and really, I think there was a breakdown in communications due to Bolton. I think Bolton took his role too seriously. I think he really was trying to make points with Kerr, and especially Mrs. Kerr, by in effect saying, "This is going to be your party." So, maybe to a certain extent, Clark really was misinformed. But the misinformation came because by that time I don't think Kerr believed anything I said-- or thought there was an ulterior motive.

Well, Charter Day came. The Kerrs came. They got front billing. I introduced him, and that's the only thing I did. He did the whole thing. He met the president at the helicopter and generously introduced the president to me and so forth and so on. He led the procession. They sat in the center of the table next to the president and the Alumni Association. I was at one end, I guess, and he was at the other. I didn't really care. Everything that he could have possibly wanted, he had. But this whole unnecessary episode, reflecting the worst ego problem, and the worst of the insecurity, and the worst of the (by that time, I think) deep resentment of my role in the university, had surfaced.

Well, the regents' meeting was scheduled for not long

thereafter down here, and the Pauleys gave a dinner that Thursday night and invited the chancellors. By this time, my theory that the chancellors should be invited to these dinners had taken hold; and, in spite of Kerr, the regents just invited them. There was nothing he could do about it. So this became a built-in kind of tradition, which continues: the chancellors still go to these dinners, Chuck tells me.

But during the cocktail hour, Pauley came to me, and he said, "I want to talk to you and Kerr alone." So he took us into another room, and he said, "Now, look. This entire episode was totally unnecessary." He said, "I want you to know that the regents have the highest respect for you, Clark." He turned to me, and he said, "Franklin, I want you to know that the regents have the highest respect for you. They think the two of you are doing an absolutely splendid job. But the two of you have got to stop this feuding." He just scolded us like, you know, little boys. Kerr was extremely restless and tried to break in on several occasions, and Pauley said, "Now, just wait till I'm finished."

So he gave us quite a monologic spanking and encouraged us to behave like adults, etc., etc. Frankly, I thought I'd been behaving like an adult. Kerr had been a child about this thing, but that didn't bother me any. And then he turned to me and said, "Now, are you willing to try to

cooperate?" I said, "Ed, absolutely." He said, "Clark, are you willing to cooperate with Franklin?" Clark said, "Well, I am, if he'll just cooperate with me." Ed said, "He's already said he would." I said, "Well, Ed, just one moment. I want to make it clear that I shall always speak up for what I think is proper administration in the university, and I'm going to continue to fight--fairly, I hope--for a situation where the authority matches the responsibility, which I do not think is currently the case."

"What do you mean?" So I talked about appointments and promotions and a few other things like that.

And then that was over, and we went back in. I could tell Clark was absolutely furious. He wasn't talking to anybody, least of all me. He was morose and quiet all during the dinner; and as soon as it was over, he got up abruptly [snaps fingers] and left.

MINK: I imagine it was humiliating for him, as the president of the university, to be talked to in front of a subordinate, which I'm sure he considered you to be, by his own boss, who would be the chairman of the Board of Regents.

MURPHY: I'm sure you're right. And I suspect if I'd been in his position I would have felt much the same. But anyway, that was that episode.

Well, just to continue the Charter Day thing, by this

time, the UCLA event in the spring had gained, as you know, a lot of momentum. And inevitably, Charter Day began to be a chore. Furthermore, the problem of getting a truly distinguished guy was getting more and more difficult. And so there was little enthusiasm on this campus for the continuance of Charter Day. By this time, the regents, having seen this kind of friction and this kind of confrontation, which all of them felt--and incidentally, I think that at that point Clark Kerr really began his downhill thing.

MINK: He began to lose votes.

MURPHY: That's it. This childlike petulance--you know, "I won't come because...." You know, when they fully realized that there was no real reason except a little bruising of the ego.

MINK: See, I was wondering about other regents. You always talk about Pauley; you always talk about Canaday, Forbes occasionally, Carter and Mrs. Chandler. But what about [Howard C.] Naffziger? What about [William M.] Roth?

MURPHY: Well, Naffziger was gone by then. Long since.

MINK: What about Roth?

MURPHY: Bill was kind of neutral in this thing. Ellie Heller was sort of believing Clark in the beginning, but in the middle and the end it shifted because of some of these kind of episodes. But the core of southern regents--Carter,

Pauley, Canaday, Forbes, Tom Davis; the alumni presidents, of course--Bob Haldeman and those people when they were there....

MINK: Simon hadn't come yet?

MURPHY: Simon? Oh, he was.

MINK: I believe he was a regent in '60.

MURPHY: Simon became a regent the year I arrived.

MINK: Yes, I believe that's when he was appointed.

MURPHY: And Simon was always with me on these things, always--trying to negotiate, but still negotiating in my behalf. But always supporting Kerr. In other words, I want to make it clear that in the beginning they were supportive of Clark as president but of my view, too. In other words, they weren't choosing between the two of us. That only came after these episodes, down the road.

In any event, to wind up Charter Day, it was dying on the vine, anyway. And at that point, Ellie Heller and some of the others said, "Look. Rather than to have these kinds of unnecessary confrontations, why don't we just leave it up to the campuses whether they want it or not?" We had one more, and I think that's the last Charter Day we had.

MINK: We don't celebrate it.

MURPHY: Yeah. So that's how Charter Day ended.

MINK: They celebrate it, I believe, on the Berkeley campus.

MURPHY: They do. It's a big day in Berkeley. Well,

naturally. It's their equivalent of what we do in the spring.

MINK: It's quite appropriate there.

MURPHY: Yes, of course it is. That is the foundation of Berkeley. On the other campuses, I don't know. I think maybe they do, because they're smaller and they don't really have a tradition. I don't think it means very much. Okay, so much then for the Charter Day.

MINK: You said parenthetically after you talked about that you wanted to talk about the problems of letters of appointments for deans and so on.

MURPHY: Oh. [It was] one of the things that we had as a problem from the beginning, and it finally never really got solved for about six years. It led to all kinds of aftermath. And Andy Hamilton can tell you a lot about this. They had at Berkeley, as a public relations fellow in the statewide office, [a man] called Al Pickerell.

MINK: I know Mr. Pickerell very well.

MURPHY: Unbelievably limited, but a slavish servant, if you will, and always trying to make points with the boss. In the beginning, when I was discovering how little authority the chancellor had, along with his lack of any real authority in promotions or appointments was that when they were made they were always announced as follows: "President Clark Kerr announces that the Board of Regents has appointed

so-and-so as such and such at UCLA." So I started out by saying, "It seems to me the chancellor ought to make this. So why don't you let the chancellor?" "Well, then what is there for the president to do?" "Well," I said, "he can announce the appointment by the regents of chancellors, vice-chancellors, this and that."

Well, that was a struggle. No, he wouldn't give an inch. This went on year after year after year, till finally I got them to agree--and again I think I just wore them down--that it would be that President Clark Kerr and Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy announce the appointment of such and such, which seemed reasonable to me, Kerr first, chancellor second.

We won that, and I thought that whole nonsense was over, and I assumed that that set a pattern. Andy sends up to Berkeley a proposed announcement for honorary degrees for President Clark Kerr. Well, Pickerell says no. No way--a university thing, only the president can do it. Well, Andy said, "Look, we've set a pattern or tradition." "No way." So we had to fight that battle. I kept saying, "You know, this is so silly. This is ridiculous." And they'd turn around to me and say, "Of course it is, so why don't you stop asking?" I said, "It's ridiculous from your point of view, but it's terrible important from the campus point of view, because I'm trying to build a pride on the campus."

I've got to let them think down here, in the Academic Senate and the student body, that I am more than just a housekeeper, clerk, locally situated." Well, all I can say on this subject is that here again, [it was] something that Kerr could have gracefully said. In fact, as I look back, a lot of these thing, he should have taken on his own issue and said, "Franklin, you know, traditionally the president announces these, but I think the chancellor ought to be included." He'd have lost nothing, you see, because the way it turned out, he still loses nothing; the president loses nothing. And my God, think what he would have gained--not just for me, but Mrak and everybody else, the greatest guy in the world. Or call up and say, "Look. You know, you fellows are closer to the campus; I've got lots of confidence in you; you're doing a great job. I think I'm going to delegate a lot more of my authority to appointments and promotions." You'd die for a guy like that.

Now, parenthetically, I don't know, but there's always a possibility that Kerr, in rational conversation with me or Mrak or somebody else, might have come to that conclusion on his own, except for two things. First of all, he never had time to talk with the chancellors except once a month at these meetings, and that's no time. I used to say to him, you know, "Look, I'd like to talk to you about this

issue in depth." "Well, I haven't got time; I'm going here and there." I'd say, "I'll ride to the airport with you." "Well, I'm sorry, but I'm riding to the airport with Harry Wellman; we've got things to do," and so on. He really never spent time, except with his own staff. Therefore, you never had the opportunity to explain these things in any kind of depth. Secondly, his own staff vicariously--it's like any other staff--were so possessive about the power they had, because since he wasn't there it was all delegated, they were doing these things.

MINK: No different than what we saw in the White House.

MURPHY: Precisely. They would, I'm sure, tell him, "Clark, you can't do this, for this and that reason." Well, Clark wasn't really doing it in any event. They were doing it for him. So to delegate that to the campus would mean that somebody else would do it for him. And they didn't want to lose it. I'm sure 90 percent of the advice he got was, "You can't give that for this, this, and this reason."

As I look back on it, the things that were done did not weaken the presidency one damn bit. It in fact loosened up the president's time. If he had done many of these things of his own volition, if it hadn't been dragged, he would have had a group of chancellors, I repeat, that would have thrown themselves on the railroad tracks. Instead, he had a group of chancellors, part of whom were disappointed in

him in the end and part of whom were absolutely bitter at his underlings. And to that extent, they were really getting at him.

Well, it's just too damn bad, because many of that man's qualities--his mind is absolutely first-rate, and his technique of negotiation, if properly applied, is really just the right thing. Whatever these qualities were and whatever the forces were that made him blind to the necessity of streamlining and modernizing the statewide university--I'm sure some were personal and some were pressures on him of the type I've described--it's one of the great tragedies of my memory; because in the end his illogic in many of these things, his technique of trying to prevent them, backfired and boomeranged. That leads to an episode about a year before he left. It was a meeting at San Francisco.

MINK: A regents' meeting?

MURPHY: Yes. It was before the troubles in Berkeley were over, but they'd been under way for quite a while. Strong had been fired and was bitter beyond expression. Clark had not defended Strong. Clark had tried to explain Strong and his position. Strong's position and Clark's position on how to maintain control of the Berkeley campus were diametrically opposed. Strong wanted to take the tough position; Kerr wanted to negotiate. And here again was this terrible

problem of having the president acting de facto as chancellor of Berkeley. Right at the critical time when Strong wanted to lay on certain activities, Kerr intervened, and moved in, and took over the responsibility of settling the problem from Strong. Now, as you know, his efforts to settle were failure. In fact, they led to more riotous behavior, which continued to humiliate the regents, anger them and frustrate them. But Strong was the chancellor. Here he was with the responsibility and none of the authority, which had been taken away from him by Kerr and some of Kerr's underlings who were supposed to run this, negotiate this. Then, when it failed, and these riotous things got even worse, where did the criticism go? It went to Strong. And the criticism was, "This weak man; we should have known; he never had administrative experience; and we should have known when we put him in that he was not up to the test." And Ed was hearing things.

There was a regents' meeting at Davis one time. We had this dinner before, and after dinner the regents wanted to talk to Strong about this. This was about two months before he was fired. They were really very upset, and they didn't want to do it publicly at a regents' meeting or even in closed session. They didn't want the press to know about this. They did it at this dinner the night before, and all we chancellors were there. Ed Strong got up, and

the regents really started to go at him. "Why did you permit this? Why do you do that?" The questions were not just tough questions; they were asked with rancor and bitterness. And Ed was defending himself. And finally he said, "Look, you people don't understand something." He said, "I didn't have any authority to do this thing." He said, "When I was about ready to move, here's what I'd planned to do," and he listed them.

MINK: Was Kerr there?

MURPHY: Yes. He said, "Your president moved in and told me that I no longer would deal with this problem." He said, "I haven't had any authority or responsibility for the past"--whatever it was, three weeks, four weeks, five weeks--"Clark Kerr has been doing it. Now, if these things are wrong, ask the president what went wrong." The heads turned. Kerr got angry, and he said, "Chancellor Strong, that's not true at all. You're chancellor at Berkeley. It's your responsibility and still your responsibility." He said, "I've been giving advice." And boy, they really got into it. Ed said, "That isn't true. You're lying, Mr. President. You sent so-and-so to do this, and you told so-and-so to do that, and you countermanded my orders or so-and-so that you sent countermanded my instructions to so-and-so."

MINK: He read it chapter, line and verse.

MURPHY: Yeah, chapter and verse. And he was red; Clark

was red. Well, finally the chairman, whoever it was at that time, simply said, "Okay, I think this meeting has gone to the point of no return, negative returns, and we'll quit." Well, it was perfectly clear at that moment that one or the other had to go. You can't have a chancellor publicly telling the president he's a liar, or implying it and saying it, and the president denying responsibility. It just isn't going to work. And it was my view, of course, that Ed would go. I talked to Ed afterwards, and he was shaken. He was absolutely shaken. He didn't believe that Clark would ever understand. He had blind, naive faith. In subsequent times he said, "You know, if I'd only listened to you"--this sort of thing.

MINK: He had never joined the club.

MURPHY: Oh, absolutely not. This was the terrible thing about it. He was one of Clark's most faithful servants in these chancellors' meetings. And more than once he tried to knock me down, in views that I would bring up, in support of the president. And then to all of a sudden find himself just dropped as a sacrificial goat was, needless to say, bitter gall to him. Well, needless to say, he was out in a week or two, and Martin Meyerson came in. He was an interim chancellor, remember?

MINK: Before Heyns. Yes, that's right.

MURPHY: Martin Meyerson. Martin was a close friend of

Clark's, had known him a long time. Clark admired him. Martin was a very capable fellow. One of the first things Martin did was to come and ask me about this whole thing. I tried to explain it to him. I said, "Martin, now, you are going to be chewed up unless you've got a very clear understanding of your authority and responsibility here. It destroyed Ed." Well, as you know, Martin did what he could. The statewide administration would be in it one minute and out the next minute, and Martin finally quit and went off to Buffalo. But let me get back to this.

So these things had been developing all along, and as I say, the regents were deeply distraught about this Berkeley thing. Now, in the meantime, the thing that infuriated the statewide administration was when I was present--it was embarrassing even to me--at these meetings. You know, for a year, the business of the university at regents' meetings practically was nonexistent. All it was involved with was the Berkeley riots. And during this you could just see it grow and grow and grow. The bitter, bitter gall was, repeatedly they would say, "Well, why can't you handle it the way it's being done at UCLA?" And repeatedly I'd be asked, "Chancellor Murphy, would you please tell us what you're doing down there they aren't doing at Berkeley?"

MINK: Maybe you'd like to tell us now what you were doing that they weren't doing.

MURPHY: Well, in all fairness--let me come to that in a moment--I think the record of the regents' minutes are there. I never once said, "Well, if you'd only do it our way, you wouldn't have the problem." I repeatedly said to the regents, "Look. You're talking about apples and oranges." And then I would describe the difference. UCLA's located in Westwood and Bel-Air; the campus environment is totally different. We don't have the magnet in Southern California that the Bay Area seems to be for the drug kids and the runaways and the great unwashed who moved over from--what do they call that beach?

MINK: North Beach.

MURPHY: North Beach to Berkeley. We have a very different situation here in terms of kinds of students.

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MURPHY: In other words, I would make the point that the environment was totally different and that, therefore, keeping things under control was [easier]. We didn't have the nonstudent problem to the extent that Berkeley did. And it was always my conviction that if they hadn't had that nonstudent crowd hanging around the periphery of the campus, sure, they'd have had a few minor riots and this and that, but they'd never have been able to get the massive number of troops. So I just would repeat that. And I don't think I ever gave the feeling that--in fact, I think I said on more than one occasion, "You know, if I were at Berkeley, I don't think I'd be doing much better, because I think you've got an impossible problem, really."

MINK: Well, one thing intrigues me, and I often have said to other people at Berkeley: was it ever seriously suggested that they might simply put a cordon around that campus and make every student that went in and out show his reg card? Because really, it was this hanger-on group; you know, you never knew where they were. They were right in there.

MURPHY: Charged up with drugs and irrational and so on. Well, I would say this more than once, while I'm afraid half the regents were saying--privately to themselves, of

course--"Isn't he a modest man?" I really meant what I was saying. In fact, I know some of them would say, "Come on, Franklin, now really level. What is the secret?" I'd say, "I'm telling you that if I were at Berkeley, I'm not sure that things would be a lot better. Maybe they wouldn't have started in the first place, but who knows?" But the thing, I'm sure, that became an absolutely intolerable echo in Clark's ear was this stuff, "Well, why don't you do it like UCLA?" And I must say, had I been in his position, I would have been very bitter, too.

MINK: It was ironic, though, that when it finally did come down to the point that the regents got too scared to be on any campus, it was at UCLA that they got scared--over at the Faculty Center with the windows.

MURPHY: Yes, I remember.

MINK: You were there then?

MURPHY: No, no.

MINK: You had left already. That was Chuck's, then.

That's right; I guess so.

MURPHY: So this thing kept building. It was building on the base of a man that had been a little too clever for himself, anyway. You know, cleverness is a great thing, just like rationalization's a great thing, if properly used. But if [it's] misused, then you run the risk of being discovered or caught. And some of these things, like the Charter

Day episode and other things that I won't even bother mentioning, an accumulation of little things had eroded.

And then the Ed Strong thing. And I might add that there were a lot of people on the regents that liked Ed Strong: Catherine Hearst, I remember; Phil Boyd, a regent from Oakland, an awfully nice man, a lawyer who subsequently left the board--they were very fond of Ed. And after this terrible episode at Davis, I haven't the slightest doubt that a number of these regents called him. I don't know this for a fact, but I would just naturally assume it, because they liked him, they were close to him. And I haven't the slightest doubt that Ed levelled, that Ed was a very bitter man.

Now, about that time--I forget the exact dates, but it was in that time frame--Kerr forced out John Saunders, who had been one of his most faithful servants in the vineyard. And John's bitterness knew no bounds. It still is there.

MINK: What were, in a nutshell, the differences that arose there?

MURPHY: Well, I really never knew. Part of it was, maybe, John's fault, but down in the faculty there were some divisions. There were members of the faculty who felt that John was not getting enough for them. I'm afraid John paid the price of our getting a lot for UCLA medical school.

Remember, we doubled the size of the hospital and so on and got really up to par with San Francisco. They had a lot of demands, and ours came first. And I think they felt he had not been powerful and strong enough, and they saw the UCLA medical school growing by leaps and bounds in quality and reputation and size. I think this led to some of the problems. John did have a little degree of arrogance about him which, I suspect, had irritated some of his faculty. He was a Scotsman, you know, and he talked sort of down to people occasionally.

MINK: I remember he was the only chancellor who ever also acted as librarian on his campus.

MURPHY: Yes. You know, John and I got along fine except I didn't like the way he was totally nonsupportive of me at the chancellors' meetings. He was fired. He had some friends, because that faculty at San Francisco medical school was divided, and a lot of them were very fond of John. And I haven't the slightest doubt that John personally, with his close friends on the regents plus members of that faculty, got to some of the regents about Kerr.

So his power base--or the credibility, I guess you'd say, he had with the regents--was being eroded little by little all the time, and then it was enormously stimulated by this whole Berkeley riotous behavior. The regents were just beside themselves. It was a humiliation to them; it

was all over the country. Berkeley was the prototype, and they were hearing from their friends in California. And Kerr seemed unable to do anything about it. And I must say that things were going pretty well on their other big campus. I don't think they really accepted my explanation that the two were very different and they shouldn't compare them.

Finally, this thing all came to a head. Some of the regents had really totally lost confidence in Kerr, and they wanted to get rid of him. They wanted to fire him. This was before Reagan. And there was this meeting at San Francisco--I stayed at the Clift Hotel whenever they had meetings--and I remember that the regents were having a dinner that night in private. And the thing that really surprised me, as I recall it, was that it was so private that it was regents only, excluding the president. I remember I heard from somebody, and I can't recall why. Oh, I remember why: because we had a chancellors' meeting, and Clark was there. So I went back to the Clift Hotel after dinner, and I was sitting in the bar having a nightcap when two regents came in, Mrs. Chandler and one other. I said, "Come on over. Join us and have a nightcap." Mrs. Chandler said something to the effect, "My God, that was an exhausting session," and I innocently said, "What's the problem?" And she said, "Well, there's a movement afoot

to tomorrow fire Clark Kerr." Well, I gasped, and I said, "Gee, I hope that isn't serious." She said, "Absolutely. And it's touch and go. There are a group that absolutely are determined that he should go, and go now; there are a small group that are absolutely determined he stay; and then there's a large group of us in the center, some of whom move in the direction of firing him and others who say, "Let's hang on a while longer!" And Mrs. Chandler said, "What do you think about it?" And I said, "Look, you've got to prevent this from happening. First of all, firing Clark Kerr is not going to solve the Berkeley problem. It can only pour flames on the fire. You'll really be in for some trouble. And secondly, who's going to succeed him? Who wants to take that job under these circumstances, especially if Kerr, who is highly respected around the country as an educator, is fired under these circumstances?" I said, "Really, all of you regents have got to pull back from the tree and look at the forest. All of the signs are that this is not the time to upset the applecart." I spoke with passion, and she said, "You really feel this strongly"; and I said, "Look, I do." And I said, "Furthermore, it'll not just create problems with Berkeley and pour flames on the fire; it may create a big fire for me for a while. And I'm not anxious to have a fire."

And I remember the other person--I forget who it was--

said, "Well, we thought you would think this was a good idea." I said, "Why?" "Well, because of your differences with Kerr." (By this time, it had become famous within the regents.) I said, "You know, nobody understands my differences with Kerr. I don't dislike Clark Kerr. He's not my best friend, but he's not my enemy. I want to see him succeed. You must understand that my differences are not with Clark Kerr; my differences are really, in a sense, with the regents, who haven't had the wisdom and understanding to change the system of administration of this university to make it workable." So we talked about that for a while longer, and then I said, "Well, I hope I've convinced you that you should vote against his firing. As a matter of fact," I said, "I hope I've convinced you that you don't even bring this issue up, because if you do, it's bound to leak out. Just convince the negatives that if they do bring it up, they're going to be beaten anyway, and there's no purpose in doing it." And she said yes, and the other person said yes. I said, "Now, tell me, who might be influential in this?" Mrs. Chandler said Norton Simon might be. I said, "Where is he staying?" Well, nobody knew, so I called up Marge Woolman, and I finally discovered he was staying at the St. Francis. I woke him up at midnight and said, "Look, I've got to see you before the regents' meeting."

So we arranged to meet for breakfast. In fact, I told

him I'd drive him out. (I had a rented car.) So I really gave it to him, too--in those days, we were great friends--and on the same grounds. But he kept saying, "But we can't trust him." And I said, "Look. There are a lot of people in the world who have techniques of administration, and you have to understand them. It isn't a question of trust; it's a question of understanding." But I said, "Be that as it may, you cannot put personal feelings into this matter. This is a very sensitive issue, and it's like you throw a stick of dynamite into the whole statewide university problem."

Well, then he asked me to talk to Phil Boyd. I grabbed Phil Boyd prior to the meeting--in fact, the meeting started without Phil--and I convinced Phil. Phil is a bit of a conservative, and he was just livid about the inability of Clark to stop this nonsense. And he was one who always thought that I was being modest when I said it was a different thing. So I don't know what would have happened in any event. All I know is that these three people, and others, pleaded with the regents not even to raise this, and it wasn't raised. So we got over that hurdle.

I went home from that meeting really shaken, because I knew that there was some friction between Clark and the regents; but I had no feeling that it was so deep, that there was the slightest possibility of his being removed

from office. So I decided that this was one I could not tell Clark. If he and I had had a relationship, he was the first one I'd have gone to, but I'm sure he would have been bitter about the fact that I had enough influence to-- you know. Because at that point I had more influence than he did, and that's a humiliating thing for a proud man to have to realize.

So I went to Harry Wellman. I had my differences with Harry, I must say, early on. But I came, in the end, to have the most enormous respect for Harry Wellman. He was loyal to Clark, and he did do Clark's bidding, but at the same time Harry intuitively understood my problem. And as this thing evolved, toward the end Harry really was helpful in getting some of these administrative modifications. So, starting from that bitter moment when he gave me hell in the Bel-Air Hotel, where the relationship was below zero, it wound up like 150 percent. And I was the one who insisted that he get his honorary degree at UCLA when he retired. I went to Harry Wellman, and I said, "Harry, I'm going to tell you a story you won't believe; but I think the record's clear, I've always told you the truth. You'll understand why I can't tell Clark. You know what our relationship is, and you'll understand how it would make it even worse." Then I told him this whole story. He, needless to say, was shocked, too. And he, at first, couldn't believe it,

and I said, "Harry, it is a fact, you have my word of honor. It is that close now."

MINK: When was this? Right after the meeting?

MURPHY: I think I got him before I went home to Los Angeles. And he said, "What'll we do?" And I said, "Well, first of all, I think you've got to tell Clark to get the hell out of the Berkeley thing. He's got to stop being chancellor at Berkeley, both for his own good and for the good of the university. He shouldn't have ever tried to be that, de facto, anyway. But now his whole career's at stake. And you've got to get Clark going all out, all out to get a new, fresh, strong face, if possible, from outside the university to come in and be the Berkeley chancellor and run Berkeley. Now, let him take the full responsibility; if the campus burns up, well, it's his. But Kerr here is in and out, in and out, in a difficult situation, and he's getting the blame." "Well," he says, "you know, we're looking." I said, "The hell you are. You're just not looking hard enough. Because I think that Clark has from the very beginning wanted to be both chancellor and president. And you know that, Harry, in your heart. This is the Sproul image."

MINK: But the thing is, Dr. Murphy, at this point, who could they have gotten at Berkeley?

MURPHY: Well, now, wait a minute. I'm a year ahead. I

think it must have been two years. Let me go on. It had to be two years when this thing happened in San Francisco. Shortly thereafter, the search for the Berkeley chancellor really got going, and I finally got a call from Harry Wellman. The regents' meeting that particular month coming up was at Berkeley. Things had sort of quieted down, but you know, it was still reasonably riotous. And he said, "We've got a man out here who's coming out to meet with the regents, and he is absolutely the man, Franklin, if we can get him. And he says he wants to talk to you above everybody else. His name is Roger Heyns. He's vice-president of the University of Michigan. He's just the thing the doctor ordered--experienced, low-key, quiet but tough and firm, and a really adult, mature person." I said, "Well, why does he want to talk to me? I don't know him." "Well, that's all I can report, that that's what he said in advance. Would you be willing to meet him?" I said, "Harry, if you want, I'll go anywhere, because we've got to quiet this Berkeley thing down. It's hurting the whole university, including UCLA, in the legislature. Right now my number-one target in priority is not more money for UCLA, but a damned good chancellor at Berkeley--because there won't be any money to divide up. I'll go anywhere, do anything." And so it was arranged that I was to meet with Roger at breakfast Wednesday morning. I was to come up early--have lunch

with him; that was it. Then he was to meet with the chancellors Wednesday night; then he was to meet with the regents Thursday morning at breakfast, etc., etc.

So I promptly got on the phone and started calling my friends around the country about Roger Heyns. I'd never met him; I didn't even know the name. And I managed to get hold of some people, some of my Big Ten president friends--Meredith Wilson and people like that--who had worked with Roger and knew him; and all the word that came back was 150 percent positive. "If you can get him, God, you're terribly lucky." Then I said, "Well, why in the world would Roger want to come and take this job?" Remember, at that time Berkeley was in every newspaper. Well, as it turned out--it sounded Pollyannish, but as it turned out it was really true--one of the reasons was he was intrigued by this challenge. He couldn't believe that a distinguished university such as Berkeley could get into this kind of a mess. He's a trained psychologist; that's his PhD. It absolutely intrigued him in terms of the possibility of solving this problem. That was only one. Another one was, it seemed clear--and my Big Ten friends told me this--that for a lot of reasons, internal political reasons at the university, that he was not going to be the successor to Harlan Hatcher, who I think was going to retire that year as president. That was a good time for him to move.

And finally, as I subsequently learned, his wife wanted to leave Ann Arbor for personal reasons.

Armed with this telephoned information, I decided to do the recruitment effort of my life, and I decided to do it this way. I decided to tell Roger all the bad things, tell him how really bad they were administratively when I came but how successful I'd been, really working with the regents in solving these problems--how successful I thought I'd been. Then I decided to talk to him about the great opportunity. Berkeley couldn't go any lower; he had to go out a hero because nobody could do worse. And finally I decided to advise him as to some of the conditions.

MINK: That he'd have to make in accepting the job.

MURPHY: Yes, right. So that's the way it went. I told him of the dark old days down here and how things had changed. Of course, he'd gotten all this word that I'd gotten earlier: that you have no authority and the faculty runs the show and so forth. I told him how that really wasn't true, how you could work with the faculty and how you could develop a very successful technique. I told him how marvelous the regents were, which in my view was true; and I told him the problems I had had with Kerr, quite frankly, and the problems I had getting the other chancellors to come along. But I said, "Look, Roger, Emil's beginning to come along and some of the others. McHenry never will, but we've got

a few fellows up there, and with you in there we can just move this thing." And I told him what the targets were: the chancellors' authority for appointment and promotion, much more budgetary flexibility--how close we were to that, so forth and so on. And with him, we'd be over the hump.

MINK: What did you suggest were the conditions?

MURPHY: I'm getting to that. I said, "Roger, let me just say that you're really down to one problem. But," I said, "the reason it isn't insoluble is the regents now understand, because they didn't six or seven years ago. The number-one problem is that there hasn't been a chancellor, there hasn't been anyone running the Berkeley campus, since Bob Sproul--who was de facto president of the Berkeley campus. But in this evolution, Kerr, when he was chancellor for a year or two, had damned little authority, none at all. Sproul wouldn't give it to him. And Kerr has not given it to anybody. I fear he's wanted sycophants." I said, "The symbolism is that empty house. And I think that unless you take a commitment (it's symbolic) that the chancellor must live in--and rename it not the president's house, the chancellor's house; the University House is the way they compromised--live in the University House on the campus, don't take the job. Furthermore, say that you not only want the commitment

that you will live in that University House, which has been empty, used only for social stuff, since the Sprouls left it--believe it or not, it was empty all those years--but that you want an adequate budget to fix it up, because I can tell you by having been up there at the social events and so on, it is a disaster. It needs a new kitchen; it needs a new this; it needs new furniture and so on."

"Well, how much is that going to cost?" I said, "You'd better say that you need at least \$100,000." "That's a lot of money," he said. "You could build a house for that." I said, "Not a house that big. But you've got to spend that. But even if you could build a house, even if they'd give you a half a million to build a house, you say, 'No, it's that house.' Because that's the house that Bob Sproul lived in, and that's going to say something to this campus."

"Secondly," I said, "you say that you want an adequate budget for entertainment and to do the kinds of things in that house that ought to be done."

"Thirdly, you say that you want the regents to carefully look into and consider the role of the chancellor in molding the faculty, and when they ask you to define that you will say the role and responsibility of the chancellor, the authority of the chancellor, in the promotion and appointment process."

"Finally," I said, "you tell them that you want an

office on campus that is adequate to the responsibilities of the head of one of the largest and most prestigious university campuses in America." "Well, why do I say that?" "You should have seen the office that was available to Strong and Glenn Seaborg. It was a cubbyhole, an absolute cubbyhole. Across the street they built this new statewide building, and, my God, you could play handball in some of those offices. But the Berkeley chancellor had a little rabbit warren. You say that you want them to put in the building plans for the Berkeley campus to move that other stuff out and give the chancellor's suite a great deal more. You say that after you look at it. But you'll have that reaction. Demand to look at it." But I said, "Look, you're going to get all these things from the regents. You just ask for them and you're going to get them. They're desperate. You're in a leverage position." (At this point we'd become very friendly. Roger and I hit it off the minute we met.) I said, "Furthermore, let me play a role in the scenario. I'm going to go back to Wellman and to Kerr and to the regents, and I'm going to say, 'My God, I've never seen such a man. He's made for the job. And I don't think there's any way you can get him. He's not accustomed to this kind of administrative structure. Maybe if you offered him the house; I don't know. You think he's going to move into an office like that? I don't

think you've got a ghost of a chance to get him.'" So that's the way it went.

We had lunch, and then we met with the chancellors. And very innocently we talked about some business--the chancellors and the president; Harry Wellman was always there--very innocently. And Clark said, "Well, Roger, you've seen how we operate here. Have you got any thoughts for the good of the cause?" Roger said, "Well...." He sort of made a general opening statement; he said, "I'm a little puzzled as to how this all operates. I heard Franklin here raise questions about promotions and appointments and whether or not some of these could be delegated. What's that all about?" Well, there was an attempt made to explain this to Roger, and he said, "Gee, I don't understand that. I must say, that puzzles me." Well, this conversation went on.

Then he met with the regents. Roger's much lower-key than I am. He's a real soft kind of a person, but steel underneath. Well, needless to say, he made these conditions, laid them down mildly. Every single one was granted. And he came. What's his wife's name, that lovely little girl?

MRS. MURPHY: Esther.

MURPHY: Esther. They arrived. You know, when I got here, at least there was Hansena Frederickson, who had some back-

ground in where all of the things were, you know. He arrived and there was no such person around.

MINK: What about Agnes Robb? She was still in there sort of as secretary to Sproul.

MURPHY: Yes, precisely. She was doing Sproul's work and so on, and really, she was Sproul's secretary. No, there was nobody there like Hansena. Sproul hadn't been around all these years.

MINK: That's right. But she knew where the bodies were buried.

MURPHY: Well, sure she knew that, but you know, all these things that happened in the interim, she didn't know anything about. So Roger called me up, and he said, "God, I haven't got anybody up here to give me advice on little things. I'm getting busy on trying to find the vice-chancellor and this and this and this--I know how to do that--but," he said, "Esther and I don't know anything about whether there's an entertainment budget, where is it, how do you use it, vouchers--you know, all these things." I said, "Roger, don't talk to anybody up there about that. Don't talk to them at all. When is the earliest time that you and Esther can get on the plane and come down here and spend a day with Judy and me--we'll have dinner and all that--and Hansena Frederickson? Because I'm going to give Hansena to you. She's dealt with this

statewide crowd for all these years; she's seen the struggles I've gone through." We had built up a system and it was working perfectly. So--remember, Judy?--they came down. I had briefed Hansena and, I think, Chuck and maybe Art Eddy as to how we'd managed all these logistical things; and I had them type it out, as a matter of fact, I think, and they took notes. I think we had dinner together or something, and they went back. Well, that got them going.

I also suggested they get in touch with certain regents in San Francisco to pick out a decorator, because I just didn't want them talking to that statewide group--because I knew that there was deep resentment that Roger was moving into that house; I knew that there was deep resentment that Roger felt he had to have a bigger office suite, and they they would figure out all ways and means to slow this down. Now, maybe I was being unfair to those people. But after all, I have to deal with the track record. And I didn't believe that leopards change their spots that quickly.

Well, I'm happy to say that--you know, Roger was smart and so on--they got the thing going; the house was remodeled, I think very nicely, considering the size and character of the house, a very wonderful kitchen and new furniture and all. The regents got a special item in the budget that was

already gone in to remodel, move things over, and so forth and so on.

Well, from the moment Roger arrived, the big push was under way to finally get the authority and responsibility to the chancellors. I now had, as part of this effort, a gifted, strong, experienced man who was not brainwashed by the University of California system, had not grown up in it, as I had been. And we had, Roger and I, we now had Emil coming along, we had Dan Aldrich at this point trying to build this new campus and infuriated with these second-level bureaucrats. We really, in the end, had everybody--except McHenry, who I think to the very bitter end said, "Yes, sir; no, sir," to whatever Clark wanted. And the question went on; I'll just say it did, without going through all the exercises.

Oh, I must say in all fairness, I said, "Roger, there's one thing that maybe we won't agree upon. But I hope we can." I said, "One thing that is outstanding here is equity between Berkeley and Los Angeles." I said, "I don't want it at the expense of Berkeley. I never have. I want Berkeley to have precisely what Berkeley thinks it needs. But I think given the mandate of the regents and so on, Los Angeles ought to have precisely what it needs, and it needs about what Berkeley needs." He said, "I have no trouble with that, no argument. Let's work together

to get more for both." So even on the library--over and over again we'd get the commitment and then they'd pull the rug out, and we'd have to go back--Roger was always there.

So Roger and I were on the phone together a couple of times a week, and we really set the campaign. The first target was to get the budget flexibility, and we got it--transfer between budget items and so on and so forth, without checking with the Berkeley bureaucrats. Now, maybe it isn't totally satisfactory--I guess you'd have to talk to Chuck about that--but it's so much different than it was when we started out that you wouldn't recognize the two systems.

The second thing we got that we decided that we really had to break the back of was the appointment and promotion thing. And here Kerr really shone at his Machiavellian best. I think in retrospect this was another nail in the coffin. And I take no satisfaction in telling you this. These are facts. We started on this at the chancellors' meetings, and by this time Kerr realized that it just wasn't Murphy, but it was Murphy and Heyns and Mrak and [Ivan] Hinderaker and all of us.

MINK: Did Ivan come in earlier, or was he one of the last to come in?

MURPHY: He was sort of toward the end.

MINK: He was a UCLA grad.

MURPHY: Yes. Ivan was never a sycophant to Clark. I just would say that Ivan was a little slower getting into the fray. The leadership in the thing in the beginning, in this last push, was Heyns and Mrak and Murphy. The others came in as the momentum grew.

Well, on this promotion and appointment thing, it was fascinating. Our theory was that the senate process was a problem, but we had to tell the senate committees they were advisory. That's what the rules read. They had developed a common-law practice of thinking this was final, and it wasn't. We worked with them and so on. And each campus would have the right to fashion its own senate mechanism. Just because Berkeley said the dean couldn't sit in at the ad hoc committee, Los Angeles might have it, and that this could be local option. We wanted that, number one.

Number two, when the decisions were made within the budget reports, they would go to the chancellor; the chancellor would approve or reject as the case may be. But there was no appeal to his rejection, around him to Kerr. And if it were positive all the way through, the president would simply deliver to the regents the chancellor's recommendations without comment. This was our proposal. In the case of administrative officers--dean, that is;

vice-chancellors--the president would play a role. It would be a recommendation to the president, a rejection or acceptance, and the president would then say, "These are my recommendations."

Well, we tugged and squirmed and fought and so forth, and Clark suddenly realized that he had the entire group of chancellors, except for McHenry, for this; and by this time, he was an embattled man. And he knew that his standing with the regents was insecure. Whether Wellman ever reported that thing to him or not, I don't know; but I suspect Harry did indirectly, leaving my name out of it. So he decided to pull a typical Kerr thing. I guess it was after several of these meetings. He finally said, "Look. The recommendation must go directly from the chancellor to the regents, because the president can't merely forward. The act of forwarding implies approval. And this means that you're asking the president to imply that he's approved something that he might, in fact, disapprove. The only thing that possibly could be presented for discussion of the regents is a direct approach."

Well, he assumed that the regents would not tolerate that, and that it would have to be presented to the president for mechanical and other reasons, and that therefore the regents would say, "Well, there's a problem here, but take it back and study it further." It was a delaying tactic.

He was so confident that this is what would happen that he presented it. To his amazement, and certainly to mine, the regents debated this back and forth and back and forth and finally moved--I was at the meeting--that even the regents didn't have to deal with it. The chancellors could make the final decision and write the letter and say, "You're appointed." Well, by God, we walked out of that meeting with more than we'd thought we'd have.

Now, I think Clark was absolutely stunned, and I must say I was stunned. But again, Clark should have realized there was some symbolism here for him personally, which I realized later. In effect, the regents were saying, "Well, you know, the president's rather irrelevant in this process. The chancellor's the one we must rely on. We're relying on Roger Heyns at Berkeley; we're relying on Roger to solve that problem. We're relying on Franklin to keep the UCLA campus quiet. They've done a good job. They need this. And they need this strength because of the Berkeley riots. And people don't realize this, and I think Clark to this day doesn't realize the fact that what the Berkeley riots did was subconsciously prove to the regents that the one thing they needed was a strong chancellor forever. And the president could be just a bureaucrat. So at that point, the regents subconsciously were seeking at every turn to strengthen the office of the chancellorship. They

didn't even know they were doing that, but that's really what they were doing, and that's one of the lessons of these Berkeley riots.

Well, we got this through in an unbelievable fashion. This was in the last year of Clark's tenure. So we were really beginning now to get what we wanted, and even the statewide administration bureaucrats were beginning to listen to us.

MINK: This would have been '68.

MURPHY: Yes, '68 or '67.

MINK: Sixty-seven, yes.

MURPHY: Even the statewide bureaucrats were getting the image here that the chancellors were strong people in this system and that they were having more influence on issues than the president. So I suddenly discovered dulcet tones, you know. You know: "How are things going, Franklin?" and "Anything we can do?" You know, this sort of thing. Well, Clark, at that point, I think something was happening to him. I've never known, really. Because in the summer of that year, I got a phone call from Harry Wellman, who said he wanted to come down and talk to me. He came. He said, "I want to talk to you about Clark. We haven't talked about Clark since you related to me this thing in San Francisco." But he said, "You know the regents well, and you know the climate well, and you know Southern

California well. You think Clark's in real trouble?" And I said, "Harry, he's in very real trouble, maybe not of his own making entirely. He bears the burden of the Berkeley thing, because he insisted on getting in the middle of it. Reagan is running for office; one of his campaign planks is that he's going to clean up Berkeley and stop this riotous behavior. And I must tell you frankly that Clark's credibility with the regents has been substantially eroded. And you know the reasons, Harry."

He said, "Yes, I'm afraid I do." He said, "What should and can Clark do?" "Well," I said, "I don't know. I think one thing has already been done. The responsibility for the Berkeley problem is now with Roger, and I urge you to keep Clark out of it if there's another big flare." I said, "I think he really ought to be more understanding as to what we chancellors have been trying to do. I think there's some tension between him and the chancellors that could be relieved if he'd be a little more outgoing. Maybe it's too late for that; I don't know. It isn't too late for that." And I said, "Above everything else, he's got to stay out of this political campaign, directly or indirectly, because," I said, "it's my instinct that Reagan's going to win, and it may be hard on the university. But at the same time, I think we ought to try and woo Reagan rather than

fight him." He said, "Oh."

Now, the facts are, as you know, Clark was in the campaign--not out making speeches, but word got out that Clark Kerr said Reagan's election would be a disaster. Maybe Pat Brown put the bead on him, I don't know. Well, you know, this was just awful. Then the next thing that happened was that Reagan was elected.

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MURPHY: I think, just to complete the sad--and, to me, in many ways tragic--episode of the Clark Kerr continuing, growing problem with the regents, we can move on now to the period between the meeting in San Francisco that I previously described and the final meeting which was in Berkeley, I think, in January, perhaps. As I indicated earlier, many of the regents, by this time, had talked to me. They were worried. I think the ones that talked to me knew perfectly well that I was really not bucking for the presidency and didn't want it, and I explained credibly why I didn't. So I guess they felt I was a sort of neutral resource. And there was great concern because of the difficulties in Berkeley, the student riots; and the problems in San Francisco at the Medical Center, the dismissal of John Saunders--and his bitterness, which then fed back into the regents, his friends on the regents. Clark Kerr's credibility with the regents had clearly been eroded, even, I think I might add, unfairly. But at the same time Clark, I think, wasn't sensitive enough to this. I think he never dreamed that this questioning had developed in the minds of many regents, even friends of his.

Then Reagan was elected, and he had made, as you will

recall, as a major point of his campaign that he'd bring order to Berkeley. Rightly or wrongly, and I don't know the answer to this, friends of Reagan had told me that they had evidence that Clark was working on behalf of Pat Brown, and telling people that they had to vote for Brown and that the university would be in deep trouble if they didn't; and of course, that didn't fall happily on the ears of the governor, the subsequent Governor Reagan. So I was really convinced that with the knowledge that he was in a position to appoint certain ex officio trustees, and with the growing erosion of credibility, that Clark was in very serious trouble.

Finally, one day I had a call from Harry Wellman, who was very loyal to Clark, a real wonderful soldier. Harry and I had our differences, but I came to love him very, very much and I have great respect for him. He came down and said he wanted to talk to me, and we had a talk. He asked me what I thought the situation was--this was in about October--concerning Clark. And I told him very frankly, and I told him I hoped he would tell Clark that I thought Clark was in deep trouble, and especially was this going to be true if Reagan would be elected--and by that time, the polls indicated Reagan was going to be elected. I remember Harry saying, "But Reagan doesn't have the votes." And I said, "Well, that's not the point, Harry. He has a lot of

potential votes on this issue that he wouldn't have on others. A lot of Clark's friends and people who have in time respected him are now beginning to say that maybe he isn't the right man for this job at this time." Well, then Harry and I talked about it. He got the point, that I was very honest about it, as best I knew how to be, and sincere.

He went back, and I'm fairly certain he told Clark what I told him. I don't know Clark's reaction, except I knew that an incredible thing happened. We were preparing the budget. Reagan had now been elected; the university budget was in process of preparation. And right at the time that Clark should have been working in Sacramento and talking to Reagan and talking to the new director of finance and working toward the processing of this budget, he went off to Hong Kong. And he was out of the country for about three or four rather critical weeks when many of the regents felt he should be working to develop a rapprochement with the governor and the new administration. And this really infuriated some of the regents who had been supporters of his. They thought it was irresponsible. Why Clark did it, I don't know. I guess it was he wasn't sensitive to the seriousness of the problem. Furthermore, by this time this had been interpreted by the new Department of Finance--and then, therefore, Reagan--as a kind of a snub, because other

people, second-level people, had to go up there and talk about the budget; and in fact, a committee of the regents, I recall, finally went up along with Harry Wellman and so on.

So all these things were building up now to a crescendo. And there came the meeting in January at Berkeley. I'll never forget that one, because I went up to the regents' meeting and the chancellors' meeting the night before with a bad cold, and flying up something happened. And by the time the next morning came around, I had a very severe ear-ache, a temperature of about 102, and felt absolutely awful. Well, the first inkling that something was up was when, the night of the chancellors' meeting, the chairman of the Board of Regents called a meeting of regents only, without the president. You see, the president is ex officio a regent. Well, this was really quite unusual. And Clark, I remember, came and had dinner with the chancellors, and you could tell he was a little upset about this and very, very concerned. In fact, he came around to me and said, "Do you know why they're having the meeting?" I said no--and I really didn't; nobody had confided in me.

Well, the next thing that happened was that the following morning one of the regents--I think it was probably Norton Simon; it could have been Mrs. Chandler--came to me and said, "Franklin, this thing may blow tomorrow, because

there was a serious discussion last night as to whether given, now, all of these circumstances, Clark can continue to give the kind of leadership to the institution." Clark was then called--my recollection is--into a meeting where he laid an ultimatum on the table and demanded a vote of confidence. Clark had done this a time or two before, months before, and had gotten away with it. But he, in effect, said that he'd heard a lot of rumors and this and this, and that he wanted the board to give him a vote of confidence that he should lead the institution into the difficult days ahead. He left the meeting of the regents--which was obviously an executive session--and came back and had lunch with us. This was Friday lunch.

MINK: With the chancellors?

MURPHY: With the chancellors. He didn't tell us that he'd done this. By this time I was feeling so awful--I had, as I say, this terrible earache--that I called up Hansena and I said, "Please make an appointment at UCLA Medical Center with Dr. [Victor] Goodhill or somebody that knows about ears, because I'm really very sick, and I'm going to come right down and go directly from the airport to the Medical Center."

So I left about noon. I got on the airplane, came down; and as I was driving in from the airport, I turned on the radio and heard that Clark Kerr's resignation had been

accepted by the regents. I must say, I was surprised. I knew he was in trouble, but I didn't know that he was in that deep trouble, because at that point there was no way that Governor Reagan [could have done it]. He only had about two or three votes. He had appointed no regents, and he had only the head of agriculture and [Max] Rafferty, the state superintendent of public instruction, both of whom are ex officio. But the motion, interestingly, as I understand it--and you'll have to talk to some regents about this, like Carter or Pauley or Mrs. Chandler--was made by some moderate regent who had just come to the conclusion that this was no longer possible. And I just guessed that Clark made a miscalculation, that he never really dreamed that this could and would happen.

Let me say, having finished this Kerr episode, thinking back over what I've said, one might be able to interpret that I disliked Clark Kerr, or that I envied him or envied him his job. The facts are, I had then and still retain very great respect for him as an absolutely first-class man. He's a man, really, of great personal integrity, although administratively he comes out of labor relations and so on. He had a technique of trying to avoid confrontations, which sometimes can be interpreted as being devious. My differences with him arose from only one issue, which was that I felt that for as far back as I could look into the history of

UCLA, and down to the times I was there, UCLA had been discriminated against in terms of evenhanded treatment vis-à-vis Berkeley. And had there been, from the beginning, evenhanded treatment, provable evenhanded treatment, there would have been no differences whatsoever between us. But I was not about--as I said, I guess, before--to go down the same track that Clarence Dykstra had gone down and that Ray Allen had gone down.

I believe that the whole Kerr episode was a tragedy. I think as far as the overall University of California is concerned, it was enormously contributed to by Clark Kerr. And I think that when the dust has settled and people can get a little perspective on that, that Clark will go down as a strong and gifted president. But in spite of everything, my job was to build UCLA, and I wasn't about to let anybody prevent that from happening.

Now, the next episode in this whole thing till I left was that immediately Harry Wellman was made acting president, and he was the only logical person. He had total confidence in all the chancellors. He knew he was an interregnum, and so he tried to keep the lid on things; and we all cooperated with him. We knew this was no time to be having any internecine warfare.

Then the whole question came up as to who would succeed Clark. I was approached by several of the regents--

privately, of course--and also by Roger Heyns. Roger and I had become very, very close. Roger felt keenly that I should do this; I had been around longer and so on. I explained to Roger that I would under no circumstances do it, and I also did to the regents. But I took that opportunity to say, "Now, above everything else, please pick somebody outside of the University of California. Most of our difficulties have arisen from the fact that a Berkeley-oriented man has tried to run the whole system. And even if he'd been evenhanded, he would have been open to the criticism that he was taking care of alma mater--that is to say, the Berkeley campus." And as a matter of fact, I had gotten to know Charlie Hitch very well, and I, in a sense, sort of became a campaign manager for Charlie. I felt that he had the skills; he had the administrative background; he was not identified with any one campus. The regents had developed great confidence in him as financial vice-president. He was low-key, quiet; he was a man of great integrity. All the chancellors held him in the highest regard. And when Charlie was appointed, nobody was happier than I.

The accusation was made, of course, that the reason I left was because I was not appointed president. Well, the facts are that there are plenty of regents who are witness to the fact that I said more than once to them that

if nominated, I won't run; if elected I won't serve, absolutely not. Because I had made it clear that my satisfaction in university administration was living on a campus. And if I were to go into a purely administrative post, unrelated to the educational process, well then, why stay in the university? But really--and I may have said this earlier, I can't remember--I had long since made up my mind that ten to twelve years was the maximum time you ought to spend on a university campus. You've done the most you could by then; it was housekeeping from that point on. It was really rather healthy for a new voice and a new set of energy.

Secondly, and quite honestly, I was getting very fatigued in higher education. I'd been in it for twenty years, and Mrs. Murphy and I had not owned our life one minute of that time. And then, on top of this fatigue, came the student unrest, came some of the irrational acts of the faculty in not standing up against student fascism. And it was kind of disappointing, because higher education had always been an idealistic thing to me, a free marketplace of ideas, and here I saw these young fascists running around knocking down windows and denying one person the right to speak if they didn't speak their way. So it was a combination of a commitment I've made to myself to move on after ten or twelve years, plus fatigue after twenty,

plus this final little bit of extra fatigue and disillusionment. I was losing my temper; I was getting short-tempered with the students. Chuck Young and others would say, "Franklin, you've never been like this before." And I'd say, "You know, you're right." And I knew that the time was ripe.

MINK: I think there's one other point where speculation was made--and maybe I asked you this, too, when you spoke about this at the very beginning of the interview--but there was some speculation that you saw in the coming Reagan administration budgetary cuts, pinches, which would not allow you to perform for UCLA up to your past standard.

MURPHY: Sure. Well, I mean, that's a perfectly fair conclusion to have reached. But I tell you, really, that was very minimally in my mind. It was the fact that I was going to leave anyway. I'd left Kansas after nine years; I was going to leave here after x number of years, certainly no more than ten or twelve--and I used to say that. But I think more than anything else it was a sense of just fatigue. I'd run out of gas.

MINK: If all these other factors had been erased, you would have stayed on and fought with the Reagan policies of austerity in the university?

MURPHY: Oh, of course. You know, I was the one who stood up at that meeting out here and said I wasn't elected

chancellor to preside at the liquidation of the University of California, right in the presence of Reagan. I had no problem in wanting to fight him. But really, as I say, I was running out of gas by then. You can do these jobs just so long. I think there's no more demanding job in American society today than running a large, complex university. You belong to everybody; your time is not your own. It's worse than being a politician, almost, in terms of dinners and lunches and football games and basketball games. Your house is not your own; it belongs to everybody but you.

MINK: Parenthetically, I can't resist saying what lunches you go to, because this most recent one....

MURPHY: Oh, the Bob Haldeman thing. [laughter] Well, that's another interesting little footnote.

But anyway, I said to myself, "What am I going to do? I'm going to leave." Well, there were several things. Frankly, if the Times-Mirror offer hadn't come along, I would have probably stayed another couple of years. But I didn't want to go into foundation work, because that's just a nothing. I knew I didn't want to take on a third university. And I knew I didn't want to go into public life. I'd been pressured all along to run for governor or senator or something, but I was trying to escape from belonging to the public. I wanted a sabbatical from the

public, a little private life.

So the only thing that was left was the industrial world, the business world, and I was not unfamiliar with it. I'd served on boards of corporations and so on. But I didn't want to make tin cans or run a company that makes steel and so on. I didn't want to leave Southern California, because I'd come to really love living here. And one day, when Norman Chandler called and said he wanted to talk to me--I'd been on the board of the Times-Mirror Company, of course--and said he was ready to step down and would I like to take his place, it all came together. I mean, it was a business job; it was in Southern California; and it was in a field that I had a great interest in: publishing, which is, in a sense, a different kind of educational set of processes. So it was just like everything fitting together in a most unpredictable and remarkable way.

MINK: Good Irish luck.

MURPHY: Really was; it was just good Irish luck. So there it is. I think that, in retrospect, I did get out at the right time. I must say in all honesty that I lobbied very hard for Chuck to succeed me, because I felt it should be a young man. I felt at this point in time somebody who understood the University of California system was absolutely essential. Chuck had been with me working as my right arm during all of these episodes. He knew all

of the bodies that needed to be unburied, whether it was the library budget or this or that, completing the medical school. He was youthful; he had lots of energy; he loved the university. It seemed to me that he was the perfect kind of a successor. And I personally had given him all the difficulties. I mean, who should have been handed a thing like Angela Davis as your first problem? She came the year after I left. I never knew the lady. But all of a sudden now, a young and untried chancellor, in the midst of all the Vietnam tensions and so on, has to have Angela Davis. I think he handled that masterfully, given all of the inputs. And he's done a fantastic job in building up the private support program which we started, more or less started, an associates program and an annual giving program and so on. He has a different style, but, you know, of course. Not only is that predictable; it's desirable. And I think he has earned the respect of the faculty, and I think that going through this period of austerity, he has managed to do so with a lot of courage, cutting away dead wood but at the same time preserving the core of the integrity and the quality of the university. So in retrospect I'm just tickled to death that he was the one they gave that responsibility to.

I also think that, given the special set of circumstances, Charlie Hitch has done a tremendous job, because

I think he has avoided the ultimate confrontation with the governor. You can't win on that. And yet I think he has been strong and forthright and pressed about as hard as any human being could or should, to keep the university moving. Well, so much then for that side of it.

MINK: One other matter which we had discussed that I would like you to comment on--and I think you responded favorably to the idea of doing so--is the matter of the Byrne Report* and the reorganization of the university, more or less covering it in a philosophical way as to some of the things that weren't carried out, some of the things that were, and so on, from the recommendations in that report.

MURPHY: I don't remember the many, many details, but there were major thrusts in it. One of the major thrusts was [that] Byrne concluded as an outside look, a directed look, that the university should be further decentralized in terms of administration and operations. Now, this, of course, as far as I was concerned, was precisely on target. But it was predictable that the Kerr administration would find it way off target. Byrne was not irresponsible. He didn't say separate approaches to the legislature and even separate boards of regents. What he said was: have the

*Byrne, Jerome C. Report on the University of California and recommendations to the special committee of the Regents of the University of California. Los Angeles, 1965.

dialogue, get agreement on a consolidated budget made up of the several pieces, and then give that budget to that campus within broad guidelines and let them handle it. Forget the bureaucracy at Berkeley.

He also spoke very importantly about local boards of regents. He didn't call them that even, but he pointed out that although there was one University of California system, actually each campus had its own constituency--its own alumni, its own students, and its people living in the area that had a special interest in it. He pointed out that USC could have its own board, and these were people that would go out in the community and raise money, whether they were alumni or not--or Occidental College or Caltech--but that the university campuses were crippled by not having their kind of friends group. This was, I think, deliberately misinterpreted. And the cry was thrown up, well, he's now trying to fragment the Board of Regents. Well, if you read the thing carefully and talked with him, you knew that was not what he was trying to do.

He, as you know, talked with some vigor about the student role, I think properly so. I think there's no doubt that partly because of the resistance of the Academic Senate on the academic side and the resistance of the regents on the administrative side, there was a very clear lack of reasonable student participation in decision-making processes.

I always said that the students are a transient population; they think only of today, and you can't expect them to think of tomorrow. Therefore, student responsibility in decision making should be limited to an advisory function, but not decision making, not the ultimate decision making. When I came to UCLA, there was practically none of that anywhere within the University of California. The regents didn't even want students at the meetings, because it slowed them down. I think Byrne was absolutely right, that both the regents and the faculty had missed the big move in student attitudes and were not responding. And I think Jerry Byrne's report was on target there.

The regents backed away from that, and needless to say, the academic senates backed away very quickly. The last thing they wanted were their own students telling them how badly or how well they were doing. Now, I think that if the regents had taken the Byrne Report as a sort of long-range target and said, "Now, we'll take pieces of it and modify them out of experience, but in the end a lot of these things ought to be incorporated in our traditional way of doing business within the university," it would have been a big step forward. But there were regents who, for their reasons, didn't like it; and the Berkeley administration didn't like it; and the best way to kill something is to say, "Well, we can't possibly do this overnight; there-

fore, we can't do it." And it just, as you know, disappeared in limbo. I'm sorry, and I think it was just one of those errors in judgment on the part of the regents that they didn't pick it up and do something with it.

MINK: I wonder if you could begin to talk about how you related to the Academic Senate when you came, because I think there's a marked change here from the old style to the new.

MURPHY: Yes. Well, as I told you earlier, when I was asked to come here and then started asking around the country, one of the reasons given me by my friends as to why I shouldn't come was the control of the faculty, the power of the faculty in the University of California system. And when I came, I queried the senate leadership at that time--people like John [S.] Galbraith and others who had been in the senate, Foster Sherwood and others--and I finally realized something that just hadn't occurred to me: that of all the standing orders of the regents delegating authority and responsibility, with very few exceptions, the authority delegated to the Academic Senate was advisory authority, even including appointments, promotions, which were the critical things to me. And as I talked a little bit further, I realized that maybe--I didn't know till later that it was absolutely the case--that maybe what had happened was that given a situation where the

chancellor had to be a weak person because he in turn was beholden to Berkeley, that maybe these advisory functions had become de facto decision-making functions. And sure enough, when I got into the job, I discovered that that was precisely the case.

Now, here the poor chancellor was caught in the middle, because the process was that the budget committee and the faculty would say, "We recommend this fellow not be promoted." It's come to me; I'd say for a variety of reasons, after checking with the deans and everybody else, he should. So I'd overrule them. I had the power. But then that had to go to Berkeley, where I could be overruled. And I soon discovered that the Berkeley administration--this is my own prejudice--more often overruled the chancellor than not if the chancellor disagreed with the faculty and the senate committee, because it was important for the president's office to retain the confidence of the faculty. And this was one of the reasons that I fought my tail off and won in the end, as you know, to give the chancellors the right to make the final decision on promotions and appointments.

However, I also realized that at the other end of the line, there's no sense in fighting with the senate. You know, if the chancellor is overruling 90 percent of the budget committee's recommendations, he ought to get out. It means that he and the faculty aren't talking to each

other; they're talking about two different institutions. So I made up my mind early on to try to work with the senate, try to speed up the processes of evaluation, streamline procedures. That, incidentally, was tough, because then there was not only the several campus senates but then there was a statewide senate that set up ground rules under which the local senate had to operate; so we had to fight on that point to give the local senate power, more power, outside of the statewide Academic Senate.

Well, finally, after a while, the senate leadership at UCLA saw that I really wasn't trying to be a dictator, that I really wasn't trying to create an institution unlike what they wanted, that my interests were theirs--distinguished appointments, not letting good people go, improving the library, things like that--once we got to know each other, our differences became very minimal, very minimal. And then I had finally the whole senate leadership backing, in our fight (a) to let the campus senate have more authority vis-à-vis the statewide senate; and let the campus administrator have more authority vis-à-vis the statewide administrator.

So I would say--and others can testify however they will to this view--that my relations with the senate were by and large very smooth, my differences very little, and that in the end we had an absolutely common purpose--

namely, to get authority and responsibility located where they belong, on the campus. In the last five years of my administration, I never had any member of our UCLA faculty, old or young, ever tell me, "Look, you're trying to break up the university." On the contrary, they were always pushing, if anything, in the end, for me to go a little harder to get more done. I also give a great deal of credit to Foster Sherwood for this. Foster had been around here a long time, his father before him; and Foster educated me, I think, early on as to the values. Everybody was aware of the problems. But the facts are that in the end I came to understand what the values of the Academic Senate were, and I often said toward the end that knowing what I knew then, if I were starting a new university, I'd create a senate mechanism not very different than the one that exists now. But that mechanism only works well--that is to say, a strong advisory senate mechanism only works well--if there's a strong chancellor. But if you've got a system that emasculates the chancellor, then the thing gets totally out of focus.

So the whole problem was getting the thing in balance and trying to communicate this to a place like Berkeley where there was the tradition that the president of the university was the Berkeley chancellor, too. And of course, he had plenty of power. Nobody was second-guessing him if

he was in fact president of the university and de facto chancellor. And in the Sproul regime, of course, he was that. In the Kerr regime, there was a chancellor, but in effect he operated as vice-chancellor at Berkeley.

Toward the end, the only concern I had about the Academic Senate was that it wasn't involved as much as it should have been. I wish they really had, many of them, been in it more on the constructive side, you know. Plenty was said at meetings when this stupid Angela Davis thing was going on. Everybody--not everybody, but some of these faculty members were bleeding their hearts out for this irrational young woman. But at the time when we should have been talking about curricular reform and improving undergraduate instruction, you couldn't get very many members of the faculty in a meeting.

MINK: I wonder if you could mention--I'm not meaning to try to have you dig down for specific facts--some of what you consider the important appointments that you were able to get through the senate that sort of signified a victory for more authority for the chancellor, if you would.

MURPHY: Well, I think the first area that we had problems in, that I had problems with the senate, was in the area of the professional schools and the arts. As you know, I have an intense interest in the arts. And when I said the arts, I meant the practice of the arts as well as the

study of the arts. And obviously, if you're going to appoint a gifted painter, you can't expect him to have much of a bibliography. There may be catalogs or shows that he had, but it's his work that counts, not what he says about Michelangelo. And that would be true of all of the arts and the theater arts as well. And to try to get through appointments there in the business school, Graduate School of Business Administration, fine people who'd been in the business world. They hadn't written many scholarly articles; they were busy doing business. In the medical school, we had the same issues. We started the School of Dentistry. It was just an incredible problem. When you'd get a fellow that everybody would say, "Here's the best man in orthodontics in the United States," well, he'd only written four papers or something.

So my first major battles were across the board in the professional schools where you were dealing with application. And I repeatedly--in dentistry, in business administration, to a lesser extent in medicine, and to quite an extent in fine arts--overruled these budget committees. I got knocked down for a while up in Berkeley, and I finally had a long talk with Clark Kerr. I simply said, "I'm going to report that you really are not going to have distinguished professional schools at UCLA until this nonsense stops. I think the regents ought to know this. Mr.

Edward Carter, who's always telling me, 'Now, the UCLA business school ought to be as good as the Harvard business school,' I'm going to have to tell him why, Clark, that that isn't going to happen because you don't go through this process at Harvard. The several schools go it on their own. You don't have a budget committee in which a professor of English literature is trying to figure out whether a professor of marketing is a good marketer." So after a little of that, why, finally I began noticing that my recommendations contrary to the opinion of the budget committee were finally getting approved up there. And I spent hours with these budget committees explaining: "You're teaching and doing research in marketing, which is so different from Shakespeare. And you fellows are not drawing enough distinction between these things." Another school we had a big problem with, and maybe they still do, was library service--a terrible problem there.

The fellows out there will tell you that they used to hear me say a thousand times, "You can't compare apples and pears. We want the best apples and we want the best pears. So you measure pears one way and apples another way." Finally, I got them convinced that in the case of the professional schools, they could put a much higher reliance on the reputation of the man within his profession than on how many articles somebody had written, whether they had or

hadn't won the Nobel Prize. And that was, I think, a major breakthrough for all the professional schools.

When I came, by the way, to California, I was a little shocked that although there was enormous strength--let's take Berkeley over the years--enormous strength in the sciences, let's say in the area of arts and sciences (with the possible exception of the law school, and I can even argue the Boalt Hall problem), the same degree of distinction had not been achieved in the professional schools. Nobody ever talked about the Berkeley School of Business Administration. The San Francisco Medical Center was ranked somewhere in the middle of medical schools around the country. The School of Dentistry at San Francisco had a very average reputation--countrywide, I mean. And I always puzzled about this.

Then I finally came to realize what the problem was: that you had a multipurpose campus being run by arts and science. Now, if that had existed at Harvard or Yale, you would never have had the great medical and law and business administration programs in those places. And frankly, it's my own view that the giant strides--and I think they are giant strides--that have been made in the professional schools at UCLA are in a large measure related to the fact that now you're measuring lawyers against lawyers, doctors against doctors, and dentists against dentists,

rather than physicists against doctors or biologists against doctors.

Well, that, I think, was my major set of differences with the Academic Senate, and I think we finally talked this out. I don't think this was anybody conquering anybody else; I think we finally reached an understanding that we'd measure things this way. Now, in the area of arts and sciences, our differences were practically negligible. I just assumed that the chemists knew more about chemistry than I did, and if they said this fellow ought not to be appointed, he shouldn't be. So in the end, I'd have to say our differences were relatively very small. Of course, the final point of power came when, toward the end of the Kerr regime, we got, finally, the regents to agree that the ultimate decision on appointments and promotions would be left to the campus.

MINK: And that was soon taken back after the Angela Davis....

MURPHY: Well, let me say that....

MINK: It was a giant step backward, I'm afraid.

MURPHY: No, no, wait a minute. It really isn't, and I'll tell you why, if I understand it correctly. You have to understand the nuances. When we were in this struggle with Berkeley about where the final authority would be, Kerr engaged in a very interesting ploy. When finding all the chancellors were aligned against him on this issue, he knew

that there was a great sympathy to get it done within the regents. And our proposal was this: that we go through the process, you have the budget committee and the senate apparatus comment, it goes to the chancellor's office, then the chancellor says yea or nay within the budgetary guidelines, then that recommendation be transmitted by the president to the regents, without comment, just transmitted. Kerr's ploy was that there's no way he'd be willing to do that because he was unwilling to take the responsibility of appearing to approve this without in fact having the authority to approve it. So to his amazement, and I must say mine, the regents at that particular meeting said, "Well, look, we don't want to fool with it at all, anyway. So it doesn't even need to be transmitted. The chancellor can just act in the name of the regents."

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MURPHY: Now, this action of the regents, that they didn't even want to be in the act, is something that we hadn't dreamed was an action they'd take, and we didn't want it. We simply wanted our recommendations to go to them for their reaction rather than being second-guessed by the president's office. So not only was Kerr nonplussed, but so were we. This was not only a pie, this was a pie and a half. We didn't really want it. Okay. I must say, it speeded things up, because once we made a decision, we could call a guy on the telephone; and when we were in the heavy recruiting business, speed was very important.

But--now, here's where I get on a little thin ice--there came the Angela Davis problem; and at that point, because of the way that thing had to be worked out, the regents took over that authority from the chancellor. Then there was a reexamination. Now, as I understand it, the chancellor makes his final decision, and the president's office conduits it to the regents, which is precisely what we wanted in the beginning, because I think it is quite wrong for the regents not to have the final authority, especially with tenure and appointments. The regents, after all, have the responsibility of the fiscal stability

of the university; they had the fiduciary responsibility. When you make a tenured appointment or promote somebody to tenure, you're making a lifetime contract with that man. You're committing, I don't know, a half a million dollars of the public's money. I don't know any university in America where the regents don't, usually pro forma, say aye or nay in the final analysis. And the regents appoint the tenured professor. I think that that's the way it ought to be.

The thing I was objecting to was the chancellor being second-guessed by someone in Berkeley who didn't know anything about it. And my understanding is that that second-guessing is still out. The regents are back in the act. But again, I repeat, I didn't ever want them out of the act. As I say, I know of no university in the country where they aren't in the act. I think from everything Chuck and the others tell me that it's as different as night and day from the old days, when you'd go through a time-consuming process and then you'd just get a note back from Berkeley saying, "I disapprove." And you'd call up and say, "Well, why?" "Well, it doesn't look right to me." "What investigations have you made?" "Well, I talked to somebody in the Berkeley department and he doesn't think this fellow's that good." I used to get that sort of thing. And that, apparently, doesn't happen anymore.

Well, anyway, my relations with the Academic Senate, I look back on with great satisfaction. I enjoyed it. The discussions were sometimes spirited, but they were always in good faith. We agreed to disagree with a smile. Nobody yelled at each other, and in the end we were working very, very smoothly.

MINK: Did you get a chance to speak out whenever you wanted to in the senate? You could go down and speak?

MURPHY: Oh, yes, and did.

MINK: And did. You didn't have any resentment?

MURPHY: No, none at all.

MINK: I don't think the chancellors tended to. I don't think Allen tended much to.

MURPHY: I used to get much involved in senate meetings. But, you know, it was the old...there's so many bits of nonsense. I remember the first senate meeting I went to. There was the agenda, some phrase like report, or announcements or something, by the president. The chancellor's not even mentioned! I looked up the standing orders; sure enough, there was no provision in the standing orders that in the senate meeting the chancellor would have the same right to comment as the president. I went to the senate fellows right away, and I said, "This is ridiculous. The president isn't here anyway most of the time, and when he comes, it's ceremonial. If you really want this thing to

be pragmatic and work, you can cross out the president and you wouldn't miss a thing. But at least you've got to have the chancellor." Well, they finally agreed they ought to, and I took advantage of it. I don't think there was a senate meeting that I ever missed. I built my calendar around it. And I doubt if there was a single senate meeting in which I didn't have something to say to start it out.

MINK: Well, this would give you an opportunity, say, to funnel back information that you'd gained through regents' meetings.

MURPHY: Absolutely. As a matter of fact, when I got here, the Kerr administration had created some pattern for all the campuses. They had to have something called the executive council. And they said, "This is who should be on it." Well, I forget what it was; I just remember I thought it was ridiculous, so I never had a meeting with the executive council, as such. And that was to meet every two months or something. What I did was to create the Council of Deans, which didn't exist in these standing orders. That's another thing. [In] the University of California system, when I arrived, the deans didn't amount to a damn. It was amazing how little power they had in all kinds of processes, which I thought, again, was wrong in terms of responsibility. I created this Council of Deans, and then added people ex

officio--the librarian, some of the business people, and the vice-chancellor.

MINK: Wasn't Public Affairs Services in that?

MURPHY: Yeah, well, I had them there all the time, Andy or somebody. But then I also added, shortly thereafter, key senate people--the chairman of the senate, the chairmen of the key committees of the senate. And so I would have a meeting of this committee, this group, the Monday morning after the Friday regents' meeting, in which I had given a total report on what went on, and even attitudes. These fellows down here, I'll bet you, knew earlier more about the insecure position of Clark Kerr than nearly anybody, because I was very candid with them, and they always kept their confidence. I never read in the Daily Bruin or something....

MINK: I think that's perfectly true, because I think as far as the campus community at UCLA was concerned, the insecure position of Kerr wasn't known, really, which is a good commentary on the confidentiality.

MURPHY: Yes. But these fellows, they knew a lot of things. But the point is, they knew precisely what happened on the following Monday, and then the deans could go back, and if it were related to anything that was germane, they could bring the department chairman in the following day; so that by the end of the following week, everybody who needed to

know knew. I also frequently met at lunch with, say, the whole budget committee, not about a man or a problem, but about philosophy. I would meet with the Graduate Council from time to time and talk about, very candidly, "Why is this department, say, the Spanish department, which used to be very good--what can you do about this?" I asked the budget committee somewhere along the line to make a sub-committee to advise us on weak departments, what we should be doing with FTE.

So my concern about the Academic Senate never related to my inability to get along. In fact, I wish we could have had more dialogue. It was basically the amount of time we had to waste getting this decentralization. You know, as I look back on my years out there, if what we ended up with in terms of administrative authority and responsibility--which incidentally didn't destroy the university at all. It made certain bureaucrats in Berkeley less potent, but I think it strengthened the university. They had to have it with these young campuses coming along. God, they couldn't be run like adjuncts to some third-level bureaucrat. When I look back, if I and Chuck Young and Foster Sherwood and certain committees of the senate had had the same administrative structure in the beginning that we ended up with, we would have been able to do so many more things, constructive things.

MINK: So much wheelspinning.

MURPHY: Just for nothing. Parenthetically, and in all fairness to Clark Kerr, I think he really didn't want to give up a lot of authority, but I don't blame him nearly as much as I blame the second-level people, the shadowy bureaucracy that had no responsibility, no public visibility, and didn't have any responsibility to the regents or anything else, but by delegation had a whole lot of power and they didn't want to give it up. They didn't want to give it back to the campuses. And this is, of course, the kind of thing you see in any bureaucracy, Federal, state, or otherwise. Little people with power do not want to give it up, regardless of the logic or illogic.

MINK: I wonder if you would speak a little while about the work that you did in the beginning--I think it was towards the beginning of your administration--to set up a better alumni arrangement, the setting-up of the UCLA Foundation, the bringing in of Doug Kinsey. Why did you think this was necessary to begin with?

MURPHY: When I came, I got to know the ex-presidents of the Alumni Association very quickly. As you know, they were all dedicated, and they all believed in UCLA. They'd had to fight hard for it. They had all served, many of them, on the board as ex officios. But I'd become accustomed to a very powerful alumni organization in Kansas. As I

told you earlier, they were the ones that permitted me to beat this crazy governor year after year, override his veto.

MINK: Well, what was your assessment of ours when you first came?

MURPHY: As I got into it, I was enormously impressed with the dedication of these ex-presidents and absolutely shocked at the weakness of the basic organization. Honestly, in some respects, to me it didn't exist. Sure, you could mobilize some people for the USC football game or this or that. There were some of these organizations like Blue Shield that didn't do anything. They had a dinner once a year, and nothing transpired. The groups that were involved were the same people that had been talking to each other for twenty-five years. Some of the women's groups, Gold Shield, would spin their wheels, and then they'd come up with two scholarships per year. There was no annual giving of consequence, and quite honestly--and I'll have to say plainly--as I got into the staff down there, it was clear to me that it just wasn't up in terms of understanding and strength and capacity to build an alumni organization almost from scratch, in a certain sense.

And the best symbol of that was something that really amazed me. Here was this great, rich university, this huge alumni body with really extraordinary budgets as compared

with what I'd been accustomed to operating in Kansas, in one of the richest cities in the United States. So Harry Longway, who was then the alumni secretary, came over, and he said, "You know, I need a little help from you." And I said, "What's that?" He said, "You know, we've got a little more space in Kerckhoff Hall now, and I'd kind of like to upgrade it a little bit and get some draperies in there and new pieces of furniture in some of the new rooms we're getting." But, he said, "I've got to convince the alumni board of this." "Well," I said, "what are we talking about in money?" He said, "About \$30,000." I said, "Are you worried about getting money for that?" "Oh," he said, "it's going to be very tough." He said, "In fact, I put some feelers out, and it looks like I'm not going to get it. So we're having a meeting of the executive committee of the alumni board at the California Club or Jonathan Club, and would you come to the meeting and help me?" I said, "First of all, I'd like to go over it." So I went over there and looked at what they were talking about, which was nothing. Nothing. And I went to this meeting, and I heard these people debate this issue, and I couldn't believe it. And I just got angry finally, and I said, "Look, I've got to go." But I said, "You know, I really believe this. If you guys can't find \$30,000 to make this a respectable kind of a place on campus

when the physics department is spending that every minute," I said, "really, I think you ought to disband." I got up and walked out. Well, needless to say, they got the \$30,000 by making a few phone calls around to some people.

I got to thinking about this, and I started talking to some of the old-time alumni presidents, who had to admit to me that we didn't know who the alumni were. They didn't have any money to put the people's names on a computer. We'd done that at Kansas, little old Kansas. They didn't know who their alumni were, where they lived. And there was no annual fund or anything else. Let's see, who was the president then? I guess it was Tom Davis.

MINK: Tom Davis was probably one who you talked to.

There were others. Elder Morgan was still around.

MURPHY: No, I didn't talk to him.

MINK: You didn't talk to Elder Morgan?

MURPHY: No. I think it was Tom that I finally went to, Tom and Phil--Phil was still alive. When Tom became president, I said, "Tom, you've got a chance now to rejuvenate this damned thing." And we'd been talking about the memorial activities campaign; that was a trigger. But," I said, "we aren't going to be able to do anything until we get a new secretary. I'm convinced of that." To make a long story short, Doug came aboard. Doug, with his failings--and who doesn't have a few failings--made an enormous contri-

bution to this whole thing. Energetic, committed, smooth, wanted to go first class, wasn't brainwashed by the old Berkeley syndrome.

MINK: The hangdog.

MURPHY: Yeah, precisely. And we started a whole lot of things at once, as you know: the annual giving, the Chancellor's Associates, the memorial activities campaign. We beefed up the staff. I went up to Berkeley and got out of the regents--again with the greatest difficulty; getting it even to the regents through the statewide administration was pulling teeth--that they ought to make an investment of a few hundred thousand dollars in the Alumni Association. Let us hire some people. That would come back tenfold in private giving. So we got regents' financing. I, to be perfectly honest with you, used state funds and picked up some bills that I probably shouldn't have, bootlegged some other money in temporarily, and very quickly, under Doug's leadership and enthusiasm, we began adding a staff. We got that marvelous Nancy Naylor in, who I think has done a superb job with a magazine which, prior to that, was just nothing relatively, in my view, with some interesting, thoughtful articles, you know, rather than just a listing of what the class of '36 was doing. Doug began organizing the alumni county by county on annual giving; he got the associates thing going. All I can say is that with Tom

Davis's enthusiasm and toughness--Tom was critical in this, really; I don't think it would have happened without Tom's support, both in the board and also while he was active as president--and Doug's enthusiasm, you know, it all happened. The names on computers, people started getting done; we started developing techniques and giving associates certain benefits. And Chuck was there, right all along, when this was happening.

It was very, very sad, in my view, that Doug had to leave. In fact, I would have overlooked any kind of indiscretion. There but for the grace of God goes everybody. But the alumni president and vice-president at that time were very uptight about this, creating some morale problems down here in the shop, so Doug had to go.

MINK: I didn't know--maybe you don't want to put this into the record--exactly why it was?

MURPHY: Well, let us simply say that Doug was a little careless in his personal life. I don't want to get into any details, except to say that it created some problems down there. But it can never be taken away from Doug that the great vitality that currently exists there now in all directions--in fund raising and in alumni activities and so on--that it really all started with Doug and Tom Davis. Now, I don't want to take anything away from Chuck; on the contrary, I think he's done a fantastic job. And I

think Don Bowman, in a quiet way, has done a great job in building up the organization and giving it full support. No, I look back on that as one of my major contributions to the place.

MINK: One other thing. Where precisely did the idea of the UCLA Foundation generate?

MURPHY: It came from me. That and the annual giving program.

MINK: I think the UCLA Foundation has been a wonderful thing for fund raising.

MURPHY: There's the foundation, and then there are the associates.

MINK: Well, I'm thinking of the foundation.

MURPHY: There were really three things. Now, they had some kind of a weak annual giving thing. I forget what they called it, but it was just sort of passive. But what we established was an ongoing, hard-hitting, annual giving thing. This was based on the theory that you go after your alumni for five-, ten-, twenty-five-, hundred-dollar, two hundred-dollar annual gifts to your alma mater. Secondly, there was the Chancellor's Associates. Here you were going after \$1,000 a year for ten years from the bigger giver, the one who could give more. And finally, the UCLA Foundation, which would be concerned with bequests and with really major projects, where you were talking about

thousands or, as it turned out, millions. These were all to be dovetailed and integrated. In the beginning, we separated that function from the Alumni Association, really because the Alumni Association was a little standoffish, because in order to get the other operation going, the fund-raising operation going, we had to use non-Alumni-Association money. There were very fearful of taking regents' money. They didn't want to get hooked back up again with Berkeley. That was finally, in the end, for logical reasons--because most of the money's going to come from alumni--brought back together.

The second issue we faced was who would invest and handle the money: the regents, who had always done it, or the foundation itself? In the beginning, I said let the regents do it, because the foundation isn't big enough; there aren't enough knowledgeable people involved in it yet; we can't have a good finance committee. But at a time when you reach a critical mass, when you've got real money coming in, you've got lots of people--investment bankers and accountants and so on--on the board, and you can get an investment subcommittee, then you should take it away from the regents. Well, they've done that now, you know.

MINK: Well, that's what's so great. It really is. This means that when we get endowments for specific purposes

like oral history, we can put it in the foundation and avoid...

MURPHY: Precisely.

MINK: ...taking a lower interest than you'd get from a bank.

MURPHY: The model I had for this was the first thing of its kind ever established in a public institution in the United States. It's called the Kansas University Endowment Association.

MINK: So it was patterned, really, after your Kansas experience.

MURPHY: Exactly. I, in fact, wrote back there and had Irv Youngberg, who's the longtime director of it, send out all of the bylaws and everything else. And this was the model. They had the problem there. It was even worse in Kansas. Any money given to the university before this went into the state treasury, by God; and to get it back out, you had to go through all the bureaucracy--not just to the regents, now, but to the state treasury. Imagine! So we just set up this parallel. I didn't. This was set up in Kansas back in 1912, I think. And incidentally, that little University of Kansas, which isn't that big, Kansas University Endowment Association today has assets of \$70 million dollars.

This one is going to have huge sums of money these

days, because you've got many more alumni; you've got a much richer community from which to grab it. And as you know, year after year (Bill Forbes, who's still on the regents, loves to send me this, because he frequently comments that in a certain sense I woke the regents up to their opportunities in private giving), I think for the past, I don't know, eight or ten years, UCLA shows annually that it brings in more private money than any campus of the university, including Berkeley. And this ought to just continue to go, and I think it certainly is going to with Chuck's total enthusiasm about it. You picked out a subject that was something that was really very close to me. And you had to be successful, because you found nothing. You couldn't do worse.

MINK: One of the things that's been mentioned as being one of your strong points was the individual, face-to-face, money-raising activities that you engaged in. I wonder if you could talk about some of those, and maybe about your experiences and what your technique was.

MURPHY: Well, I don't know that I can describe any technique. I've always been a bit of a peddler or a salesman. My father was a doctor and a bit of an intellectual, and my mother was a concert pianist, and my aunt a painter; so I was always living in a sort of an esoteric intellectual world. But I had a tough old uncle who never went

to college, was a self-made businessman, very successful. And he convinced my father that I should be given to him each summer, from about the time I was twelve years old or something, to work. I worked for five summers in a department store, starting as a stockboy and becoming finally a salesman, and I enjoyed selling. It was lots of fun. It was a highly competitive exercise, because if a lady came in and wanted to buy a tie for her husband, then the challenge was, couldn't I sell her three ties? And I've always enjoyed this kind of peddling, if you want to call it that.

Well, of course, the great advantage is that when you're peddling an idea for support within the university, you're peddling something of very high quality. And if you can conceive and phrase it correctly and communicate some enthusiasm, it's pretty hard to fail, assuming that there is money in the pocket of the person you're talking to. And there are many different ways of getting at it.

I'll give you one example of many, many. One day Bob Vosper called me up, and he said, "There's a young man on the faculty spending a sabbatical year in Israel. He just called me, and the entire library of a very old bookseller firm is up for sale." This was a firm, German-Jewish. It was started in Frankfurt, had been driven out of Germany by Hitler, so they'd taken their stock and

moved to Vienna. And they'd been drive out of Vienna when Hitler came in with the Anschluss, and they'd gone to Israel. And the last member of the family had died, and the children had disappeared into the Diaspora somewhere, and nobody was interested in carrying on; and here was this huge book stock. And the fellow [Arnie Band] who was over there was one of our very bright young people in Jewish studies, Hebrew, at UCLA. So Bob said, "Can't we get them?" I said, "Well, how much is involved?" He said, "About a \$120,000." Parenthetically, Bob told me the other day that Shimeon Brisman told him that to buy that library today would cost you \$1 million.

So, where do I get \$120,000? Now, it had to be cash, and it had to be like in six days. Well, you know, you develop a network of contacts, and I called up my friend Eliot Corday, who is a doctor and one of the leading cardiologists in the Beverly Hills-Los Angeles area--devoted to UCLA. Obviously I knew that he had not only Jewish patients but very wealthy Jewish patients. And I told him my story, and I wound up by saying, "Eliot, look. Los Angeles is the second largest Jewish city in the United States, maybe in the world. There is a deep interest on the part of the Jews in this community about their culture, and there ought to be a great Jewish library here to be used not just by UCLA people but by the several Jewish

seminaries and so on, and there just isn't. And we have this opportunity. It'd be sinful to let it go by. And he said, "Well, I'll call you back. How much time have I got?" I said, "I need to know by tomorrow." By golly, that night he said, "Can you come to lunch?" He had arranged to have Ted Cummings--whom I knew slightly; I now know Ted much better--and me, and the three of us had lunch. Eliot said, "Tell Ted your story," and I walked out of there with a check for \$110,000, because the story was the same one I told Eliot.

"Targets of opportunity" is what I call them. I've never been much interested in the fund-raising side of going out and getting routine money. That's more for the professional. The challenge to me is to seize a target of opportunity.

MINK: In other words, you have to have something to offer.

MURPHY: Right. To match the man with the need. And that's fun. Then you're really putting something together. Because the great satisfaction that I have about raising money is the satisfaction that the donor has after he's given it. And you know, if you get a donor who gives you money, and you make a pitch, and a lot of people have made pitches to him before, he wonders how much of this is rhetoric and how much of it's substance. But if you make the pitch, and you make the sale, and you can go back to him and show

him that, if anything, you understated the opportunity for him, you know, you've got a lifelong friend and you've got a potential resource.

A classic example is Ed Pauley. We knew when we did the Memorial Activities Center that to really do it right I had to put a package together. I finally convinced the state that for certain activities they owed us some money, that it was proper for them to put some money up. We put together a package for the alumni to raise. (Those were the days before--quite mistakenly, in my view--the administration gave away to the students the right to say what would happen to the fees; I would never have done that. I'd have let them advise, but still make the final decision.) I agreed to put in some student fee money. We all knew we were short about \$1 million. Okay. Ed Pauley had already given \$1 million to Berkeley for part of some ballroom in the [Student] Union. I knew Ed's deep interest in UCLA--we were great personal friends--but above all else, I knew his interest in athletics. He was my target, then.

I remember when we made the pitch. I asked John Canaday to help me and Ed Carter. And it was at Berkeley in that old hotel up there, the Claremont Hotel, in that cocktail lounge. Well, we got him after a regents' meeting. We all sat down in the cocktail lounge, and I said, "Ed, I want to make a proposition to you." He said, "What's

that?" And so I made it. I said, "It's going to be a \$5 million structure. It's going to be the finest indoor pavilion in Southern California, maybe one of the best in the United States. It's going to be multipurpose--basketball, public events--and if you will give us \$1 million, we can build it, because we've got commitments all the way around. We've got a \$5 million building for \$1 million. And it'll be called Pauley Pavilion." (I conceived that name.) And I said, "Ed, I'll bet you that the name Pauley Pavilion, which already sounds good because it's alliterative, will be in the newspaper more than Royce Hall or the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion or anything else."

MINK: Well, after [John] Wooden the past seven years, I guess that's true.

MURPHY: I really hadn't counted on this. But in any event, you knew it was a central facility. Well, then John chimed in a little bit; Ed Carter chimed in a little. And Ed finally said he wanted to think about it a little bit, and then he came back and he said, "Okay, I'll go." And I said, "Now, remember, I made you this promise. As a matter of fact, we're going to open it with a nonathletic event, but it'll be jammed for athletic events."

Ed Pauley has more than half a dozen times said to me, "You know, that's the only gift I ever gave anybody where the performance has matched the pitch. They gave me an even

wilder pitch at Berkeley, and," he said, "I should have spent my million dollars for something entirely different. As I look back on it, what the hell is a ballroom?" And he said, "You know, I am so proud of that, and I'm so proud of being identified in such a constructive and, to me, happy way with the University of California that," he said, "you can be very sure at my death I'll not forget it."

So you match the man's interest with your need. To me, that's constructive fund raising. The other kind of fund raising is more routine. Not that it isn't complicated, but it is kind of routine. Can we turn that off just a minute?

MINK: Sure. [tape recorder turned off]

MURPHY: All right, so what's next?

MINK: When you came, as far as the idea of seeing a lack of private support and maybe wanting to go into this area of private support, you didn't see any one area that you thought where this support should be channeled to over another--no priorities?

MURPHY: No, not really. I sort of didn't mix the two together, in a sense. I knew that, on the one hand, I had my own ideas of things that I felt needed to be strengthened and built up: the health sciences, the library, fine arts. That was sort of, you might say, the academic plan or program. On the other side, there was the whole broad area

of private money: private money from alumni, private money from foundations, private money from individuals in the community with special interests. Now, to the extent possible, you put those two together. You knew that Jules Stein was interested in ophthalmology, and you were interested in building up the medical school; so these finally come together. You knew that Ed Pauley was interested in athletics; you had made a commitment to bring athletics back to the campus. Well, these two things come together. If, let us say, there had been a wealthy man interested in building a rare-book library because he was a rare-book collector, I could have gone to him to get a wing on the library. So this is the question of finding the interest that matches the need.

But then beyond that, there's the general flow of money which is unrestricted, which the chancellor can then move. I had the Connell endowment, [Michael J. Connell Memorial Fund], and I finally broke that loose from Berkeley. You know, that Connell endowment, that's done so much around here, when I came here you couldn't spend a nickel of it without asking Berkeley. And yet it was given to us. I got that done in the first couple of years. And as I look back, I can't believe; I repeat: If we had been permitted the same operational thing at the beginning that we had in the end, I'd have had hundreds of hours to be doing the

constructive things, getting more money out of the community, working with the Rockefeller and the Ford foundations instead of fighting with these people up north. It was so wasteful. But the main thing, I think, has been that a tradition of private giving has now really been established. And I think the momentum is up, and I think there's only one way to go.

MINK: When you first came here, did you notice an antipathy from the private institutions against tapping of private funds for this institution?

MURPHY: Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, not only antipathy, but it was pretty bitter. So I finally sat down with Norman Topping at lunch--Norman Topping had been at USC--and Lee DuBridge of Caltech. I said, "Now, look. Let's be rational and reasonable about this."

MINK: Did you have them both at the same lunch?

MURPHY: Yes. I said, "There are two kinds of money that you cannot deny us the right of getting. Number one, going to our alumni--annual fund raising, whatever. This is true of every private or public university in America." They agreed. I said, "Secondly, you cannot deny us the right to accept money from the individual who, let us say, has a particular interest in medicine or medical history or something, who says, 'I want to give \$1 million to build an eye institute.' It's either going to be built at UCLA or

it isn't going to be built at all. Now, given those two rights, I make a compact with you that we will have no large-scale fund raising at UCLA on an annual basis that goes out beyond the alumni, where you tap every corporation and every this or that. That should be your bag."

So we reached an agreement, and we've pretty well stuck to it, I guess, from what I can gather. We certainly did during my time. The only area we had some trouble with off and on was the school of business.

MINK: Yes, I was going to bring it up.

MURPHY: Obviously, you've got graduates that are going into businesses, and they want it. So I finally got Topping and DuBridge to agree that to the extent that corporations wanted to make grants to the UCLA school of business it was okay, but we would not go to the corporations for general support of the university.

MINK: Which I think had been done, like Jacoby had gotten together ninety big corporations at a luncheon meeting and raised \$90,000.

MURPHY: That's right.

MINK: I think that this is what made the bomb go off.

MURPHY: Yes. Well, we had to cool that back, and then I had to go back to DuBridge and Topping. And I finally said, "Well, look, it is quite wrong for the dean of the

medical school to start a big fund-raising drive among California corporations, or for Don Bowman or Doug Kinsey to go out and ask every corporation to give them \$2,500 for the general support of the university. That's just wrong. But," I said, "you've got to accept the fact that to go to General Electric to ask for a fellowship in the school of business is not unreasonable, because they're taking our graduates." So we sort of got over that. That was the only rough problem I had.

Topping was very supportive. He and I worked out an arrangement. I'd go down and testify before the city council on behalf of USC and the urban redevelopment when that was in trouble; Topping would encourage his legislative friends to support the university appropriation. So I think that worked out pretty well.

MINK: That was probably the first kind of rapprochement that had ever been worked out with the University of Southern California.

MURPHY: That's what Norman said. Norman said that that was the beginning. And Norman and I agreed, why fight? We agreed on philosophy, that instead of assuming that the pie was limited and you were fighting each other to get a bigger piece of the pie, that we would try to jointly enlarge the whole pie--and therefore, the same percentage piece is always larger--and that we hang together or we

hang separately. Topping and I had a warm relationship, and I think I agree that by that time UCLA was stopping feeling its inferiority. You know, you can always act like a statesman if you've got some security, a sense of security. And UCLA, by that time, had grown up, was growing up, and we were able to tell the faculty and the students, "Look, you can stop being hangdog. You're a first-rate institution." I must say, though, part of that Berkeley problem always was the fact that these people down here had been hit over the head for so long that they really had a kind of conditioned reflex. They wouldn't fight. And in the end, you know, that disappeared, happily.

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MINK: This afternoon, Dr. Murphy, I'd like to ask you first of all, in connection with the development of fine arts at UCLA, what you saw when you came here, what the scene seemed to be like to you?

MURPHY: Well, I'd start by saying that in a way it was rather spotty. There were some very great positives. The tradition of Royce Hall being the cultural center for not really West Los Angeles but in some respects for the entire city was already well established, with Frances Inglis laying on really extraordinarily professional programs at Royce for students, faculty, and for the community. That was a great positive. Fred Wight and the UCLA Art Council had begun to get the UCLA galleries going, again in a very sophisticated fashion. They hadn't geared up to their ultimate heights, but that show was on the road quite clearly. Abbott Kaplan was in the process of building the Theatre Group on the campus, which was, as you will recall, enormously professional theater, as good as one could see off-Broadway or any other place. So it was perfectly clear that important things were under way involving very gifted people.

On the other hand, there was something called the

Department of Applied Arts--maybe the School of Applied Arts--which was kind of a bouillabaisse, physical education and art history, etc., etc. I should also add that the physical plant for the theater was rudimentary. In fact, the physical plant for the arts was rudimentary: a fine building for music, a good building for art but much too small, and practically nothing for the theater. So it was a varied picture.

But above everything else, it was clear to me that within the faculty and within the community there was a real hunger and thirst for vitality in the arts. So we began to make several moves almost in parallel. The first one was an administrative one. I quickly decided that we needed to have something called the College of Fine Arts, to include music, drama, art and art history, the performing arts, theater, and the dance. And all of the other things should be stripped away and put in the College of Letters and Science or, as a matter of fact, eliminated.

MINK: Had there been a committee of the faculty appointed to look into this before you came, or were you instrumental in getting this committee appointed?

MURPHY: Really, my memory's vague here. There could have been a committee just beginning to look into it, or maybe I appointed the committee. I just don't remember that.

MINK: You remember that home economics was included as

part of this applied arts.

MURPHY: Oh, I remember very well.

MINK: And that was one area that they wanted to move out along with some of the others.

MURPHY: And I think physical education, military science; it was a bouillabaisse. The problem of home economics was a special one, because you remember I finally eliminated that department; I moved it out and then eliminated it. I must say, I had more angry women writing me from all over the state of California than you get angry alumni when you lose to USC at football.

In any event, this was accomplished within a year or two. And I wanted the College of Fine Arts to really be germane. I just didn't want it to be a department where people dabbled in the arts. I wanted to have programs where people were professionally trained as well as service programs for nonmajors. This was one of the main factors that led to my appointment of Bill Melnitz as the first dean of the new school, because Bill was a pro. He'd been trained, as you know, by Max Reinhardt; he'd been a professional theater director in Germany; and he knew what professional quality was in the arts. Yet Bill had been around the university long enough to understand some of the special problems that the arts have in the university.

MINK: Did you find that there was much opposition to what

you wanted to do among the faculty, the old-guard faculty?

MURPHY: A great deal. And they were not unique. The arts have never been regarded by the so-called Germanic-type scholars as an appropriate subject for university activity. They say it's perfectly all right to study the rhyme of Shakespeare, but it's not appropriate for a university to play Shakespeare the way Shakespeare intended. Shakespeare never, I think, assumed there'd be people devoting hours and hours, theses and all the rest, to what he did at eight o'clock in the morning or where he went to bed at night or with whom he went to bed at night. Shakespeare wrote for the theater. I can't understand how anybody can understand Shakespeare without seeing Shakespeare played. Well, anyway, that's another subject entirely.

There was a good deal of opposition. There still is, I suspect, in certain quarters. This is true in American universities; it's true in German universities; it's true in English universities. But I will say that in my lifetime in university work, the arts have come a long way to being fully accepted in professional terms in colleges and universities. I think that the day will come when nobody will be surprised that you're training a lawyer, that you're training a doctor, or that you're training an actor, or that you're training a director, or you're training a painter, who intend to make their living doing that.

But we had no real problems creating the college, no problems in the appointment of Bill as dean. But then, as Bill got into the remodeling of the curriculum, and as we began to talk about appointment of professional people to these departments rather than somebody who just talked about the theater, we began to have tensions within the Academic Senate and faculty.

MINK: The old question of publications and that sort of thing.

MURPHY: Yes. My theory always was that a theater director isn't supposed to publish; he's supposed to direct. So let's not compare apples and pears. Remember early on about this apple-pear problem. I might say that it was in the area of the fine arts where we first began to have this struggle. It spilled over into other disciplines.

MINK: In the professional schools as well, I'm sure.

MURPHY: Well, that was the first major move. Secondly, I threw--as I think Abbott Kaplan and Gordon Davidson and John Houseman will tell you--my total support behind the Theatre Group. This we managed to do pretty well with because we didn't have to deal with the Academic Senate; this was in extension. And it became, as you know, a very distinguished group and finally moved to the Music Center, which I think was proper because that more broadly serves the general public.

We also modified the long-range building program to expedite the building of the North Campus. And you will recall that included theater--two units in the theater, actually, one for the theater and one for motion pictures and television. We expedited the new Dickson Art Center for art higher on the priority list for the building and thus were able to create that beautiful North Campus with the sculpture court, which I'll get back to in a moment.

MINK: I might say in this respect, did you encounter problems in the overall campus planning committee, where they opposed the development of this area, say, as opposed to the development of other areas within the university?

MURPHY: Well, yes. You know, everybody wants their building now. But I just made up my mind that I was going to see two things happen, if nothing else. Happily, a few other things happened, too. One was to get that North Campus built, to create an environment for the arts; and the other was to finish the Medical Center, including the Schools of Public Health and Dentistry. And sure, I had opposition. But as I told you earlier, I assumed I was the boss. I listened to everybody and then said, "We're not going to take a vote. This is the way it's going to be." And that's the way it turned out. Now, in addition, we got a lot of other things done too, fortunately. We got the [University] Research Library done--two-thirds of

it, anyway--and we got some major additions to chemistry, geology, physics, engineering, mathematics. But these two were very high priority: the arts and the medical school--or the health sciences, really, which is medicine, dentistry, nursing, public health, and the hospital.

Anyway, back to the arts. One of my failures, I'll mention very quickly. It, to me, is a tragic and a classic example of this nonsense between writing about an art or doing it. One day I had a phone call, within two or three years after I'd come. I'd met Jascha Heifetz through mutual friends. And Jascha said he wanted to come see me, and he said that he and Gregor Piatigorsky and William Primrose (and here were the three preeminent string players in the world on the three different instruments--the violin, the viola, and the cello), that Bill Primrose was going to come to California to live (Grischa and Jascha were already here), and they were going to do a lot of trio, quartet music. And would UCLA be interested in their teaching master classes, coming on the faculty? Well, now, here you had laid out on a platter three of the giants in this field. So I jumped with joy. I said, "Jascha, no problem. I'll be back to you quickly."

I promptly got hold of Melnitz, who was very excited, and then we got the music people in. And you will not believe it, but to a man they said, no. No, these are not

musicologists. These are not historians of music. They haven't written any papers. The problem was, unfortunately, with a few exceptions, many of the members of the music department were scholars, not professional musicians. That's why they were in the university. And this was a defensive thing; this is the insecurity of the inadequate.

Well, I was fresh and young here at the time and still feeling my way through the Academic Senate process, the appointment process. But we pulled and hauled and twisted, and I finally got extension. Abbott Kaplan, needless to say, was enthusiastic about the idea. But then the courses had to be credited by the Academic Senate, and the music department dissented; and to make a long story short, these three people, I finally had to say we just couldn't fit them in. And they went down to USC. Gifted students of the strings come from all over the United States and the world to work on a selective basis with Jascha and Grischa. Bill Primrose has subsequently died. But it's this kind of nonsense and this kind of sophistry and this kind of defensiveness that has created problems for we administrators who are determined to see that the practice of the arts have a proper role in university curriculum. So that was one abject failure, and it illustrates the problem.

Now, going beyond this, then, a little bit, you've got the building program going, and I was determined. I

felt that we ought to build out on the West Coast a distinguished department of art history. Berkeley has a good one. At that time, Stanford had nothing. Subsequently Stanford has build a very fine Department of Art History. But really west of Chicago there was nothing of distinction. All on the East Coast: Columbia Institute of Fine Arts, the Fogg Museum at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, University of Chicago. Well, in order to attract good art historians you have to have a distinguished art history library. So we set about to build that section. And I scouted around, got a lot of money--more money than I thought I could. I also convinced my friend Bob Goheen of Princeton to let us have one of the few copies of the Index of Christian Art, which is an indispensable tool for the art historian, as well as for other scholars of that period in other fields. We put a lot of money in the slide collection, the photographic collection, to build up these scholarly resources to permit.us. We had practically nothing in this area to begin with. We do now have, I think, one of the best sort of archival bibliographic resources in the West for the young art historian or the older one. But unfortunately, I didn't get very far in building the quality of the department. It's still an average department. It ought to be a distinguished department. And here again I was stymied, I think, by the existence within that department of some very

pedestrian people who were defensive, insecure, and really stymied Bill and me in getting the people to come. But the base is there, and I think Charles Speroni understands this now. There've been some fortunate retirements in that department, and there'll be some highly fortunate ones in the very near future, and they now have a chance to really build some distinction within their department. I'm at least pleased that the physical resources are there and the library and the archival resources are there.

In theater, the program has always been good. It still isn't quite as professional as it ought to be, but [Kenneth] Macgowan was an extraordinary man, a combination scholar, writer, and director. Remember, he'd worked with O'Neill and also worked in the motion picture industry but was a very gifted writer. Some of the books he and Melnitz did are classics in history of the theater. They have a physical resource, I think, second to none to lay on good programming; and here again it's just a question of getting the faculty to understand that you've got to have a couple of truly distinguished professionals, and then the thing goes--like [George Pierce] Baker at Harvard at one time.

Television and radio, we really were on the way to building a truly distinguished program, and I think it's still a very good program, with Colin Young who was recruited away just in my last year by the British government; and in

fact, the reason he went back was that the government mandated him to build a film school in London, or just outside of London, for all of Great Britain. That program is spotty, but by and large it's certainly one of the two or three best in the country. And I think it retains that quality. We tried to help that. We got a lot of resources, foundation grants--the Louis B. Mayer Foundation was very generous--and federal grants of consequence. Again, they've got superlative quarters, and it's just a question of agreeing to get good people and continuing to build.

In the practice of the arts, the practicing arts, that faculty has grown, I think. A giant step forward was when we were able to recruit Richard Diebenkorn. And here again, you have this old problem of the senate mechanism and defensiveness. Fred Wight was successful in getting Dick to come down here from the north. Diebenkorn is certainly one of the half-dozen most distinguished practicing painters in America today, so recognized. But I have to tell you frankly that Dick either has resigned or is going to resign, because he told his colleagues that he'd do all the teaching he was supposed to, he liked teaching this and that, but he didn't want to do administration. He was a painter, a teacher. Well, his colleagues, who obviously are jealous of him, because none of them have ever come close to him in stature, told him--at least, certain of

them--that he had to do this. Everybody rotated in this administration. Dick said, "Well, if that's the choice, I'm going to stay in Venice"--or Santa Monica or wherever it is--"and paint." So again, it's the problem of how do you get and keep gifted people, even when you've got the physical resources for them.

I guess the next thing I'd take note of was our determination when we were planning this North Campus area mainly for the fine arts, I did want to make a rather beautiful area out of it. All my life in academia, I've believed that a university campus ought to be a good deal more than just efficient and functional, that it ought to have beauty in it; because I think that young people should be encouraged to grow up in the presence of beauty, to think of art as something you live with rather than something you just look at. And when I was at Kansas, I had engaged in a program of building a few fountains here and there and putting some sculpture around the campus, and I conceived that this was really a superlative opportunity.

So I got together with Ralph Cornell and our landscape architects and explained what it was I wanted--namely, a sculpture garden, mainly on the grass but also flowing into the brick in the plaza of the art building, really flowing the other way. And they said, "Well, what sculptures?" And I said, "I have none, but forget about that. My

responsibility is to find the sculptures; you design an area where we will put the sculpture." Well, you know, we had to guess. There'd be some monumental pieces, some smaller pieces, middle-sized pieces.

About that time, when we were engaging in this dialogue, Fred Wight and the UCLA Art Council laid on that great Lipchitz show. (I guess it was the first major Lipchitz show that had ever been held.) And of course the major piece in it was the Song of the Vowels. And Lillian Weiner, who was very active in the Art Council then--and still is, for that matter; a close friend of Norton Simon and Lucille Simon, to whom Norton was then married--heard me talking about this one day, and she said, "Franklin, why don't we get the Song of the Vowels?" I think the cost of that piece then was \$90,000. Today, I don't know--\$300,000. I said, "That's great, but where do we find the money?" She said, "Let me talk to Norton." So again, to make that long story short, the Simons gave half the money, and the Art Council put up the balance. So we had the first piece. And we knew where that would go, because of its monumentality and the rest of it. But here were many places, areas--now that the design was going forward--for so many pieces of sculpture.

Then happened one of those extraordinary things which is tragic but also fortunate, depending upon what side of the coin you examine. There was at that time living in Los

Angeles, in Holmby Hills, a very competent, capable businessman called David Bright, who had made a great deal of money in the cable television business. He was a great collector, great eye, great enthusiasm. And his great Holmby Hills estate was just filled with sculpture. Very important pieces. He was a member of the Art Council at UCLA, also on the board of the L.A. County Museum of Art. He told me en passant that he had in his will--now, he was a young man in his fifties, so we thought we were talking about thirty years from now--that he had willed a certain proportion of his paintings to UCLA, a certain proportion to the L.A. County Museum of Art, and the balance of his art to his widow, and then there were pieces that were joint property of both of them. The widow was Dolly Bright--I mean, his wife. Well, as I say, tragically he died suddenly, just about the time this garden was ready to come on-stream; it was in construction.

So here we were, needing lots of sculpture, having been willed an important collection of paintings, and with his widow not wishing to live in this great big estate. So logic prevailed. I sat down with her, and I said, "Look, Dolly, we have paintings, you have the sculpture. Let's trade them, because you can put the paintings no matter where you live, an apartment or what." Great idea, as far as she was concerned. We got appraisals so everything was

very legal, and I got the regents to agree to this trade. Overnight we had ten very important pieces of sculpture: the Lipchitz cubist period, The Bather, the Calder, the Chadwick, the Barbara Hepworth, etc., etc., and of course the great Henry Moore. Well, what was it Andy Hamilton said? "The Lord protects or looks over sculpture-ridden chancellors," or something of that sort. At that point we had a critical mass, and of course since then pieces have come, as in fact I knew they would once you get the magnet. And I'm prejudiced, obviously, but others tell me who are, I think, objective that they regard this as one of the most beautiful sculpture gardens in the United States, if not anywhere in the world. And the reason I think they do is that it's laid about so people live with it.

There was a group from the East out the other day and wanted to see it. Mrs. Murphy and I went out with them and had a little tea and showed them around. They were commenting on this, because the students were there studying and leaning against them and all the rest of it, and the point was that this was unlike the sculpture garden in the Museum of Modern Art where people have to go into the building and go by guards and then go out in a cluttered area. But it was a place where people lived.

I said, yes, that the greatest compliment and the greatest thrill I'd ever gotten out of the garden was when

a few years ago, after I'd left UCLA, I ran into a young couple at the Music Center, at some performance. They came up to me and said, "Dr. Murphy, we're So-and-so. We were at UCLA when you were there, subsequently married." And I said, "Well, that's fine," and so forth. They kind of looked at each other and smiled, and then the girl, the young woman, turned to me, and she said, "We'd like to tell you something. Our first child was conceived in your sculpture garden." And I said, "My dear, that's the nicest thing I've ever heard." Because that's what it's for: it is to live in and with and so forth. Well, that of course takes care of that part of the thing.

I guess finally we can talk about the ethnic arts, that is to say, what some people call "primitive art." I think that's an awful term. It's actually highly sophisticated art. The proper term, I guess, is an explanatory one. It should be called the "highly sophisticated art of technologically primitive people." But in any event, I have long, as you can see, personally been interested in the art of technologically primitive people, whether it be Africa or pre-Columbian America or Oceania, because in many ways, to me it's the most honest art. It's art created for a purpose--although that used to be true of Western art. After all, the frescoes painted in the early Renaissance for the church were there to teach illiterate people the

story of the Bible. So it was a functional art even then. But in these latter years, as I, like everybody else, began to puzzle a little bit as to how you explain to Africans who by way of slavery had been chopped off from their cultural roots, or the Mexican-Americans here in the Southwest who really again, in a sense, were chopped off from their [roots], how do you explain to these people that they have a right to cultural self-confidence just as much as an Italian or a German or a Frenchman. And of course, it is their art, it has always seemed to me. I therefore wanted early on to create a program at UCLA in the ethnic arts. I felt that no university had really done it well, and that it was overdue. After all, the world is getting a lot smaller; people are exploring in a much more intimate, in-depth way the very different cultures of other people. And in my view, the best way to get to the cultural commitment of the people is through their art--music, sculpture, painting, dance--depending upon the culture.

Well, I began talking about this at UCLA and discovered that nobody was interested in it. The art department were only interested in Western art, maybe the art of China and South Asia. The people there didn't regard this as art; they regarded it as artifacts. They said, "That belongs to the anthropologist." So I go in to the anthropologists, and they said, "Oh, that's the nineteenth-century material

culture of the Germans. We're much more advanced now. We're talking about the psychology of the natives and the Freudian approach to examining matrilineal things." So the anthropologists regarded them as tools; the art historians regarded them as primitive scribbling.

So what do you do if you're determined to do something about it? Well, I decided to bring in somebody, and I found Ralph Altman. Well, Ralph had one great problem: he didn't have the PhD degree. So I had to sort of smuggle him into the university. Anthropology didn't want him because he didn't have the PhD degree; the art historians didn't want him because he didn't have the PhD degree in that field, except that he just happened to know more about primitive art than ten PhD's. And he was, above everything else, a cultivated human being.

(You know, that's one interesting thing I've discovered. And that is, that the one thing--there are many things, but certainly one thing the PhD does not give anybody, and that is cultivation. I've seen some of the most uncultivated boors who had the PhD, and some of the most cultivated, gifted, stimulating, creative people who never had the PhD degree. It's one of the curses of the university that that badge has to be so often required for creative, stimulating teaching or research.)

When Ralph came, there wasn't even an office for him,

and there was no budget, there was no money. So we just carved it out. And with his energy and his commitment and loyalty and dedication, and with my ability to find a few dollars here and there, and--if I may use a word so bold--my power to tell people to clear out the basement of one of the buildings, we got something started.

MINK: You did have on the music side the beginnings of the Institute of Ethnomusicology with Mantle Hood, though.

MURPHY: Yes, I was going to come to that. Mantle was already here, but Mantle never really got involved in this thing of Ralph's. To him even though many of his musical instruments were works of art, he didn't really care; he didn't want his materials commingled. They were musical instruments. Again, this is the stupidity of these classical boundaries. I don't know whether you should talk about a Renaissance man, but at least you ought to talk about a flexible man, who's not possessive and who says, "Sure, I use it, but you use it, too," because these things serve many purposes in different cultures.

Well, by main force, and Ralph's energy and knowledge and connections and commitments, we got a show on the road. Objects, very few, dribbling in, and then all of a sudden a remarkable development. There was here at that time--one of the great losses to UCLA was his death--Professor [C.D.] O'Malley, who was a professor of the history of

medicine, a truly cultivated human being, a very distinguished medical historian. O'Malley was an Englishman, a Scotsman, I think. He had very close connections with the Wellcome Medical History Institute and Library in London, which had been established by Sir Henry Wellcome. One day he called me and said that he had learned that the trustees of the Wellcome Foundation had decided to let go of all the art collections that Sir Henry Wellcome had brought together and simply concentrate on the library of medical history and the museum of the history of pharmacy. Henry Wellcome was the founder of Burroughs and Wellcome, the world-wide British pharmaceutical company.

If we have a minute, I'll tell you an interesting aside. He was a very strange man, Henry Wellcome; I never knew him, of course. An interesting footnote: Sir Henry Wellcome was born in Minnesota of English parentage. And as a boy, his parents went back, and he went back with them. He grew up in London. He started working in a little apothecary shop and gradually made his own things and built this company. He married a woman called Surrey, and this woman divorced him to marry Somerset Maugham. And she was the mother of the Maugham girl who sued her father, you remember, a while back, creating a great crisis. You remember, Somerset Maugham married this woman, and they lived together for a while, and then Somerset Maugham decided to live with his

male secretary for the rest of his life rather than with his wife; and in fact, he spent the rest of his life trying to autohypnotize himself into believing that he was never married to a woman. This is why he denied the parentage of this one daughter.

Well, the loss of his wife made such a misogynist out of Henry Wellcome that he simply never looked at another woman again. He never married, lived in a great big house in London, and devoted his entire life to his company and collecting. Now, he had agents out all over the world, at the time when Britain ran the world. And so crates and boxes of African art, Northwest-Coast Indian art, the art of Melanesia--they had great coconut plantations in the Pacific where they got coconut oil, this sort of thing--he brought together a fantastic collection of primitive art. He had also brought together a great collection of Egyptology. He scoured the Middle East. A very distinguished collection. In the meantime, he made a great collection, a library of medical history--it's one of the finest in the world--and this extraordinary collection of the history of pharmacy.

The Wellcome trustees thought they just couldn't keep this all up, so they concentrated on the medical history, created an institute out of it where scholars come and do medical history and the history of pharmacy and so on. And

they were going to dispose of these collections. The University of London agreed to accept the Egyptology collection and built a building for it. It's one of the finest small collections of Egyptology, Egyptian art, to be found anywhere.

But what to do with the primitive collection? The British Museum, as you know, still have in their basements, these cavernous basements, crates that have the date 1895 on them that have never been opened. This is an unbelievable experience, to go through the basements of the British Museum. They couldn't take additional materials. Oxford and Cambridge were approached, said they'd love to have it but didn't know what they'd do with it. They were very diffident. I think they thought they'd get it anyway.

Well, Donald O'Malley was a close friend of the director of the Wellcome Institute. To make a long story short, on my next trip to London I went and met them. They got very interested. Why California? Well, I said, "You know, New York has their Nelson Rockefeller materials, London has the British Museum. Here's the western part of a great country like the United States. You do business all through the United States. It's a logical home. We really want it. The others might not." I thought we were whistling in the dark, but to my amazement, I got a call from London one day saying the trustees had met and voted to give it to us.

I couldn't believe it, but I got Ralph Altman on the plane, told him to get over there. He was absolutely astonished, because he, too, was opening crates in warehouses that had never been opened.

Well, one of the exciting periods was that two-year period, when month after month I got a call from Altman saying the next shipment's arrived. We'd go down into Haines Hall and open up the crates, and here were these fabulous objects coming out. And so overnight, from having relatively nothing, UCLA--and the West Coast, for that matter--had one of the distinguished collections of primitive art anywhere. And not a year's passed since, that private collectors haven't given additional materials. We expanded the program to include the folk arts, the ordinary arts of everyday people of Mexico and South America; and the collections are so important now that if, down the road, the senate and the faculty decided not to have an interest in this, they'd have no alternative. They've got to go forward. The critical mass is built.

One thing I was unable to complete before I left the university was to provide adequate housing for it, a Peabody-type museum or a University of Pennsylvania-type museum. But I guess it's no secret that I'm personally working on that project now, and we think we have in sight an angel or angels that, with some cooperation from the regents,

will permit us to build the kind of facility that would have research space; office, teaching, seminar space; and exhibit space, for rolling exhibits in this material. As you know, we have had exhibits on campus, bits and pieces of the collection from time to time, and will continue to, in the enlarged new Fred[erick S.] Wight [Art] Galleries that are just going to open in January. In fact, they're going to open with an African show, as you know, after a Wight show.

But that's, to me, been a very exciting development. I think it hasn't been exploited by the university, not yet, because I think what you have there in the basement of Royce Hall and elsewhere is the cultural heritage of cultures which in sum total make up many, many millions living in this world, and whose descendants who live in this country have the opportunity to develop some kind of cultural pride.

Well, I could go on, but I think that in my own view, I didn't get done in the arts nearly as much as I wanted to. I got done a good deal, I think, and even though I'm no longer officially connected with the university, I'm sort of an unofficial--I won't say adviser--generator of extramural money to continue this development.

MINK: In the area of the School of Architecture and Urban Planning, you did have a hand in that, I know, and I thought maybe you might like to speak about that for a minute, too.

MURPHY: During my tenure, we created four new schools, actually; a School of Dentistry, a College of Fine Arts, a School of Public Health--it was a department when I came, a department of the Berkeley school, believe it or not, another example of that nonsense that we talked about earlier (we created our own School of Public Health, which incidentally has developed great distinction around the country)--and then the College of Architecture and Urban Planning, I think we called it. Well, this was done on the grounds that there needed to be within the system at least one more. There had always been one at Berkeley.

MINK: This was done in spite of the fact that USC has always maintained a school?

MURPHY: Oh, it's a very fine school.

MINK: But it was felt that there was sufficient need?

MURPHY: Yes, sir. Sufficient need, and that we had on campus, in a variety of other departments, resources that could be highly supportive of this new college. But here we had one hell of a time, again, with this professional versus the fellow that does iambic pentameter. And we really maybe had more problems here than we almost had any other place, because we were not creating, as I had to over and over again explain to the senate and budget committees, a department of the history of architecture. We needed practicing architects, fellows who knew how to teach other people

to build and design a building that wouldn't fall down. I got George Dudley, who was a very capable guy, from Rensselaer Polytechnic [Institute]. George came out, and really, in the two or three years that he had in trying to recruit and get people through the budget committee and this sort of thing, it finally just took the heart out of him.

MINK: It's really what turned him off and made him leave, I think.

MURPHY: No question about it. It just cut his heart out. He said, "My God, how can you build this kind of thing?" And he'd get angry, and I think justifiably so. "Why has some professor of English literature got the authority to tell me as a member of the budget committee that he doesn't think this fellow is a good architect? What does he know about it?" But anyway, George made progress, and George did creative, broad design, including a very important commitment to urban development, urban planning.

MINK: That was the real difference in our school vis-à-vis Berkeley and USC, that we were going to add this other element.

MURPHY: That is correct. It's important because this is an element that everybody was increasingly interested in.

MINK: Los Angeles was a fine laboratory for this.

MURPHY: A great laboratory. And parenthetically, that

was one of the reasons we were able to attract some people, in spite of the budget committee nonsense in this regard. Well, he left, and I think we were very fortunate in getting his successor. George had really sort of broken the ice. By the time George left, we'd pounded the budget committee often enough; and I'd gotten more authority, as I explained earlier, back from Berkeley to make some final decisions down here overruling people without worrying about them. So that by the time the new man came, we were able to move on appointments with a good deal more vigor and also make arrangements for part-time practice, which the purists.... You know, I'll never forget when some fellow from one of the humanities said to me, "Well, why do you say that an architect can practice outside and earn money as well as teach? Why not me?" I said, "Did I ever tell you that you couldn't write a book that somebody would want to buy? If you're up to writing a book on your own time, in addition to your teaching--I don't care what it is, a Mickey Spillane novel or whatever--I never told you you couldn't go to a publisher and get it published and keep the money."

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MURPHY: There's this kind of an element in this whole thing. There's sort of a jealousy between the purists and the professional schools and the like. In any event, I think that school is on its way.

MINK: I think so.

MURPHY: But boy, bringing a professional school to birth is especially hard in the University of California. Harvard never had this problem. Harvard doesn't have a budget committee system, where the liberal arts people decide what the Harvard Business School is going to do or the Harvard Law School is going to do. This university system was in the grip of the liberal arts faculty--like this.

[gestures] Bob Sproul gave it to them. It was the deal when he became president. And that's why the professional schools in the California system have really lagged behind their counterparts in the East. There's been a medical school in San Francisco for a long time as part of the University of California, never a distinguished school as compared to Harvard, [Johns] Hopkins, etc., etc. Boalt Hall really never achieved the distinction, until more recently, that Yale and Harvard and Columbia or Chicago have. Engineering schools--my God! no comparison in terms

of MIT, and Cornell, Caltech and so on. The business school, same situation: the Harvard Business School, Columbia Business School, the Chicago School of Business. And it was this grip that the liberal arts faculty had, with the full support of Sproul and Kerr, on the life of the university that did it. And it was only broken when the regents themselves, at the behest of some of us, simply explained to the then president that they wanted this stopped. I'm told by Chuck that although there are problems in this regard, they're infinitely less than they were ten years ago.

DECEMBER 26, 1973

MINK: I was wondering if you would discuss, just for a while this afternoon, your involvement with the library. Now, just at the time that you came, we got a new university librarian, Bob Vosper. I wonder if you could more or less relate how this happened that you and he came together.

MURPHY: Well, I guess it's fairly well understood that I've always been interested in libraries wherever I've been. I guess that's because I grew up with a bibliophilic father. I became a sort of a book collector at a very early age myself. But over and beyond just the love of books and book collecting and this kind of thing, I've always felt

that in a very real way the quality of the library is a measure of the quality, the intellectual quality, of the institution. Curious scholars need books, especially in the humanities and the social sciences, and if the books are unavailable, you don't get the scholars. It's a kind of a deep interrelationship.

So when I went to the University of Kansas as chancellor, I found a library situation that was most unsatisfactory. There was a very old, tired chap who'd been director of libraries for thirty years. He was unfortunately one of those librarians who dislike books. They represented a chore or a problem. He retired, happily, was scheduled for retirement within a year or two after I came, and I put together a committee to seek out his successor. The chairman of that committee was the head of the English department, Jim Wortham. Jim had been at UCLA in the English department, and he remembered Bob Vosper as an energetic, delightful human being, very knowledgeable about libraries and with a real love of books. So in the end, the committee came up with Vosper's name, and then I had the problem of convincing Bob to leave UCLA, leave Larry Powell, leave a very happy environment, to come to Kansas in a rather austere environment and with a very bad library situation. But I think the charm of the Lawrence campus plus my sense of commitment convinced Bob that this

was an opportunity for him to go on his own. So then began this relationship which continued over many years.

We had a very exciting time at Kansas. I found the money, both public and private, and Bob managed to build a really extraordinary, active and gifted staff, many of whom have gone on to the senior positions since; and we had enormous fun in getting real vitality back into the library program.

I might add that one of my gambits in attempting to convince Bob to come to Lawrence from UCLA in the beginning was, of course, my comment that Lawrence was a beautiful little hill town in eastern Kansas with pure air and none of the smog and none of the tension and excitement. And now I leave Lawrence to go to Los Angeles. And incidentally, the year I left, Bob was on sabbatical in Italy. I remember the painful--because we had developed not just a professional but a very personal relationship--problem I had of writing him and telling him that I was leaving.

When I got to Los Angeles--I had known Larry Powell, and of course I consider Larry one of the really gifted men in the whole history of library science in this country--I discovered that Larry was near retirement; at least, he wanted to get out of managing the library to become dean of a new school of library science. That was about it. He really wasn't retiring from the university. So within a

year or two, I had the problem of replacing Larry. And needless to say, I really wanted to get Bob. I finally sort of had to clear it with my successor at Kansas. I think he was not surprised when I called him and told him that I wanted Bob, because he knew how close Bob and I were. Then I dealt with Bob, really, by mail. I didn't have to have him come to UCLA; he knew it very well. And to make a long story short, it was like Bob coming back home, but as boss this time.

And here again, we made a commitment--several commitments. I go back to the old Berkeley problem. Berkeley had repeatedly had the advantage over UCLA in library money. Furthermore, all of the exchange material that the University Press got for their journals that they published all automatically went into the Berkeley library. This was a hidden subsidy to Berkeley.

So my first job was to get Bob. That was fairly easy. My second job was to get the money to build the new research library, the first unit. This was a little more difficult. But we got it pushed up on the agenda. I remember we had great difficulties with the Berkeley people, though; they wanted a smaller building than Larry and I knew we had to have. We finally had to get the ex-librarian at Harvard out here as a consultant to convince the people in Berkeley that what we had talked about was reasonable. The money

for this was acquired; we, happily, were able to hire Quincy Jones to do the building; and I think that research library is one of the most attractive buildings on the whole campus. Quincy did a superb job. The third problem was much the more difficult, and that was the effort to get parity with Berkeley. And here, again, we had to almost-- not almost, we had to go the regents route again.

MINK: You actually had to go to the regents?

MURPHY: Privately. As I said in one of these earlier tapes, I'm, in retrospect, never happy about the fact that I had to go out of channels so often. I never wanted to. But this Berkeley favoritism was so rampant that channels wouldn't work on anything.

MINK: I'd be curious to know, which regents were most responsive to library needs?

MURPHY: Well, again, regents such as Ed Carter, Ed Pauley, John Canaday, Bill Forbes, Dorothy Chandler--all of them. They understood this instinctively. They're all bright and intelligent people. But always there was this element when I had to go to the regents, whether it was on dormitory or housing or union building or whatever, to get parity with Berkeley. Always there was this element of the unfairness of not having parity on any issue.

Well, we finally got an agreement out of the statewide administration, as a result of regents pressure. So we

were on our way. And I think it's fair to say in retrospect that those nine years that Bob and I had together--again, my getting the money and the resources and Bob building the staff and developing this very sophisticated acquisitions program--were really very satisfying years for me and for Bob, and I think they were sort of golden years for the UCLA library. I think the UCLA library is now one of the better university libraries in the country. It should be. It's a resource for Southern California as well as for the university.

I understand my successor, Chancellor Young, however, has to continue to scrutinize the situation on this parity business. It tends to slip from time to time. But my conviction is that as long as the statewide administration sits in Berkeley, California, UCLA is always going to have to be looking over the shoulder. It's a bad situation. And parenthetically, I should say that I, for years, have taken a position, and communicated to the regents, that the healthiest thing they could do is to move the statewide administration out of Berkeley. Until they do that, there will always be this problem.

MINK: That's what Jerry Byrne recommended in his report.

MURPHY: Of course, he did. And any logical person looking at it objectively knows that's what should be done.

MINK: Tell me, in this matter of parity, did this come in

what I recall was a period of the enjoying of large lump sums of regents' opportunity money, chancellors' contingency money. I think that decade when you were chancellor probably brought that bulk money in greater amounts to the library than ever before. I wondered if this was the way in which the parity was balanced off.

MURPHY: Well, this was a curious thing. You put your finger on what continues, I think, to be a small but nagging problem for Chancellor Young. There was a basic reluctance on the part of the statewide administration to get the annual operating funds on a parity.

MINK: That's what I was wondering, yes.

MURPHY: So what they did was to go to the regents and say, "Okay, we can't cut Berkeley back to equalize it, so you've got to give us your funds." These could not be regarded as continuing funds. They were continuing, in that it happened every year for a number of those years. But they provided a spurt, if you will, to get the collections closer to parity. And I don't know the details, it's been five years, but I always said that until the annual state appropriated budgets for books were equalized, you could never say there was parity. What that situation is now, I don't know. I must say that I think, however, in terms of private funds and use of campus funds that we had control over, we finally got control over, like the Connell

money.... I think I mentioned earlier that when I came, that Connell money, although it was given to UCLA, was controlled by Berkeley. One of the first things we did was to tear that away. It wasn't a lot of money--I think about a couple hundred thousand a year--but that was a crucial couple of hundred thousand a year. However, I don't know, you know, how you could ever measure perfect parity. But I must say, I think we're much closer to it than we used to be.

MINK: I think we certainly are.

MURPHY: And I think the library has shown it in terms of the growth of its collections, the quality of the collections, the depth of the collections.

MINK: Was it ever your intention that, if at all possible, the University Research Library should have been built in one single...?

MURPHY: I fought to have it built.... Well, let me go back a little bit. When we proved that we needed this additional library structure, I had hoped we could build it in two pieces, two bites. The Berkeley crowd started on a four-bite basis. And the way it really wound up is that it's a three-bite basis.

MINK: The unfortunate thing--just in commenting--is that it's made it so much more expensive to build.

MURPHY: Precisely. This was our point, that you can do

it much more cheaply. But, again, those are battles that are better forgotten. At least we've got a rather distinguished building there, and it's only got one more piece to go.

MINK: Turning now to the student unrest, the whole matter of the fruition of student unrest, if you want to put it that way. The real battle, demonstrations didn't occur until after you'd left, but did you begin to detect this during your administration?

MURPHY: Oh, yes. We had some problems during my time, because of course the [Mario] Savio, the Free Speech Movement, so-called, had started at Berkeley. There'd been a lot of trouble up there, and troubles had started on the Stanford campus and around the country. So we had some real problems when I was here. We had the SDS group trying to block up the Placement Center. We had the Dow Chemical Company difficulties, broken windows, and we had to use the campus police several times. I had the big sit-in in the Administration Building where we did bring police on campus. We asked them not to do anything, and the youngsters did leave the building. You will recall that we had some sort of mass meetings, and people demanded to see me; and for a period of time, I'd go to the union building once a week and sit down with a group of militant students and let them tell me how bad society was and the

university was and I was. So we had that kind of difficulty.

Also, we began to have the militancy of the Chicano students and the black students, because there was a lot of militancy going on at that time. There was the anti-Vietnam [War] militancy. There was the Free Speech militancy: we ought to be able to do what we want when we want. Then the blacks were coming on strong, and they had their special kind of militancy--black studies, rights for the blacks. And the Chicanos came along. I had that episode when one of the fraternities that traditionally had a party put up signs in the front of their building. And the Chicano students felt that these signs were very demeaning to the Mexican tradition, and they threatened to break down, burn down the fraternity, bring the university to a screaming halt--things like that.

But you may recall that we took a pretty strong position, and it was based on a three-point sort of platform. The platform said: One, that we believed in the freedom of expression without fear of retribution; we could protect that. Two, that we would protect the right of privacy. Just because one man has the right to speak is not the guarantee that he has a captive audience. Another man must have the right not to want to listen and not to have to listen. That's why we had this time, place, and manner

set of rules. And then, thirdly, we said that nobody-- and that meant nobody--had the right to interfere with the normal conduct of the business of the university. We had a number of disciplinary hearings; we had some suspension of students; we had--fortunately, as I think it's the case-- to bring the police on campus only once and that was the sit-in in the Administration Building.

MINK: Was that the campus police? That wasn't the LAPD?

MURPHY: No, I had the LAPD in. And we put them in the basement, and the students were sitting in on the third floor. And we told them that unless they got out by five-thirty, they would be interfering with the normal conduct of the business of the university. The key to it, in my view, was that they knew the LAPD was in the basement. And by five-thirty, they had gotten out; so the police filed out and we had no further difficulty.

But I will admit that the combination of the struggle to get parity across the board with the Berkeley campus, the pressures that normally bear on a person who's chancellor or president of a university having done this for twenty years, I would say then that the extra effort, which involved literally hours of talking with and listening to these instant wisdom-type--the student arrogants, I guess you'd call them-- undoubtedly played a role in my finally deciding that I wasn't young enough. You needed a younger man to take this

kind of pressure. And I'd been doing it for some twenty-odd years.

MINK: You know, it was originally planned, as I understood it, when home economics was moved out, that the School of Public Health would have its new building.

MURPHY: Right.

MINK: That was to be part of the humanities complex, and in fact it was even named after Lily Bess Campbell.

MURPHY: That's right.

MINK: But then, was this one way in which you were able, by giving into the blacks and the Chicanos and the Indians, to provide a center or place for them on campus?

MURPHY: That was done after I left.

MINK: Was that done after you left?

MURPHY: Absolutely. I had, and I still have, very grave questions as to these black studies programs, Indian study programs, Chicano studies programs. I think they're devoid of much intellectual content. I think it was psychotherapy rather than intellectual activity. But I'm not going to second-guess anybody, because maybe some psychotherapy was needed to quiet people down. I think it's a miscarriage of space and everything else, on a campus that's very short on space, to provide a sort of social meeting room for these people. I must say, I'm glad to see that the more intelligent and thoughtful blacks around the country are now admitting

that these black studies programs were really nothing much more than buying some time and interest. The history of the black in this country and the history of the Chicano in this country ought to be an integral part of history.

And any department of history with integrity will put it in. And they'd even have a separate course. But to create these so-called centers is, I think, really quite absurd.

MINK: So if you had been there, you would have vetoed this.

MURPHY: Well, let's put it this way: Who knows? You know, Monday-morning quarterbacking is easy. If I'd been there and I'd felt that the situation called for some kind of psychotherapy, I think I would have involved myself in it. I just don't know because I wasn't there then. I was not there during the Angela Davis difficulty. That happened, I think, a year or two after I'd left. But I am rather pleased, looking back--even though it was totally exhausting--that we did engage in conversations in different quarters of the campus and with the faculty and with militant students to the extent that we prevented any fire.

MINK: In this, you took a leaf from the Berkeley situation.

MURPHY: They communicated by memo.

MINK: Or refused to communicate.

MURPHY: Yes, or refused to communicate. And then, of course, I think anybody deserves the dignity of a response, even to a demand. Now we turned down many of these so-called demands.

They were impossible. But at the same time, they had a hearing.

MINK: Were you ever asked by the Berkeley people how you managed to keep the lid on?

MURPHY: Yes. Very often. And all I could say was what we were doing. In all fairness to Berkeley, I think Stanford is, perhaps, a better example. But maybe that's not true, either. As you know, everybody thinks of Berkeley, but I think probably as many or more acts of vandalism and real violence occurred on the Stanford campus as occurred at Berkeley. But in all fairness to both of those places, much of that difficulty was as a result of nonstudents, hangers-on around the campus or mixed-up high-school students who wanted some kind of excitement. One of the big problems from the very beginning at Berkeley has been the horrible state of the society around the campus. We never had that at UCLA, and to that extent we had a great advantage. I always said it wasn't quite fair to compare the two situations. I can't take credit for the environs of the UCLA campus.

MINK: One of the points that was often made about you personally in relation to the students was that you didn't like to address a lot of them as a group, that you would lose your temper, so you would send Chuck instead.

MURPHY: Well, toward the end that happened, yes. This is when I began to sense that I wasn't very good for this kind

of thing. I remember one time, the thing that really, I think, made me seriously consider whether I wasn't really getting a little fatigued was this Chicano thing, where these arrogant kids--I agreed to meet with them. I agreed to meet with ten of them, and thirty of them crowded into this room. All their own scholarships, money that I'd personally gone out to get from government and other agencies, being given a first-rate education--snarling, spitting, making demands; and I did lose my temper. And I finally got up and stomped out. I said, you know, "Vice-Chancellor Young will deal with this matter from this point on."

And I went back to my office and I said, "Look, you're obviously losing your patience; you're obviously fatigued." You know, it was battle fatigue. That was before, of course, I'd been offered the Times-Mirror job. But it began making me think that after twenty years maybe I ought to try something else.

MINK: Let's take up the matter of athletics during your administration. What did you think of the athletic setup as you saw it when you came?

MURPHY: Well, I frankly was a little disappointed, for a number of reasons. Number one, there was a kind of, to me, depressing attitude surrounding athletics. Wilbur Johns was the athletic director, a very nice and loyal

man, but Wilbur had been there too long. And he was the product of those older days when there was a lot of chicanery and a lot of nonsense going on. Secondly, the department itself was very inefficient from the business-management side. It also seemed to me that alumni groups were running Wilbur rather than vice versa. Thirdly, I was very depressed about the fact that the athletic facilities on campus were relatively nonexistent: no football, no basketball arena, no track of consequence, no baseball field. In short, everything had to be done off campus. And yet this was a university activity. This was disappointing. And finally, I was very disappointed at the lack of support by the athletic department and interest in the so-called minor sports: the swimming, crew, tennis, golf--you know, this sort of thing. And my theory, ever since I'd been in higher education, was that you shouldn't demean the athletic program; you should broaden it to get more and more youngsters involved in it.

Well, it was clear to me that a lot of things had to be done, and a whole basic change in attitude had to occur toward athletics at UCLA. And the more I thought about it, the more I realized that everything really was related to finding a new athletic director, the right fellow. I talked to a lot of people. I personally felt that Wilbur had outlived his time, that we had to have new, fresh blood. Not

that he hadn't done well, but there had to be a new epoch.

I talked to many, many people, and Bill Ackerman was the one who put me on to J.D. Morgan. The more I thought about J.D. and I got to know him.... Here was a man who was deeply interested in athletics--he was the tennis coach--but he was in the business side of the university and a good, tough, hard business mind. And the more we talked, the more I realized that he had the interests I had: broadening the base of athletics, building some facilities on campus, getting the control of the program back into the university rather than out on the alumni and this fiction of the students running the program. About that time also, the regents, you may recall, transferred the management of athletics to the chancellor, where it had been in the Associated Students--this curious fiction. So all these things came together. I was given the responsibility--rather than the ASUCLA--of the program.

MINK: Were you in any way responsible for this action of the regents? Were you lobbying for it?

MURPHY: Yes, sir, I demanded it. I said, "This is a nonsense." Incidentally, again I had problems with the Berkeley campus on this. They said, "Oh, we're doing beautifully," you know, and, "This ought to be with the students. The students are running the program." And I said, "That's the damndest fiction I ever heard. Students

aren't running the program. Professional managers are running it. If things go wrong, the chancellor gets the blame; but he has no responsibility." And I must say that Kerr was very supportive on this, right from the beginning. And the regents got this done with a minimum of difficulty, with only the Berkeley campus, not the statewide administration, raising objections.

But as I say, all of these things came together. Then we got the Memorial Activities Center program campaign going. Tom and Phil Davis were central to that. And of course Ed Pauley's gift, which John Canaday and Ed Carter and I got Ed to commit to one night up at the old Claremont Hotel in Berkeley. Since then, I think that the program has become one of the most successful in the United States. It's a program that is defensible; it's not done violence to the academic quality of the institution. And really, to summarize it, if I'm to get any credit at all, it's my decision to appoint J.D. Morgan, because J.D. is the one that's really built the program. I think he's the best athletic director in America.

MINK: Actually, did you really have quite a lot to do with getting this before the regents?

MURPHY: You mean to get the control of athletics back in to the chancellor?

MINK: Yes.

MURPHY: Yes, sir, I did. I did a lot of lobbying.

MINK: How did you do that, just by lobbying with regents?

MURPHY: Absolutely. Well, I mean, these are businessmen, these regents. This thing is a tradition going back to a lot of Sproul nonsense years before, even [W.W.] Campbell nonsense. But when I could go to a Carter or a Pauley or anybody else and say, "Look, how can you possibly manage something, bear the responsibility, if you don't have the authority?" They understood that quickly. As a matter of fact, a lot of the regents didn't understand that. They didn't know that the chancellor wasn't running the athletic program. But I want to repeat, Clark Kerr was very supportive right from the beginning. I had no problem with him at all, nor he with me.

MINK: Turning from athletics, unless you have some further comment to make about it...

MURPHY: No, no.

MINK: ...to the whole matter of public information, public affairs. As I remember, before your administration, the office was called the Office of Public Information. And soon after that, there was a reorganization in this area, reorganization not only in Public Affairs, but bringing into that office the Office of Publications and all of this.

MURPHY: Well, the story there is, I think, a fairly simple one. First of all, you know, a lot of these things that

I found when I came were, I think, not the fault of any of my predecessors, but the fact that they had no authority to do anything about their problems. Everything had to be cleared with Berkeley. And the Berkeley people, the statewide people, would always say, "Well, if it's good enough for the Berkeley campus, then it ought to be okay for UCLA." So the first and most important thing in the resolution of a lot of things--athletics; the thing that we're talking about now, public information; and many other things--the first and most important thing was to get the authority to do what you had to do at the campus level. Now, having gotten that authority, or increasing amounts of it year by year, one of the things that was very clear to me was that this big, sprawling campus, with different departments and schools wanting to get out newsletters and this and that and the other thing, that this thing had to be coordinated, had to be pulled together. Furthermore, as you know, one of my major commitments was to bring the university to the Los Angeles community. This is their public university.

MINK: And publicity, of course, is an important factor.

MURPHY: Very important. And it had to be sophisticated. It was not just grinding out press releases, but it was a plan of telling the story of the university. Beyond that, the statewide people were now into this bond issue thing, and they depended heavily upon us, because if the bond

issue didn't carry in Southern California, that was the end of it.

So all of these factors led to my pulling things out of the various schools and out of different units on the campus, pulling them all together into the Andy Hamilton office. And this had to do, number one, with a public information program--planned, organized, and developed. Secondly, [we set up] a campus visitation program. After all, the UCLA campus was becoming, and I think today has become, one of the things that many people want to see--nonstudents, people from abroad, and all other kinds of people. So [we had] to organize this visitation program. Thirdly was the publications program. It was a wastage of money to have people sending out.... I used to get calls from people saying, "Look, I'm getting three copies of this and seven copies of that. What's going on there? Who's in charge?" So this had to be pulled together and organized. And I think, in retrospect, Andy Hamilton did really a superior job with his people. But it was sheer logic and necessity that led to this. Anybody would have done it if they'd just seen the situation. I can't recall; have we discussed the growth of the fund raising and the Alumni Association?

MINK: We talked about your fund raising and your special efforts at fund raising, with what you call "creative fund

raising."

MURPHY: Yes, and the way this has finally gotten now organized in the Chancellor's Associates. That was all related to this, too, you know, because it was clear that this campus was doing really only a fraction of its potential in generating financial resources out of public interest. And so all of these things sort of got tied together. We tried to revitalize, and I think successfully, the Alumni Association and the fund-raising thing and tied that together to Andy's operation--not directly under Andy, but sort of guaranteeing a dialogue at the very top between the alumni fellow (in that case, Doug Kinsey) and Andy. Chuck was my administrative assistant, Chuck Young. We had these weekly meetings where everybody knew what everybody else was trying to do. I must say that I'm enormously pleased how successfully the fund-raising program has gone forward under Chuck and Don Bowman.

MINK: You can really see it.

MURPHY: But back in those days when I came, it was practically nonexistent. I think I told you earlier the story about the Alumni Association puzzling as to whether they could pay a couple of thousand dollars for new draperies. It's in one of the tapes, I remember.

MINK: I believe so.

MURPHY: The attitude was totally different. But it was a

part of that old inferiority. Sure, Berkeley does it, but they're old and they're big and this and that. We can't quite do it. I don't think you find that attitude. I think our people now take the position that we don't know what Berkeley's doing. That's their business. We do our own thing.

MINK: I think maybe the last question I ought to ask you is: Looking back in retrospect, can you see anything that you would have done differently now?

MURPHY: You know it sounds strange to say this, but looking back, I don't think there's a single thing that I would have done differently, because given the personalities involved, given the history, the things that were done really had to be done. And I can't think of any other way of doing them.

I have regrets. I regret that I had to spend so much of my time in emotional energy on what I call "the Berkeley battle." You know, most of those issues have been resolved now. They could have been resolved right at the beginning. UCLA is still quite as much a part of the University of California system as it always was. The battles were unnecessary, but in view of the fact that there was intransigence in the statewide administration, they had to be carried out. If UCLA were today operating under the restrictions that I found when I came, half of what happened could not have

happened, including library development, new programs, building programs, morale, and everything else. So I cannot say that I would do anything differently. I repeat, all I can say is that I regret that we had to waste so much time on struggle when that time could have been invested in mining the gold in the community.

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APPENDIX

Director's note: On August 17, 1967, Verne A. Stadtman interviewed UCLA Chancellor Franklin D. Murphy, as part of Stadtman's research for preparing The Centennial Record of the University of California, 1868-1968. Stadtman later forwarded to Dr. Murphy a draft transcript for review and corrections, which Murphy approved, but stipulated that it not be made available to the public until his death. Following Murphy's death on June 16, 1994, I reviewed the draft transcript and file of correspondence among Stadtman, Murphy, and James V. Mink, former Head, UCLA Department of Special Collections, and decided to append Stadtman's 1967 interview to the interview which the UCLA Oral History Program had conducted with Murphy in 1973. What follows is the text of the transcript as reviewed and approved by Murphy in 1967, subject only to minor editorial modifications to conform with the Oral History Program's current format and policies on punctuation, proper name identification, and paragraphing. The original draft typescript approved by Murphy is on file in the offices of the Oral History Program. There are no corresponding audiotapes.

--Dale E. Treleven, UCLA Oral History Program
July 11, 1994

STADTMAN: Let us go right down the questions: How were you approached about becoming Chancellor here?

MURPHY: I was approached while Clark Kerr and I were members at that time of something called the Commission on Higher Education in the American Republic. We were at a meeting together--this I think was in 1959--in Santiago, Chile, and he had previously called me by phone and told me that the [University of California Board of] regents were interested in the possibility of my becoming chancellor, did

I have any interest. I said, well, I would be willing to talk with him, and we agreed that we would talk, which we did in Santiago, Chile, in the spring of 1960, late February. Subsequently, I agreed to look at the job and came twice to California and met the regents and had visits with the regents in San Francisco at one of their meetings and met some of the faculty here, and in essence that was it. And that answers your second question, namely that Kerr was my first contact in the matter.

STADTMAN: Now about the third.

MURPHY: I was unaware of the fact that I had been a candidate for the presidency in 1958, was told that only two or three years later by a couple of the regents. I was completely unaware of it when I was approached as chancellor.

STADTMAN: Had you met any of the regents at that time?

MURPHY: I knew no regents at all. I had known Bob [Robert Gordon] Sproul rather well.

STADTMAN: So if you had been put on the list, probably that was the direction.

MURPHY: I would suppose.

STADTMAN: What attracted you to the position at that time?

UCLA had had some troubles up until--

MURPHY: Two things, basically. I was then convinced and still remain convinced--indeed I think there is more

evidence of it now than even then--that UCLA as such had the potential of becoming one of the distinguished universities of the country. I am more convinced of that now than I was even then, and I think it is well on its way. So one saw in the job--at least I saw in it--the chance to be involved in a creative development, but one that I felt had almost a guarantee of success as well, if it were done reasonably well. Secondly, I was then, and am even more now, convinced of the excitement of living in Southern California, especially Los Angeles. I came, you recall, seven years ago, and Los Angeles was just beginning at that time--but you could really smell it and sense it--to explode in cultural and creative terms. It was a very fortunate time to have come because, by virtue of my job, I was immediately catapulted into the cultural developments of the area, the music center [Los Angeles County Music Center], the art museum [Los Angeles County Museum of Art], etc. So it was the excitement, the creative excitement that I saw both in UCLA and in the city of Los Angeles, on the other side.

STADTMAN: You had been aware of the difficulties of the past?

MURPHY: Yes, I had. That leads to the next question: "Was the scope of the job fairly represented to you before you came?" I will answer this frankly and with candor: It was not. I had thought, and perhaps-- In retrospect, I thought

many times that I should have been more precise in my questioning. I took a little bit too much on faith. I had thought that the authority of the chancellor was far greater than it turned out to be after I got on the job, and that perhaps leads into question number six.

STADTMAN: Yes.

MURPHY: I think there is no secret that from the day I arrived, or shortly thereafter, I discovered the realities. Let me say parenthetically, going back to the previous question, I had been warned by a number of people not to take the job. I had run the University of Kansas as its chief executive officer. It was a smaller university, actually, than UCLA, but I had full authority with direct responsibility to the regents. I had been warned by a number of very knowledgeable people in American higher education that I really shouldn't take the job at UCLA because it was really impossible, they said. They said it was impossible for two reasons: that the chancellor would be ground between the great tradition of faculty autonomy and control on the one hand and the centralized administrative control from Berkeley on the other hand; that the chancellor had an awful lot of responsibility, and that this was the kind of situation that would destroy a man. As I say--I am now repeating a little bit--having been told this by people, I asked some very specific questions of

President Kerr and of the regents, and I must say that, in retrospect, either I asked the wrong questions or I didn't get very clear answers. I took the job assuming that a lot more authority would have been mine than, in fact, I discovered was.

For example, I found it almost incredible to believe that at the first commencement it was expected that the president would give the degrees to my students. I said, "You know, this is ridiculous. You are responsible for the students on the campus. You are supposed to be the leader; [they are] supposed to look to you for leadership. And then at the critical moment in their lives when the degree is granted, the chancellor sits on the stage like anybody else! You may recall that this was the first real confrontation. And ever since I have been here, I have given the undergraduate degree. I am speaking about the degrees in course, not the honorary degrees. Things like that.

I found it incredible to believe that the final decision, at least before the regents, in terms of appointment and promotion of tenure faculty didn't lie with the chancellor. After all, he worked with the faculty, it was his faculty. I am not now speaking about the [Academic] Senate input but the administrative decision, things of this sort. So that comes to number six, and I would say that there are-- The question is "What have been your most

difficult challenges as chancellor?" I think the first one, basically, has been that I have had to fight for-- I think the record is probably clear on this--I am trying to be just as candid as I can--that in the beginning I was alone even among chancellors for a basic decentralization of the administration of the university. I have said many times that the governance of the university had not been arranged by the regents to match its enormous growth, that you were in danger of creating a dinosaur with a huge body and a little nervous system that was incapable of managing this vast enterprise. I have said that policy should be centralized--that is, basic university statewide policy should be centralized--but that once decisions, budgetary and otherwise, are made, administration should be left to the campus. The name of the game should be post audit rather than looking over people's shoulders. I would say that the most difficult challenge has been trying to fight through within the system my very strong views about matching the authority of the chancellor with his responsibilities and what the public and the regents have expected of him.

I think, incidentally, this terrible division of authority and responsibility really accounts for the fact that I have been in this system for only seven years and I am the second-oldest chancellor in service. You add up the number of chancellors that have been around in this

system in the last seven years and you will discover that it is over twenty, including three at [University of California] Berkeley and two or three at [University of California] San Diego and two or three at [University of California] Santa Barbara, and two at [University of California] Riverside, and so on. And the reason that you did not have chancellors that could survive the difficult strains and pressures, for one reason and another, was that you gave them all this responsibility but the authority was completely blurred and divided between the regents, who wouldn't give it to the president, and the president, who wouldn't give it to the chancellors, or who couldn't because the regents still had it, and so on.

STADTMAN: This is the question that I wanted to clarify: When you were first aware that the chancellor did not have the authority that you thought he would have, is it your impression that he did not have it because the president did not have it to give or--?

MURPHY: Or whether the president didn't want to give it? My view is that it was both. I think that the record is clear. Clark Kerr had suffered under this as chancellor. When he became president, he moved very strongly and quickly to make some acts of decentralization. I think that the record is equally clear, however, that as time went by the degree of enthusiasm for decentralizing--I am speaking of

operation, not long-range policy--became less. At that point I think the record is clear. Part of the reason had to do with the fact that he didn't have it to give. There is no question about that. On the other hand, in my view--and I think there is some record on this--there were some things that President Kerr felt, even if the regents were to give, should in fact not be decentralized. A very good example of this is the final decision on tenure and promotion.

STADTMAN: I understand that you and John [S.] Galbraith apparently led the fight on that.

MURPHY: With Roger [W.] Heyns in full agreement, although he was a little late in coming. We felt that this was the ultimate symbol. If the chancellor could in fact look his faculty in the face and say, "I am the administrative head"-- There was nothing more symbolic and important than this particular act. Galbraith and I did lead the fight on it. Heyns joined up very soon after he came. He, I think-- You will have a chance to visit with him, and he will give his views on this.

STADTMAN: Sure.

MURPHY: Now, the second basic problem that I have had as chancellor has been to bring UCLA and the community and Los Angeles into some kind of relationship and dialogue. When I arrived here I discovered very quickly that UCLA really was

not regarded by the establishment and the structure in Los Angeles as their institution. It was an institution located here.

STADTMAN: What was?

MURPHY: USC [University of Southern California], I would suspect, because of time and age and so forth. I have worked very hard, both in terms of my personal participation in the life of the city and in encouraging our faculty and deans to become involved in, as appropriate, the life of the city and the area of Southern California. To somehow weave the image of the university into the area in which it is located and to get an increasing number of people to understand that it is their university and not somebody else's up north or something, you know. I must say that this is terribly important in a place like Los Angeles, where you have such a vast input of new, nonnative population. People who got their degrees, college people, in the East and the Middle West and then come here to live-- In a positive sense, this is vast in-migration. And I have been deeply interested in building up what I called the dual loyalty, the loyalty of the Harvard [University] man to his institution of Harvard but at the same time getting him to recognize that, now he is living in Southern California, he has some stake in the development of the importance of UCLA.

STADTMAN: Gee, Chancellor Murphy, this doesn't square away

with the picture that people have of UCLA being the darling of Southern California.

MURPHY: Seven years ago it was not. You should talk to some of the regents. The first thing that Mrs. [Dorothy Buffum] Chandler, the first thing that Ed [Edward W.] Carter, the thing that John [E.] Canaday, Bill [William E.] Forbes all said to me is "We have got somehow to bring UCLA into the mainstream of the life of Los Angeles; people don't regard it as having this kind of relationship." But anyway, whether it was needed or not, this had been a major concern of mine.

A third challenge had been to work on the so-called inferiority complex of UCLA, the little brother complex. We might as well touch on it now because it has been a major factor. Here again, I am going to be very candid. The story of the difficulty of the birth of UCLA is well known and documented. At the time the [University of California] Southern Branch was created, the administrators in Berkeley didn't want it. It was forced on them almost by threat: either Southern California would have a state university presence as part of the system of the University of California, or if Berkeley wanted to keep its head in the sand, then a new university would be established. It was the latter threat as much as anything that finally pushed this through. At that time there was one southern regent,

Edward [A.] Dickson, and all the rest were north of the Tehachapi [Mountains] and mainly from the Bay Area. And the position of the then president--I forget exactly whether it was [Benjamin I.] Wheeler or [William W.] Campbell--is also clear in the record. This was finally accomplished.

Again, the record is clear and there are people still around that could be interviewed. For example, the Southern Branch, and even when we came to the new campus, forty years ago-- At that time the commitment was clear that there would be no graduate study at UCLA. There would be no graduate study, which meant there would be no Ph.D. degrees or no professional schools. This was to be a feeder to Berkeley of undergraduates. Now, the record is clear. The School of Engineering, the School of Law, the School of Medicine were in essence forced upon the university. And I have had long conversations with Phil [M. Philip] Davis and Ernie [Ernest E.] Debs, who were in the legislature at that time, and they tell me the story. It is not a pleasant story. But this was all known. This was all known to these people down here, one way or another.

Then when there was suspicion that was expressed to me by the faculty-- "Why is it that the Berkeley library budget is X times that of UCLA? Why is it that the faculty-student ratio is remarkably different between the two campuses?" Why this, why that, why this? And one of my first jobs was

first of all to get the facts. You can't begin to try to convince people that they have got to grow up and be mature unless you can honestly talk to them. And the facts were not very pleasant when I finally got them. I will give you one example: At that time the incidental fee, which is collected from all of the students of the university to take care of nonacademic requirements of the university, was collected from every student and then sent to Berkeley, where the statewide administration distributed that incidental fee in terms of the so-called extracurricular student needs. I discovered when I came that X number of dollars was going annually from UCLA to Berkeley but distributed back was X number of dollars minus a very considerable number of dollars to service UCLA campus extracurricular needs, whereas Berkeley put in Y number of dollars on the same formula and got back Y plus a very substantial number of dollars. Whereas the UCLA needs were, in effect, greater than the Berkeley needs: it was younger; it didn't have the endowments and other kinds of things. It took me a long time to get these data, but when I got them I forced the issue, and finally, about three years after that the incidental fee was collected on the campus and kept there and it was decided that Berkeley would have to live within the amount of fees that it got from its students just as we do.

We discovered an enormous differential between the library budgets of the two institutions, even when calculated on a per capita faculty or student basis. Here again we demanded equity. We still don't quite have it, but we are in the process of almost getting it. This is when the regents created their long-range library plan in which they stated there would be two major libraries, north and south, with the other institutions depending upon these major research libraries for support. The faculty-student ratio was very, very different. The amount of money per faculty member for organized research in Berkeley--from the state, that is--was substantially in excess of that at UCLA. In other words, it was perfectly clear that the complaints of the UCLA faculty were not just dog in the manger.

STADTMAN: Yeah.

MURPHY: And I felt my job here then was twofold: first of all, to get what I call simple equity on the one hand and, second, having achieved simple equity, say to this faculty, "Stop all of this crybaby nonsense and let us get on with the business." You can't earn what Berkeley has earned over a hundred years of distinguished service to society by crying about the fact that they have got it, and as a matter of fact you don't want to take it away from them. I always said, incidentally, that the achievement of equity between Berkeley and UCLA should not be at the expense of Berkeley,

that the regents and the statewide administration had to fight to get additional resources which would go to us, rather than taking resources from Berkeley, the balance. This has been my position and it has been clear. Now, in addition to this we had the problem, to close this issue out-- We tried to get simple equity in terms of financial treatment on some reasonably agreed-to formula that would not do violence to Berkeley but would simply give us what we deserved to do the job. And, secondly, I have said to the faculty, "As we get this, then, get on about your business and stop grumbling about history! This is history, and forget it. We are dealing with the present and the future."

My next problem, as I view it, has been to try to build a sense of identity in UCLA itself. When I came here this was essentially a commuting campus. It was a campus in which both student body and alumni had no facilities or resources at all to provide really on-campus vitality or visibility or activity. All the major athletic events were played away from the campus because there were no facilities here. The kinds of things that Berkeley or Harvard or Yale [University] or Princeton [University] or Stanford [University] could do about homecoming weekends and bringing classes back and so on were just not possible, or at least very difficult. There was nothing in a certain sense for the students on the campus except classrooms and

laboratories, which meant that this was for many of them or for most of them a kind of cafeteria, academic cafeteria. Come and nibble a sandwich or two, academically speaking, and go home. We had no dormitories; we had no facilities for foreign students, we had no athletic facilities of consequence; our [student] union building was practically next to-- Kerckhoff Hall was just a tiny little place and so on.

We have made a major effort to build the kind of facilities and then the program to give some real sense of identity and vitality on the campus to what is still a fairly larger number of commuters and will always be, but now with an added mixture of an ever larger number of people who make their full life here. This meant a major union building development, this meant a massive dormitory program; this meant the creation of our [Sunset] Canyon Recreation Center; this meant the creation of a married student housing program of some consequence; this meant a major addition to our alumni facilities. It meant the [Edwin W.] Pauley Pavilion, where at least the major basketball activity can be carried out, and we have a program for additional athletic facilities on campus. A track stadium, we built facilities for crew and for other minor sports, so that an ever larger number of people can find that aspect of their activities serviced here.

And related to that has been the additional problem of growing up under the very big tree of Berkeley, the shade of the tree. The conditioned reflex--and I, after all, had been in education a good many years before I came out here--both in the United States and around the world, when you said the University of California you automatically meant Berkeley. These were synonymous terms. UCLA was beginning to get some visibility around the country, but not as the University of California but as UCLA, because Berkeley had preempted, out of history, the title of the University of California, as a practical matter.

So I said, "Okay, let's not fight that battle. Let's just give that to Berkeley, as it were, from a de facto." And I said, "From now on out, everything around here is UCLA." The first thing that I did was to tell the telephone operators you didn't say University of California, you said UCLA. I had a lot of our stationery changed. I said that we will make those four letters just as visible and indelible as MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology], or something of this sort. This again went to the point that in order to get the kind of loyalty and the kind of commitment, the old school-tie commitment, you had to have something visible and something specific and precise, and the concept of the University of California was simply much too fuzzy for this particular point of view, especially

since, as I say, Berkeley had in fact over nearly a hundred years preempted that, in any event.

This again I made quite clear to the regents and Kerr and others when I told them frankly that this was going to be my position and was, in my view, not going to do violence to the long-range development of what is not a university any longer but a system of higher education. It was going to add strength ultimately, because as I was able to strengthen UCLA, I would add more strength to the regents as they needed to face the legislature and the people of California down the road. Because, after all, if I am successful or Dan [Daniel G.] Aldrich [Jr.] is successful or John Galbraith is successful in building the sense of real local identity and support, it will be not because somebody in San Diego is really interested in what happens with the Berkeley-Stanford football game except if by accident he is an alumnus of either Berkeley or Stanford, it will be out of a sense of pride as to what happens at San Diego, you see. You build up this foci of strength around the state related to the local institution, and in sum total then, as long as the university is unified through one board of regents, you then make a very considerable contribution to the total strength of the system.

STADTMAN: Can you count on the people in this vicinity carrying over their loyalty to the entire system when the

chips are down?

MURPHY: Well, they have to, because the only way they can support UCLA through the unified regents' budget is to support the regents' budget. You see, that is the key. Now, if you had nine separate universities, each of them with a separate board, each of them with their own route to the legislature, you would have chaos, then you would be in a dog-eat-dog position, and this would not-- Look at the strength of the university through the whole Berkeley FSM [Free Speech movement] difficulty. Our ability to keep the legislature from chopping much further away than they did in terms of teaching assistants and in terms of out-of-state waivers and things of this sort, when a lot of those fellows up there as a result of Berkeley and the FSM wanted to get rid of it completely, was because Emil [M.] Mrak and I and John Galbraith could go to the legislature and say, "God, you can't do that because we have a unified system; if you do what you are talking about doing you will do violence to us." And the fact that we were able to throw our shoulders to the wheel when Berkeley was practically a word, two years ago, that you couldn't dare mention in the legislature actually saved a lot of things that Berkeley would have inevitably lost. The key to it is, of course, the retention of a unified system at the policy- budget-making level. And my position on this is perfectly clear: I am strongly

opposed to any notion of decentralizing that. Well, so much for that.

So that has been a major issue, how to get a sense of identity, how to get these people prideful of being a part of UCLA and building its visibility and strength and not having them saying, "Gee"--you know, subconsciously--"it is good to be in chemistry here, but nationwide I would have much more distinction if I were in chemistry at Berkeley." Make UCLA mean just as much as the University of California, which, as I say, in the scholarly field still means primarily Berkeley.

I think, finally, my most important challenge has been to build an administrative organization here that matches the much increased responsibilities that we have as a result of decentralization. The regents generally, and the state of California legislatively, have been very slow to come to the recognition that competent administration is essential in a university in the modern world, and I must say that the faculty has been equally bad on this. They still have the old romantic notion, many of them, the faculty, that you can run a modern university like you can a medieval university, which was run by a bunch of senate committees with lots of authority and no responsibility, as far as the public is concerned. The University of California has always looked down on administrators, basically. You can see this in

salary scales, you can see it in authority, you can see it in the whole range of activities. I have had a dual job here: at the one level, at the regents and the statewide administration level, fighting for the kinds of money and salary scales to permit me to recruit first-rate administrative people; with the senate, on the other hand, getting them to recognize the visibility and authority of these administrators in order to make this thing work. And I must say that with the two appointments made this last year, we have about filled out our complement. I feel very comfortable about the way this has developed.

However, this leads to question number seven: "Which ones of these issues remain unsurmounted?" I still think that we have a way to go at the administrative level. We still have not yet achieved the administrative sophistication to match both the administrative need, on the one hand, and to match the quality of the faculty on the other. Secondly, I think that we still have a way to go in terms of getting final equity with the Berkeley campus. Again, these are arithmetical facts and figures. We still haven't quite achieved the library parity that has been promised. We still have not achieved by any means the parity in organized research resources on the two campuses. But I must say that enormous progress has been made in the last two or three years in this regard, and especially do I

think that it will be made in the next two years.

STADTMAN: But isn't this, as you alluded yourself a few minutes ago, pretty much a question of history as much as anything else?

MURPHY: Oh, yes, I think it is history that created it.

STADTMAN: Just the fact that UCLA has already done in its lifetime most of the things in a much shorter period of time.

MURPHY: The problem is this, though, now, and it is a very complicated problem. The regents and the statewide administration and the legislature and the [California State] Department of Finance now refer to UCLA and Berkeley as mature campuses, and they are therefore treated exactly the same, presumably. They speak of [University of California] Santa Cruz and [University of California] Irvine, for example, as new campuses; they get--and I agree to this--special treatment in terms of percentage of tenure faculty, and so on. Then [University of California] Davis, Santa Barbara, Riverside are referred to as developing campuses. They get special treatment, not as special as Santa Cruz and Irvine, but better treatment--these are per capita kind of calculations--than Berkeley and UCLA. Now, I agree with this in principle, I agree in that in terms of the stage of your development, you need different kinds of resources and different amounts. So I have no objections to

this system, but it will work only as far as UCLA is concerned, if we are to be grouped with Berkeley as the two mature campuses, that we are as mature as Berkeley in terms of resources. If we are not as mature as Berkeley, then we are not a mature campus.

STADTMAN: I see.

MURPHY: It is that simple.

STADTMAN: What you are actually saying--

MURPHY: I said, "I don't want any more. I just want the resources to match what you say is our responsibility, and then it is up to us to perform. But you can't ask us to perform at a level that you have arbitrarily set with less than the resources of someone else that is at that level. That is all." Now a lot of progress has been made, and I think in a year or two this will be the end of the history, but it has taken an awful lot of my time and energy and emotion and pain and travail, and I don't want to ever have to go through it again.

STADTMAN: Well, this is one of your unfinished jobs, but isn't it also probably fair to say that this is one of your greatest achievements?

MURPHY: Yes, I would think so. Even so, I would hate to have to do it again. I would like to run a university rather than, you know--

Finally, we still have a way to go in terms of this

UCLA identification. We have special problems because we are an urban campus, and therefore the job is a little tougher than if you were isolated out in the country or if you had had a hundred years to do it in a different period of history. But we have made enormous strides here in terms of programs and in terms of physical facilities to make the programs work, and I see the end of that rainbow in terms of feasibility in sight. Now, do you believe that UCLA can achieve scholarly distinction in worldwide terms when it depends so much on regional support? Well, actually, UCLA is not a regional institution. The bulk of our graduate students are, of course, non-Californians, and we are rapidly becoming a graduate school. Our centers for African, Middle Eastern, and Latin American studies are among the most distinguished of their kind in the United States. These are three of the peaks that we have been able to build.

Now, we do depend-- The only regional support we look for, and that is why perhaps we need to define that term-- We of course get the major part of our support from the whole state of California through the legislature. We get an enormous amount of support, the bulk of our research budget, from the federal government, which is, of course, not regional. So the only kind of support that we can talk about in terms of regionality is the private support we get

in dollars at least.

STADTMAN: And moral support.

MURPHY: And moral support. And here I think that we are in an unusually advantageous position. This goes back to our getting UCLA identified with the community. If you will have somebody pull out the records over the last five years in terms of private support, the last five years of private support, I think you will find that this campus has led all the other campuses of the university, including Berkeley, every year. And it has all come practically locally. There is an enormous financial resource untapped in Southern California, private, which we are now beginning to tap. And I see in this one of the great advantages and one of the great pluses that will permit us in a much shorter period of time to build up our endowment resources to a level that at least can begin to approach Berkeley.

STADTMAN: Something here that I think is pretty important: You have done this despite the fact that you are in the most sensitive area of the state vis-a-vis private institutions and their feeling of prior claims on private giving. Has there been any howl?

MURPHY: There have been a few squeaks of pain but they haven't been howls, and I think that is for two or three reasons. First of all, I have offered my services, and they have been used by private institutions to help them raise

money. I have made speeches for USC. I have gone down to the [Los Angeles] City Council and have fought as hard as Norman [H.] Topping for the urban renewal project that USC had to have if it were to develop. I have helped raise money in a period of fund-raising drives for the Claremont [Colleges] group and also other private institutions, Occidental [College] for one. Now, secondly, our private fund-raising has been on an annual basis, nonrestricted type of funds. We have been confident on its being limited to alumni, but here the very regionality of our undergraduate student body is a help, because the bulk of our alumni live in Southern California and we are visible to them and we are close to them.

Thirdly, I have a clear understanding with the heads of the private institutions that in terms of ad hoc projects like the Jules Stein Eye Institute or like the sculpture court in the north campus we have just completed, or like somebody deeply interested in cancer or rare books or art, if they are interested in UCLA then this is not regarded as a competition, because very often-- You take the Jules Stein Eye Institute: The issue here was, in terms of Jules's own position, would it come to UCLA or would it go to the University of Chicago? It was not a competition locally. The question of this sculpture basically was whether it would come here or be sold as part of an estate. There was

never any question of whether it would go to Occidental or this or that. There are people in this community who know of our interest in building our library collection, especially the rare book collections. This is not a competition with Occidental, because they are not interested in the rare book program; Caltech [California Institute of Technology] is not in the rare book program. Our competition here is like Stanford or Berkeley, or in one case recently, Lehigh University. In this case, 'SC was not in the picture.

Now, I am not going to say that there hasn't been a sense of friction any more than I am going to say that there isn't a sense of friction in the Bay Area sometimes between Stanford and Berkeley. This is very ancient; this goes back a long way. I am saying that there have not been howls, that we have managed to do this. One thing that I think has prevented it--at least it has kept the howls down to a low grumble--has been our insistence that we would not engage in any annual fund-raising to the general community for nickels and dimes or hundreds of dollars or thousands of dollars or five thousand dollars. So we really either stay with the alumni on that basis, as they fully respect our rights to that, or the occasional multimillion dollar ad hoc project would come either here or go some place else other than a private institution.

Now, finally, let me say when you talk about regional support-- I have talked about the private regional support, and it is enormous, and as I say, I think we have just barely begun to tap it. I see literally tens of millions of dollars in the near future in all kinds of interesting projects relating to distinction. But beyond that, this is not a regional university. We have the third largest number of foreign students in any university of the United States; only Berkeley and Columbia [University] have more. As I say, the bulk of our graduate students--and we are becoming a graduate institution--are all non-Californians, the majority. This is a highly international school. But like Columbia it is urban, or the University of Chicago. It is in the city. The University of Chicago gets the bulk of its money from Chicago actually, yet it is thought of as an international university.

All right, sir, should we go to the next? "Does UCLA--you or the faculty--regard the new campuses at San Diego and Irvine as competition for support?" No. Not at all. As a matter of fact--and I hope that you would talk to them--you will find that we made a conscious decision around here, and it wasn't difficult to achieve, that we would do to Irvine or to San Diego or Santa Barbara or Riverside the kind of thing that we felt Berkeley over a time had tried early to do to UCLA (that is a matter of fact): we would hold out the

hand of real support.

Now, the first symptom of that, when I arrived here, the university [Academic] Senate existed as the senate north and the senate south. The senate north was run by Berkeley. The meetings were held there and it was a Berkeley senate. The senate south was actually run by UCLA.

You know, these fellows had to come to the meetings, and they couldn't come or wouldn't come. So you would have a meeting of the senate, and there would maybe be one or two or maybe none from some of these smaller campuses, and mainly UCLA guys all making decisions, sometimes, about what San Diego wanted to do or what Santa Barbara wanted to do. And I declared that this was outrageous. This was a part, again, of my principle of decentralization. With a broadly based university policy, it was not our business to be telling San Diego what they wanted to do. I was one of the first fighters for the decentralization of the senate and got our people in the senate, our faculty, to raise the issue and begin the battle to decentralize the senate so Davis would have its own senate and it didn't have to go to Berkeley on hands and knees and say, "Please, we would like to start a program in this, that, and the other thing." And the same with San Diego.

STADTMAN: Was this part of the problem you mentioned earlier when you said people had advised you to be between

the senate and the faculty--?

MURPHY: The faculty on the one hand and the statewide administration on the other.

STADTMAN: In that case, your feeling apparently was that the faculty that you had to contend with was not really the UCLA faculty but this other.

MURPHY: Right, exactly. And even the Berkeley faculty. I didn't want the Berkeley faculty, through the senate mechanism, to veto-- In those days the basic thing was that the southern division would take a position, the northern division would take a position, and then they would get together and decide on a unified basis what they could-- They couldn't initiate something for UCLA; they would block it. It was like the Russian veto. I said that that was none of their business. It is this faculty's business. I felt that I could deal with this faculty, but I felt that I couldn't deal with nine faculties. And I think the record is clear, we are able to, basically, deal with the faculty.

But my point is that--back to Irvine and the other southern campuses--we do not regard them as competitors for support. I have long believed that we have got to have a system, and I supported Clark Kerr in his expansion program all the way, without reservations. I think it is his great contribution as president. I will say however, frankly, that we have felt not the financial competition, support

competition, but in terms of recruitment of our faculty we have suffered a great pain. And here we had to be very disciplined, because actually-- It is kind of ironic. In terms of trying to keep our faculty from raids, we have far greater success against Harvard, University of Chicago, and Yale than we do against Irvine, Santa Barbara, and San Diego. They have done more violence to us in terms of taking away faculty than out-of-state institutions. So in this area we do have a degree of sensitivity. By God, we have provided, what, three chancellors, [Dean E.] McHenry, Galbraith, [Ivan H.] Hinderaker; we have provided deans for Page Smith at Santa Cruz; etc., etc. And I think the record is clear that UCLA has provided a great deal more to these southern campuses in terms of manpower than Berkeley by a great deal. You can get these figures from Angus [E.] Taylor. But nonetheless we bite our lip and go forward. We don't feel competitive with them and we have tried to help in all possible ways.

"Do we feel any pressure from state college competition?" No.

"Has UCLA overcome its little brother feelings toward Berkeley?" I think I have discussed this.

"Does the existence of so many private institutions in the southern part of the state affect UCLA?" Not really. This is the only part, at least at the moment, that I can

think of that I would want to go off the record. Well, let me stay on the record for a minute. I think healthy competition among educational institutions is good. I think it spurs and stimulates. I think, for example in the Bay Area, it is a wonderful thing that Stanford and Berkeley are first-rate institutions. There is a mutual stimulation, like a Harvard-Yale competition. Therefore, I am delighted that we have Caltech, I am delighted that we have the Claremont group, which is a very distinguished group of mainly liberal arts, and Occidental.

Our big problem has been USC. Here I go off the record. All I say is, I don't mind this being on the tape, I don't want it written up in this way. Our big problem is that USC is the oldest and quantitatively the largest private institution in Southern California and until very recently has been qualitatively the worst. The result of this has been that they have watched UCLA grow qualitatively and quantitatively and their whole reaction has been one of envy. The insecure man looking at something overtaking him and passing him. Their attitudes, therefore, have been dog in the manger, negative and destructive rather than constructive. This is slowly changing, and I give Norman Topping the greatest credit for this. Norman has done an incredible job in raising the standards at USC. They still have a way to go, but really, in a certain way he has done a

more remarkable job than Wally [J.E. Wallace] Sterling has done at Stanford. Wally has done a tremendous job, but he started at a much higher level. He [Topping] has raised the aspirations of those people, he has raised the aspirations of the board, and he has raised enormous amounts of money. He is beginning now to acquire some first-rate scholars. And when USC reaches a level of quality, a qualitative level that begins to make it intellectually speaking in the league of Stanford and Berkeley and UCLA, this will be a great day for us. Because then there will be competition, but the competition will be onward and up rather than "Let's do something to UCLA to slow down its growth because it is getting too far beyond us." But in principle I welcome an ever stronger and ever more qualitative effort in private higher education in Southern California.

"For many years UCLA benefited from having a southern bloc of regents; does it have such a bloc now?" I don't think so. I find it rather fascinating that at regents meetings you find Bill Forbes, Ed Carter, and others showing as much interest as to what is happening in Irvine or Santa Cruz or Davis as they will at UCLA. As a matter of fact, I have even sometimes complained a little, saying, "Listen, guys, don't forget your back door." I also want to point out that when you talk about the southern bloc you are talking about regents whose interests and attitudes are

ranged all the way from, if I can use the phrase, liberalism to the unpredictability of Norton Simon to the attitude of an Ed Pauley, who has a somewhat more traditional approach and has a somewhat more conservative approach, you might say. So that I think the regents really do not break down today in geographical blocs as much as they do in philosophical blocs, and I don't think any institution either benefits or is disadvantaged by that kind of a breakdown.

STADTMAN: In your earlier remarks you said that the development of this bloc is a conscious kind of thing and it helped UCLA at one point.

MURPHY: I think you have to go back before I came, even, for that. I think there is no doubt about the fact that some of the alumni regents in earlier times, utilizing both the alumni association and their positions on the board, were fighting very, very hard proprietary battles in the board on behalf of UCLA. But this I think is no longer true.

"What is the significance for the support of UCLA of the fact that two appointed regents are former presidents of the UCLA Alumni Association? Have you found this circumstance particularly helpful?" No. Not particularly. For example, Bill Forbes, who is one of these, had daughters who went to Santa Barbara and to Berkeley, and I think he had more to say in the regents meetings about Santa

Barbara and Berkeley than he had UCLA. John Canaday and I-- and this is on the record--have had some very sharp differences about the handling of students at UCLA. He is a close friend of mine, but I am also a close friend of Ellie [Elinor R.] Heller, and Donald [H.] McLaughlin was a close friend of mine. I don't think that I can point to a single thing on this campus that is here because some regents put some unusual pressure on behalf of UCLA beyond what a regent who might know a little more about UCLA understood to be a simple equity. In other words, it was well known that Donald McLaughlin as a regent had a special interest in Berkeley, but that special interest in Berkeley in my opinion never did violence to UCLA. Donald was very fair about that.

STADTMAN: Of course, Dickson--

MURPHY: Now, this is before. Oh, before my time, there isn't any question about the fact that even survival, to say nothing about growth and professional schools establishment, depended critically upon Edward Dickson fighting the UCLA battle. I mean just fighting it like Sir Galahad, aided and supported by the alumni presidents. I am saying that in the last seven years since I have been here, I have seen very little of that, and I don't think you will see much of it. I don't think it is necessary anymore.

STADTMAN: This in a way takes care of this, but there is

the question of the historian that someone writing a history does keep in mind. That is, do the Southern California regents ever get together, ever huddle together, this kind of thing, to your knowledge?

MURPHY: No. Especially in the last five years. There used to be the tradition of people going to the regents meetings-- You see, now they are all over the place, but when they were between L.A. and Berkeley, most of the Southern California regents used to go to the northern meetings on Ed Pauley's airplane, and they had the inadvertent opportunity to huddle. But I don't see any huddles at all. For example, I see Norton Simon, who is a southern regent, participating in discussions in the hall way more with Ellie Heller and with Bill [William K.] Coblentz than I see him talk to John Canaday, and so on. I don't think this geographic thing is-- If you want to talk about the regents being somewhat divided today in camps, I don't think the geographic thing holds up anymore. I think it is accidental.

STADTMAN: Do you think it is a political thing?

MURPHY: I think it is more philosophical. I would even go beyond politics and I would say that it is more philosophical. What a university is. Freedom for students. Rights of faculty. This kind of thing.

"Do you tend to confer more with regents in Southern California than with those in Northern California?" The

answer is yes, and the main reason is because I see them so often in contexts other than the university. I am on several boards with Ed Carter, I am on several boards with Norton Simon, I am on several boards with Buff [Dorothy Buffum] Chandler. I see them very frequently socially and professionally outside the university, and inevitably university matters come up. I never call a meeting of the southern regents or anything like that.

STADTMAN: Right.

MURPHY: "How do you account for the fact that in the thirties UCLA was considered to have a more radical student body than Berkeley and that in 1967 the situation is reversed?"

STADTMAN: This is a little unfair, for you weren't here in the thirties.

MURPHY: Well, yeah. I have heard a lot about it. "Little red schoolhouse" comments, and so on. Let me say that I think--I am here kind of reaching, you know--in the 1930s UCLA was a kind of rootless institution. It didn't have any of the traditions of Stanford or Berkeley or Harvard or Princeton. It was much more like CCNY [City College of the City University of New York], just a kind of completely commuter-based academic cafeteria, a low-cost place where bright people could come who couldn't go elsewhere for financial or other reasons. Therefore, there was very

little, in a certain sense, to build morale, to get a kind of sense of unity or spirit. There wasn't even the outlet for athletics, which is an outlet for energy and enthusiasm, commitment. And I think that--plus, of course, the external stimuli of the Great Depression and so on, flirting with communism, etc.--these two factors made UCLA much like CCNY.

I think the situation to a certain extent is reversed now, was even in 1957. We had convinced the student body here and the faculty that we had a chance-- You know, my speeches in those days [were], and still are, those of a great university in the Western tradition: you can achieve the Berkeley, Stanford, Harvard, Princeton level if you want to and let's get with it and you are a long way there. These kinds of positive, sort of morale, psychological building things I think played some role. And evidence of that fact that something was happening: a great building program and so on. Whereas Berkeley had become kind of static, and what was the thrust--? I mean, athletics was going down. Berkeley had achieved a plateau, albeit a very distinguished one. But what was the elan in Berkeley to which students and large numbers in Berkeley could cling subconsciously? I don't think there was much there. We had this elan. You can call it beat Berkeley, beat Michigan, beat Harvard, etc.

This, however, does lead to numbers seventeen and

eighteen. "How did UCLA avoid being swept into a more activist response from students during the FSM?" I think there are two or three reasons for this. I have my own belief of what happened in Berkeley and some of the reasons that led to the difficulty. I think a lot of those conditions didn't prevail here. I think we had a much more sensitive staff in the dean of students office and all of the subdeans of students. They are in constant--were and are--in constant dialogue with student leadership at every level. I think my office, not only myself but my own immediate staff, have understood from the day that I arrived here that we were going to talk to students, and we have, in large numbers.

Now, from the beginning, even before FSM, we drew students, not into the decision-making process, but the dialogue leading up to the decision making. As you know, once a year--I established this when I first came--I take key members of the faculty, administration, and students to Lake Arrowhead for a weekend and we have an agenda which relates to some specific set of problems. For example, years ago, what do we do with the quarter system? How can we take advantage of that to make more germane our curriculum? We had students involved from the very beginning, graduate students and undergraduates. When we set up our ground rules on the management of political

action, where they could speak and all of these things, I had the Graduate Students Association and Undergraduate Students Association hold hearings. Any student for four days could go and express his views, and then a committee of those two student associations could put together a summary of the hearings. They analyzed them and they made recommendations to me and I discussed them with the faculty, and in the final drafting three students were involved along with three faculty and three administrators. I, of course, made the final approval. So we have had students involved in the dynamics pretty much from the beginning, and I think that may be one of the reasons.

Number eighteen I think I have answered. "Do you believe that the ties of the student body to the chancellor are stronger at UCLA than they are at Berkeley? If so, how did they get that way?" I don't know about now, because I think Chancellor Heyns has done an absolutely superb job. I think that the record is going to show that he has done one of the most remarkable educational jobs in the country when he is finally finished at Berkeley. So I suppose they are fairly close now, I would hope so. I do think, however, that students have been closer to our entire administrative apparatus here, from this office all the way down, than they were at Berkeley prior to the time that Roger came.

"You were out of the country when President Kerr was

dismissed. Would your reaction to that event have differed from that of the chancellors had you been here?" I was not out of the country when President Kerr was dismissed. You are thinking of a previous episode. I was in São Paulo, Brazil, when Clark Kerr, two years ago I think it was, announced his intention to resign along with Martin Meyerson. I got a phone call from the Oakland Tribune, which got to me at four o'clock in the morning, got me out of bed, and the Oakland Tribune fellow said, "President Kerr has announced that he is going to resign. What have you got to say about it?" Well, hell, I was half asleep and the connection all the way from Berkeley to São Paulo, Brazil, was not very good. It took me twenty minutes--it seemed twenty, perhaps five--just to understand what he was saying. I didn't know what had happened. I didn't know whether the regents had fired him or whether he had resigned or what, so all I said was "I have no comment. I will make a comment if necessary when I get back and find out what it is all about."

Well, all the other chancellors were here. Predictably they commented immediately, "It is a tragedy," etc., etc. The Chronicle [of Higher Education], for reasons that I will never know--one for which I will never excuse them--then did a story which I subsequently saw saying, "President Kerr announces his intention to resign. Eight chancellors said

terrible, don't do it; Chancellor Murphy said, 'No comment.'" Well, when I got back--it was a week or two weeks afterward--the matter was already settled by then, there was no purpose in making a comment. So I got off to a bad start on that at that time.

Now, what happened this time-- This happened at the January meeting of the board of regents. Prior to the fact that Clark Kerr had gone-- Well, in December Clark Kerr went to Hong Kong. Prior to his going--I think it was at the December meeting of the regents, or maybe the November meeting--he took me aside privately. He said, "Franklin"-- it was after the [gubernatorial] election at least--"I think I am in deep, deep trouble. What is your opinion?"

"I will have to tell you that I think you are for several reasons, " I said. "In the first place, you know, since June of 1964, I believe, you must have known that a minority but a very substantial minority of the board are opposed to your continuing as president." And this was known. "Frankly, I don't think there has been any remarkable change in the view of at least a significant percentage of that minority. Now," I said, "there is a new governor. In his campaign he has made it clear that he has been deeply critical of the management of the university, and he and the lieutenant governor--who has not been very vocal on this, but obviously there is some party regularity

here--will be new members, and then I think there will be two new ex officio or one new ex officio." I said, "Regardless of whether that becomes a large minority or a small majority, you have to honestly evaluate whether you can do this enormously difficult job, which is difficult in optimum circumstances, knowing that half of your board, more or less, has lost confidence in you. I think at some point you have to get that clarified. I just don't see how anybody, Leonardo da Vinci, can run a big complicated university system with the kind of heckling that you have had to put up with from people [who] for whatever reasons, right or wrong, seem to have lost confidence in you." I said that "This is a decision that only you can make, but I think there are other people, of course, that you should talk to: Harry [R.] Wellman, Charlie [Charles J.] Hitch, people of this sort, who I think are prepared to give you very objective, honest advice because they are fond of you."

That was the last I ever talked to him on that or on any other subject, basically because he went to Hong Kong and then came all this big flurry, you know, budgets and this and that. And there came the January meeting of the board, which was in Berkeley. I arrived at that meeting with a temperature of 102. I was at the COC [Conference of Chancellors], which was a kind of routine chancellors meeting which we hold the night before. The next day,

this-- Incidentally, I had a terrible earache, and that was what started the thing that put me in the hospital last week for the operation. I got up the next day, I went to the regents meetings. I had the obligation to report to the regents about the most recent discussions in the Commission on Constitutional Revision, of which I am a member, about Section IX, Article 9. I had made my notes and went through the third day-- That was a regents-only meeting, which I didn't attend, needless to say.

By Friday morning, I was terribly ill, so I went to Clark, who in retrospect-- You know, Clark was always rather cool and self-contained, but in retrospect I realize that he was unusually cool. And I said, "Clark, I have to go home; I just can't take it any more. My ear is throbbing. I have an appointment with my doctor to meet me at the airport and take me right to the hospital. I've got a temperature--" That morning I had a temperature of 103. I said, "You have got to make this report for me." I briefed him. He didn't say a thing to me. Not one word except, "Okay, Franklin."

I put my plane off to the last possible minute. I stayed through the morning meeting of the regents, and then the chairman of the board called for a special executive session of the regents, regents only, and I asked the president to leave. We had already planned a luncheon for the chancellors and the president and vice president to talk

about our budget problems upcoming. We all went up to that conference room on the seventh floor, and my plane was scheduled to go, I forget when, but I had a quick swipe at a couple pieces of meat or something and then I said, "I have to go and get over to the San Francisco airport and down to the hospital." I went to Clark, shook his hand, and said good-bye, a routine. He looked up at me, he said good-bye, and I said, "I will be staying in touch with you" about some problem with [Ronald W.] Reagan. (He had asked me if I could assist in getting a dialogue open with Reagan.) I said that as soon as I got well I would try and get in touch with [Philip M.] Battaglia. "And I will see you then." And he said "Okay."

I walked out, got on the plane, came home and was met at the airport, went to the hospital, where they promptly took cultures and put me on antibiotics and gave me stuff to go home and go to bed with. I went promptly to sleep--had some phenobarbital, etc.--and was awakened by my wife, who said, "By the way, Clark Kerr has been fired." That is the first that I heard of it. So that is the story.

Now, at this point I went out and turned on the television, and I got the first inkling of the semantics battle. Reagan had been interviewed when he first came down there, and he said that Clark had asked for a vote of confidence. As a matter of fact, that didn't surprise me

very much in terms of my conversation with Clark in November. In fact I would have done the same thing. I think frankly I would have done it a little differently; I would have resigned out of hand. But that is just a question of style, the principle is the same. Now I read Clark's statement in the paper the next morning that he had done no such thing. Well, at this point I was, needless to say, concerned on two points: First of all, Andy [Andrew J.] Hamilton had called me and said that the press wanted a comment. I said, "I am not going to say a damn thing until I know what this is all about." So I got ahold of some of the regents, got ahold of Mrs. Chandler, in fact the one I finally got hold of. I said, "Please tell me what happened." And then she told me, and I suddenly realized here that we had a semantic problem. You ask for a vote of confidence in so many words, or do you simply say, "I cannot do my job unless it is clear that I have the confidence of the regents, the support of the regents"? I am sure that you will be interviewing Mrs. Chandler and Mr. [Theodore R.] Meyer; they were there and they were the ones, apparently, that had the conversation.

I then called Clark to try to tell him how sorry I was this turned out this way. Nobody answered the phone. I couldn't get through, just a constant busy signal. So I tried the next day and I tried for two days, and I finally

called Harry [R.] Wellman and he said, "I don't think Clark will take your call; he isn't talking to anybody." He had gone off to his ranch, or something. I wrote him a letter, a personal letter in my own hand, telling him how sorry I was, how tragic I felt the whole episode was--like a Russian novel--starting two and a half years ago.

That was when I began to make some statements. I made statement number one, that I thought it was a great loss to the university. I made statement number two, saying that I thought that the people who would suffer the most were the ones that either deliberately or inadvertently were responsible for it, namely those who created the riots, those members of the faculty at Berkeley who out of some kind of sense of frustration or naiveté fanned the flames. Because they represented the liberal element of the university, and nobody had protected freedom and the right of individuality within the university better than the man that they had helped destroy. Thirdly, I think I said--and I believe it--that although Clark Kerr and I had profound disagreements concerning decentralization and concerning internal management, nobody had more respect than I for his overall philosophy about the meaning of a university, what it was supposed to do, rights of students, faculty, freedom. Nobody was in fuller agreement with him than I, and that I thought the record, once the dust had settled, would show

that Kerr had been one of the really outstanding presidents in the history of the system.

Any further statements that I made (they weren't statements really) had to do with an attempt to clarify--which I finally realized was none of my business and so I stopped talking about it--the question of who was really responsible. Did the regents fire Kerr or did Kerr ask the regents to do something to guarantee that he would be fired? This kind of chicken-or-the-egg kind of thing. My position here was an attempt to prevent further erosion of the public image of the regents, because in the long run, I believe the University of California or the University of California system--however you wish to describe it these days--will depend more than anything else on the constitutional authority of the regents. I don't believe they will retain that constitutional authority unless they retain the confidence of the people in the state of California. So in terms of the objective, non-ad hominem issue, I have done my level best in the last several months to try to build up the confidence of the public in the regents. That is a very complicated, long answer to a simple question.

STADTMAN: It is a good answer.

MURPHY: "I am told that you would favor reorganizing the university into a regional system. Is that so? If so, why?" That is not so. Let me make my position about the

governance of the university very clear. I believe that there should be one board of regents for the system. I believe the board should have full constitutional independence and authority. I believe that there is a possibility of reshaping the board, but I think that is unimportant, basically, whether the terms are sixteen years or twelve years, whether there is ex officio or not ex officio. There should be one board with full constitutional authority. I believe that there should be one president with a staff. I believe that that office should primarily be a planning, policy-making office, a planning, policy-making, budget-making, postaudit analytical office, serving the regents and serving the system. I believe that that office and only that office should be in contact with the legislature and with the governor and with the Coordinating Council on Higher Education. I believe that once budgets are agreed to and money is distributed, there should be maximum local authority to spend that money, transfer money in and out of budget lines, etc., and there should be maximum decentralization of operations within the policy and within the budget that has been made and with a full recognition that there will be a post-audit. And if a fellow can't do the job, he goes out, but you don't tell him how do it, the chancellor I mean.

Now, I believe that the regents must organize

themselves, however, in a way to make themselves much more familiar with each of the campuses. Let me be specific. If Roger Heyns were president of the University of Michigan, he would be meeting with his board at Ann Arbor to talk about Ann Arbor once every month. Berkeley is more complicated than Ann Arbor. Roger Heyns meets with the regents in a once-removed relationship and in a relationship where he is in direct dialogue with the regents about Berkeley's problems at best thirty minutes a months, the same with me, and this is nonsense, just nonsense. The regents don't really know what is going on on the campuses, in the subtle in-between nuances. How do you start a dialogue with the regents about a little cloud that I see on the horizon at UCLA that a year from now could lead to a crisis, do it confidentially and carefully and analytically, so that when you make the final decision you make it with the sense of the problem rather than just off the top of your head, the way the regents make their decisions these days about so many things?

I hope that somehow in this organization you could create a pattern-- I will give you one example, and this is merely an example. The regents could break themselves down into groups of, let us say, three--two or three. Each of them for a period of no longer than three years would be that subcommittee, the subcommittee of Berkeley, the

subcommittee of UCLA, the subcommittee of Riverside. Now, they would shift every three years so that no one over the time could have a proprietary interest in any one campus. The regents would then appoint from the local region, let us take UCLA, to the subcommittee of UCLA six distinguished citizens of Los Angeles. Now, the regents' official meetings where they [conduct] de jure business at the university would be every other month. Every other month the regents would meet somewhere and deal with the things that they deal with now. Every other month the two or three regents on the subcommittee with the seven other people would meet on the Berkeley campus or the UCLA campus for two days, and here the chancellor or the president or the vice presidents, or however you want it, would talk about their specific problems. Then when they came together on the every other month basis, as specific proposals came in to the regents there would not only be the statewide administration, the campus administration, but at least two or three regents who were thoroughly familiar with this problem, or whatever the issues. Now, the campus committee would have no legal authority, but it would be of such a distinguished type that what the chairman of the board of the Bank of America, the chairman of Lockheed, the head of AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations], the editor of the Los Angeles Times-- What

they had to say obviously would have tremendous influence, and this would be input. And, furthermore, it would be a tremendous public relations thing. You draw in the life of the university to the leadership of the state of California, that now is kept out to a certain sense. Now, there are some problems, I recognize. But let me point out that if a regent over a period of sixteen years-- Say three or four years-- Let's use four years. At the end of sixteen years he would at least be intimately familiar with four campuses of the university. Today, few regents are intimately familiar with any campuses.

STADTMAN: And because of certain similarities of campus problems, their acquaintance would be even deeper still.

MURPHY: Yes, sir. But if you call that a regional system, then okay, but it is by no means splitting the university up.

STADTMAN: What I had reference to was something like the Texas plan.

MURPHY: No. The furthest I would be willing to go is the thing that I just described, or some counterpart to it.

"What do you believe are the most important achievements of your chancellorship?" I have said something about that.

"Chancellors tend to react alike to questions of university decentralization?" They do these days.

STADTMAN: Do you think this is due largely to what has happened since 1961?

MURPHY: I believe so. That is a prejudiced answer, but I believe so. At least I can tell you that there was by no means-- Well, to be quite honest with you, when we started to talk about this in 1960, it isn't that chancellors spoke against it; they just didn't open their mouths.

STADTMAN: Tell me this. About the time of his dismissal, wasn't it true that President Kerr had gone just about as far as anybody had asked him to go in decentralization? Except in terms--I understand there were semantic problems-- of the language of it. Aside from that--

MURPHY: Yes, I think it is fair to say that there is very little decentralization left to be done. There are some nuts and bolts still to be dealt with, but there is very little decentralization left, proper decentralization left, after last January.

STADTMAN: Isn't one of the things that we have to be careful of in the next six months or a year, with a new president coming on, is the regents really assuming by necessity a large share of the responsibility of administration of the university? Of this battle losing some ground?

MURPHY: Yes, sir, very definitely, and I think any man coming in would be well advised to get thoroughly briefed

before he accepted the job and make some written conditions just on this point. I think if we lag back and go back to these old days when regents were tampering and trying to evaluate \$300 transfers and all this nonsense, it would be a tragedy for the university. I personally will fight the regents as hard as any president, or anybody else, to prevent this from happening, because I have been in this job long enough to know that if there is any backing up on the decentralization thing, I can't do the job. You were willing to stay even though it was tough when you could see a ray of hope--I mean that the movement was positive--but when you see retrogression when it isn't even fully completed yet, then this would be a very negative thing. I don't think fellows like Heyns or Galbraith or myself would stay under those circumstances.

STADTMAN: If you have a two o'clock appointment--

MURPHY: "What would you consider to be the essence of the 1967 spirit of UCLA?" Well, that we are on the go, that the distinguished university in worldwide terms is not a cliché but is possible of achievement, and we are closer to it than we realized. There is, I think, a sense of vitality, a sense of pride, growing pride, and a sense of self-confidence.

"How would you like to have it regarded by the people of the state?" As a distinguished university that is

contributing to an important part of the life of the state.

"By the rest of the university system?" I would like to have it thought of as, well, as a distinguished university.

Are there any other questions?

STADTMAN: There is only one question: You are on the record publicly as saying that you are not interested in the presidency?

MURPHY: That is correct.

STADTMAN: There is a general concern now that this position is going to be eroded. Do you sense that this is a probability?

MURPHY: I think anybody who takes the job on the theory that he is taking a classical university presidency is going to be disappointed, because it can never be that. You see, this is no longer a university as Harvard is a university. This is a unique, unprecedented system of higher education really made up of nine universities, one day twelve. The president of the University of California has, therefore, got to be quite as unprecedented as the system itself if the two are to match. Now, I think what one is talking about is a man who does not bear the relationship that Nathan Pusey bears to Harvard, but more a man who bears the relationship that the minister of higher education of West Germany bears to the universities of West Germany. It is a ministerial

job rather than an administrative job. Policy-making, budget-making, analytical, planning, etc.

STADTMAN: How about statesmanship?

MURPHY: Above everything else statesmanship. Communicating the importance and consequences of a great system of public higher education to the people of the state. It may be the most important statesman education job in America, because the way the University of California has gone from a single-campus university to a system of higher education is the way many others have got to go as well, so it really has great consequences for the whole country. Now, this means that the job is quite as exciting in its way as it used to be when Benjamin Ide Wheeler was there--maybe much more exciting--but it has to be a job that is accepted in terms of what the job is. Now, my position is clear: I am in higher education because I like the interplay of the human relationship. I am not an office fellow basically; I like to deal with students, with faculty, to take little things, start them and watch them grow, like a program of African studies. My interest in higher education is the campus relationship. The job in Berkeley is a corporate statesman job, like going into the president's cabinet, as it were. It is in the office, and this does not appeal to me. If I were wanting to take a corporate job I would go into industry, I would suspect, because this fascinates me, too,

for other reasons. It is not, therefore, that I think it is a bad job; it is just that I am a round peg and it is a square hole.

STADTMAN: I get it.

MURPHY: And may I say frankly, since this is only for the archives, I have not only stated my disinterest in the presidency publicly, but I am now prepared to say, since the Chronicle wrote about it, that early on I wrote a firm letter to the committee of the regents seeking a new president saying that if I were on the list, I would hope they would take me off, because I could conceive of no circumstances in which I felt I could accept the appointment if offered.

STADTMAN: Not in any context of vision of weakness--

MURPHY: On the contrary, I have said that they should strengthen and build the image of this role by all possible means.

